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3Abstract
This research primarily examines the trends of changing characteristics of corporate 
boards within New Zealand listed firms. Expressing in a quantitative framework, this 
research provides an insight of how board compositions have changed over the past 
decade,  within  which  two  major  corporate  governance  legislative  reforms  have 
occurred. These two reforms are known as the Companies Act in 1993 and the New 
Zealand Corporate Governance Best Practice Code in 2003.
This study aims to cover a full range of board characteristics mentioned in previous 
related  literatures  in  order  to  give  a  more  complete  view.  Sixteen  variables  are 
selected and examined: board size, board independence, multiple directorships, CEO 
compensation, chair and director fees, CEO duality, gender diversity, staggered board, 
directors'  ownership,  director  tenure,  directors'  experience,  committee  existence, 
committee  independence,  CEO  involvement  on  board  committees,  board  and 
committee Meetings, directors' educational and industrial background.
Within the above variables, board size, board independence and CEO duality receives 
the  most  attention  from  New  Zealand  investors  and  regulators.  Tendencies  of 
movements  regarding  these  characteristics  appear  to  collaborate  with  public 
expectations. Board size has decreased while independence has increased throughout 
the periods examined. CEO duality phenomenon sharply reduced during the periods 
after 2003 legislative reform. Committee independence has also grown according to 
the public recognition, especially for audit committees. CEO involvements on board 
committees are less than before. Boards within New Zealand listed firms desire more 
diversification of both gender and backgrounds of directors. These findings fill the 
4gap of the evolution of corporate boards’ characteristics of New Zealand listed firms 
over the past decade.  
Keywords: Board characteristics, Corporate governance, New Zealand listed firms, 
Descriptive study  
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7Introduction 
There has been extensive acknowledgment and empirical verification that corporate 
governance provisions can play a key role in affecting shareholder wealth and firm 
value.  A  good  corporate  governance  structure  can  obviously  assist  in  a  firm’s 
sustainability  and growth.  Within  the  broad construction  of  corporate  governance, 
there has been growing awareness by academic researchers of the need to examine the 
structure of boards of directors of corporations. As indicated by numerous researchers, 
an  efficient  structure  facilitates  effective  decision  making  by  directors  and  helps 
improve the performance of the service, control and strategy roles (Fama, 1980, Fama 
and Jensen, 1983, Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
8Jane Diplock, Chairman of the Securities Commission of New Zealand, said in her 
2003 annual speech that good corporate governance is a positive contributor to the 
growth and prosperity of business. Good governance undoubtedly requires a board of 
directors that is genuinely effective in the role, i.e., one that can properly discharge its 
responsibilities for directing the entity and overseeing management. Therefore, it is 
important  and interesting  for an investor  to  study the characteristics  of  the firm’s 
board before investment decision-making.
The  well-known  and  shocking  corporate  scandals  such  as  Enron  and  WorldCom 
signaled the need for better corporate governance worldwide and the US authorities 
have  since  been  prompted  to  establish  significant  corporate  governance  reforms, 
particularly  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  (SOX)  of  2002  and  the  NYSE  Governance 
Reforms. The same also happened in the UK and Australia.  Both the international 
implications  (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  and the  UK Cadbury Code) and subsequent 
local awareness of high standard corporate governance regulations finally triggered 
the official resolution and adoption of similar corporate governance practice codes in 
New Zealand in 2003, known as the Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance 
in New Zealand (hereafter “the Code”). This code was incorporated into the Listing 
Rules of NZX in the same year. The updated provisions in the Code approved the 
proposals from the Institute of Directors with reference to board independence and 
separation between CEO and chair. Specifically, corporate boards within listed firms 
are required by the new listing rules to have at least three independent members or a 
third  of  the  total  number  of  directors  must  be  independent.  The  CEO  and  the 
Chairperson  of  the  Board  must  be  separate  individuals.  With  regard  to  the 
9committees,  an  Audit  Committee  is  mandatory  with  the  required  level  of 
independence as well. Many other board features deemed to be good factors for better 
corporate governance are discussed and recommended in the Corporate Governance 
in  New  Zealand  –  Principles  and  Guidelines.  This  booklet  contains  principles 
developed by the Securities Commission for high standards of corporate governance 
system and summaries of opinions from the listed member firms who were consulted. 
In this study, the primary goal is to identify those board characteristics deemed to be 
important elements for better corporate governance within the Code, Principles and 
Guidelines  as  well  as those that  have received  a  large amount  of examination  by 
academic scholars. These board characteristics are arguably the influential drivers for 
improving a company’s corporate governance structure and hence firm performance. 
Therefore, the objective of this research is to examine how these board characteristics 
are structured and have evolved within NZ listed firms from 1995 to 2007, and to 
what  extent  these  features  have  changed  during  this  period.  From this,  it  can  be 
speculated  whether  arguably  NZ  listed  firms  generally  have  the  characteristics 
necessary for good governance. 
The  social  awareness  of  the  importance  of  good  corporate  governance  leads  to 
academic researchers examining the influences of various NZ board characteristics on 
firm performance. While there have been studies of assorted aspects of NZ corporate 
governance,  the  literature  lacks  an  all-encompassing  study  of  the  stylised  facts, 
especially  since  the  publication  of  the  Companies  Act  in  1993.  Therefore,  the 
contribution of this study is to fill such a gap by reporting a comprehensive set of 
characteristics  that  relate  to  good  governance.  In  addition,  the  aforementioned 
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legislative  reform  will  presumably  have  impacts  on  firms’  decisions  on  board 
structures. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine board characteristics prior to 
and after the reforms, i.e. to what extent board characteristics have changed around 
the new legislation. In a nutshell,  this study allows entrepreneurs to sense whether 
their firms are running at an appropriate level and if they are market-oriented.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the completed 
literature  on boards’ roles and the empirical  findings. Section 3 describes the data 
source,  examination  periods,  selection and definition of variables,  and the method 
employed. Results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 gives concluding remarks 
and possible future research direction. 
2 Literature Review
2.1 Role of the Board
Corporate governance is a broad framework dealing with mechanisms facilitating the 
firm’s owners (principals),  who provide resources and capital,  to protect  their own 
welfare by exerting control over corporate insiders and management (agents), who 
make major decisions for the firm. Owing to the wide dispersion of common stock 
ownership preventing shareholders’  collective justification  on resources utilization, 
shareholders possess little or no direct  control over management decisions. Such a 
phenomenon is  called  the separation of ownership and control  (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). However, with differentiated responsibilities and pay-off structures for both 
principals and agents, conflicts between these two parties are likely to arise, namely 
agency problems. For instance, a modern large corporation is commonly owned by a 
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large  number  of  shareholders  with diffused ownership.  Managers  who control  the 
actual operation of the corporation may typically lack a majority of, or not even own 
stock  ownership  positions.  This  would  then  create  managerialism,  meaning  that 
managers purposely make decisions that are at the expense of the principals in order 
to secure their job positions and expand their reputations. 
To overcome such agency conflicts, the formation of a board of directors has long 
been recognised by both institutional investors and empirical researchers (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983, Williamson, 1983) as the important mechanism to address the issues. 
The authors defined a board of directors as the entity which “has the power to hire, 
fire,  and  compensate  the  top-level  decision  managers  and  to  ratify  and  monitor 
important decisions… [and]… helps to ensure separation of decision management and 
control even at the top of the organization”. This characterization of a board is still 
maintained after two decades. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argued that a board of 
directors exists as the equilibrium contractual solution for ameliorating some agency 
problems which plague any corporation. Owing to the fact that shareholders neither 
have  director  control  over  management  nor  have  large  enough  shareholdings  to 
determine appropriate compensation for managers as their motivation,  shareholders 
need to have helpers who are outside shareholders and have sufficient incentive to 
tackle the problems. These helpers are known as the board of directors, hence are the 
reason for board’s existence.       
The core duty of a board is to protect shareholders’ assets and to ensure investment 
returns. Agency theorists define the primary duty of the board as providing continuity 
for the organization through both resources provision and governing. As it is central 
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to corporate governance mechanisms in market economies, the board is viewed as the 
chief means shareholders use to control management, and to align managers towards 
the  interests  of  shareholders.  In  other  words,  a  board  of  directors  serves  as  the 
problem-solving  interface  between  a  particular  set  of  manager-shareholder 
interactions to economize on the transaction costs in between (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985).  It  has  a  mediating  function  in  conflicts  of  interest  without  fracturing  the 
contractual relationships. 
Moreover,  the law and economics  literature  suggest that  directors  have usefulness 
beyond pure governance purposes (Mace, 1972, Burt,  1980). Baysinger and Butler 
(1985)  further  expressed that  directors  accumulate  valuable  qualities  of  judgment, 
maturity,  and  leadership  through  occupational  experiences,  which  allow  them  to 
contribute  to  board  decisions  more  effectively.  As  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983) 
documented,  economists  emphasize  that  an  optimally  constituted  board  should 
comprise  a mixture of insiders and outsiders. As described by Byrd and Hickman 
(1992),  inside  directors  are  experts  who  can  contribute  valuable  inputs  for  firm-
specific business. Inside directors are usually corporate officers or who have family 
ties.  Outside  directors,  on  the  other  hand,  are  those  bringing  both  expertise  and 
resources from various aspects, and more importantly,  objectivity in evaluating the 
management’s  decisions.  Such resources  possessed  by individual  outside  directors 
may well be their social ties with other organizations as the competitive forces for the 
firm to defeat  their  competitors  (Schoorman,  Bazerman and Atkin,  1981).  On the 
question of  whether  having  inside  directors  on a  board would lead  to  managerial 
entrenchment, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) reported the fact that the advantages of 
having  inside  directors  as  board  members  outweigh  the  disadvantages  from 
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managerialism when interests  are  closely  aligned  between  managerial  and  outside 
shareholders.
Theoretically, boards of directors should always be on the shareholders’ side, helping 
them  to  monitor  managers  and  prevent  managerial  abuse  of  capital.  However, 
academic researchers found that the theory of directors always being shareholders’ 
protectors was sometimes not true in reality. Herman (1981) and Mace (1986) pointed 
out that substantial power to appoint and fire directors still falls on the management’s 
shoulders.  This  means  board  membership  can  be  endogenously  determined,  i.e., 
management  can  appoint  candidates  who  are  their  people  on  to  a  board.  Wather 
(1998) documented that a board of directors is an independent entity which aligns 
neither with shareholders nor management. It is an active player in the same way as 
shareholders  and  management.  Warther  proposes  that  the  board’s  function  is  no 
longer as simple as protecting shareholders against managers but is also affected by 
the complex dynamic within the board. That is, boards can be either docile or critical, 
depending  on  who  owns  more  power  within  the  board,  the  shareholders  or  the 
managers. Further, an individual director may be reluctant to voice a critical opinion 
to management but more often will wait for others’ support in order to maintain their 
position. This means the board members sway between the extremes of passivity and 
action  rather  than  being  a  society  for  open  discussion,  in  order  to  secure  their 
positions.
  
In a nutshell, decisions made by the board of directors are influenced by forces from 
both managers and shareholders.  It depends on which side has sufficient power to 
shift the position back to its own side. Therefore, the board’s composition is a critical 
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factor  in  influencing  and  determining  the  board’s  decisions.  One  of  the  most 
prominent  changes  to  the  recent  corporate  governance  system  is  to  add  board 
independence.  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983)  strongly  advocated  the  presence  of 
independent directors as a majority of board members as independent directors are not 
subject to the classical agency problems, which can be detrimental to shareholders’ 
wealth. Apart from board independence, corporate governance scholars and empirical 
researchers also advocate the independence of board subcommittees (Abbott,  2000, 
Klein, 2002, Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal 2009), the reason generally 
being that these committees are more specialized in solving assigned tasks. Similarly, 
many other  board characteristics  have been examined and used as mechanisms  to 
promote  board  effectiveness,  such  as  board  size,  share  ownership  of  each  party, 
whether  the  CEO  sits  on  board  subcommittees,  and  so  forth.  Thereby,  board 
composition  and  board  characteristics  are  both  significantly  vital  components  in 
determining the effectiveness of corporate governance inside a firm and should be 
highly regarded. The revolution of these components should also be of great interest 
to  economic  scholars  and  institutional  investors.  Subsequently,  Section  2.2  will 
introduce empirical investigation into hotly-debated board characteristics.
2.2   Prior studies for board characteristics
This section outlines some of the prior literatures examining the board characteristics 
that have received most attention (or interest) from academic scholars. These studies 
are  categorized  into  board-specific  and  director-specific  groups  for  better 
comprehension in Table 1. This table shows how important and hotly-debated these 
chosen variables are. Arguments, opinions and findings from these prior studies are 
specifically  presented  in  section  4.  However,  this  section  presents  a  summarized 
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version of contents of these articles for the purpose to give a more complete picture of 
what is demonstrated later in section 4. 
Firstly, variables for investigation are classified into two broad groups, either board-
specific  or  director-specific.  The  board-specific  category  covers  variables  that 
describe  board  characteristics  such  as  board  size  while  the  director-wise  category 
pinpoints  features  of  directors  such  as  compensation  to  directors.  Subsequently, 
board-specific  variables  are  further distinguished between “board as a  whole” and 
“board  committees”  while  director-specific  are  “given  by  board”  and  “bring  to 
board”.  “Board as a whole” subcategory isolates  variables  that  describe the board 
generally  such  as  gender  diversity  while  variables  fall  into  “board  committees” 
subcategory  are  specifically  committee-related.  “Given  by  board”  subcategory 
contains director-specific  variables with characteristics  given by the board such as 
director fees while “bring to board” are those qualifications brought by directors to the 
board such as director experience. The following subsections specifically summarize 
main points of prior articles quoted in this paper regarding these categories.  
2.2.1 Regarding Board
2.2.1.1 Board as a whole
2.2.1.1.1 Board Independence
Directors, in general, are charged with looking over management’s shoulder to ensure 
the company is being run in a proper and lawful manner. Boards of directors have 
several  key tasks to  perform for the firm:  decision  making for CEO replacement, 
response to a takeover bid, assessment for acquiring another company, strategy for 
takeover  defences,  evaluation  for  executive  compensation,  diversification  and 
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research  and  development  among  others  (Bhagat  and  Black,  1999).  Independent 
directors are board members who are neither employed by nor affiliated to the firm, 
i.e., they do not have financial ties with the firm that can lead to conflicts with their 
shareholders. Owing to the conflict of interest between shareholders and management, 
it  has been proposed that  inside directors  can compromise  their  impartiality  when 
benefits are involved (Sheppard, 1994). In contrast,  Fama and Jensen (1983) argued 
that  independent  directors could  serve  as  a  corporate  governance  mechanism  by 
increasing the effectiveness of board oversight.  They argue that independent directors 
are  more  efficient  in  monitoring  management  and  will  not  collude  with  it. 
Consequently, under the separation of ownership and control, independent directors 
facilitate the governance functions of the board.
In New Zealand, there has not been a mandatory ratio of independent directors on 
board by law until the release of new NZX listing rules incorporating the proposed 
requirement  regarding  board  independence  in  the  NZ  Corporate  Governance 
Principles and Guidelines in 2003. Before then, the level of independence for board 
members was just determined in accordance with the constitution of the company. 
However, the series of corporate scandals and international legislative reforms greatly 
influenced NZ corporate governance legislation. In 2003, after consultation with listed 
issuers and other interested parties, the NZX released its new corporate governance 
regime. This regime is in the form of a Corporate Governance Best Practice Code and 
a  number  of  governance-focused  amendments  to  the  NZX  Listing  Rules.  The 
Corporate Governance Best Practice Code and amendments incorporating corporate 
governance  regulation  into  the  New Zealand  Exchange Listing  Rules  entered  into 
force in 2004, in which the ratio of independent directors on a board was mandatory at 
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33.33% minimum.1
Many studies have investigated the relationship between the presence of independent 
directors  and  various  measures  of  firm  performance,  with  mixed  results.  Uzun, 
Szewczyk and Varma (2004) found a negative association between the likelihood of 
corporate fraud and the degree of independence on a board. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) 
reported  similar  results  to  Uzun  et  al.  with  regard  to  the  notion  that  board 
independence serves as an effective mechanism for aligning a firm’s objectives with 
shareholders’ interests. Beasley (1996) also showed that the likelihood of financial 
statement  fraud is  reduced by the existence  of  independent  directors  and an audit 
committee. Further, in firms with an entrenched CEO or a CEO who also chairs, a 
high percentage of inside directors are reluctant to either raise equity-based incentives 
for  their  CEOs or  replace  cash  with  equity.  Australian  firms  also  present  similar 
phenomena of enhanced firm performance by having independent boards within the 
firms; the reason for this is that the level of specialist knowledge and skills brought by 
these independent directors to the firm can provide effective decision-making (Bonn, 
2004). Hossain, Prevost and Rao (2001) reported the same independent board effect 
using NZ data. However, they did not find any influences from the Companies and 
Financial  Reporting  Acts  1993  on  the  board  independence  and  firm performance 
relationship.
However, there has also been numerous research proposing arguments that oppose the 
presence of outside directors on boards. According to Zahra and Pearce II (1989), the 
insufficient time and expertise possessed by outsiders prevent them from performing 
effectively.  They  further  proposed  that  outsiders  may  not  be  able  to  completely 
1 See NZSX rules 3.3.1 (c) for details.
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comprehend  the  complexities  incorporated  in  the  company  and  thus  ineffectively 
monitor and control its operation. Studies also report a negative relationship between 
board  independence  and  Tobin’s  q (Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  1996,  Barnhart  and 
Rosentein, 1998). Bhagat et al. (1999) showed a lower level of profitability possessed 
by firms with supermajority-independent boards. They suggested that firms ought to 
have a moderate level of insider director presence on board. Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2003) advocated for more insider presence on boards for R&D-intensive firms owing 
to the level of firm-specific knowledge provided by insiders.
In all likelihood, a globally-optimal mixture of inside directors and outsider directors 
is unlikely to exist. Instead, the optimal mix depends on the individual condition of 
the firm (Fama, 1980 and Fama and Jensen, 1983). Fama and Jensen proposed that a 
majority  of inside  directors  should serve on the board when the firm needs  more 
specialty expertise for decision-making, while a more independent board should be 
employed for firms with a higher probability of collusion among managers. 
The  extensive  debates  regarding  director  independence  and  a  series  of  global 
legislative  reforms  requiring  minimum  board  independence  reveal  the  fact  that 
director independence is an important factor for firm performance and therefore its 
evolution in NZ firms would be of great interest.
2.2.1.1.2 Board Size
Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and others 
have suggested that board size can have an important  effect  on firm performance. 
When  all  else  is  equal,  bigger  boards  can  result  in  impaired  communication  and 
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coordination  between  directors,  free-rider  problems,  a  lack  of  cohesiveness,  less 
candid discussion of managerial  performance,  and greater  control  by the CEO. In 
short, board function risks becoming symbolic when board size becomes too large. By 
contrast, smaller boards permit better monitoring of management and impose fewer 
costs on shareholders.  Many studies that examine the relationship between board size 
and firm performance find evidence for this view, across a wide range of markets and 
countries. Yermack (1996) found a negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance for large US firms, as did Eisenberg,  Sundgren and Wells (1998) for 
small Finnish firms, and  Mak and Kusndadi (2005) for Singaporean and Malaysian 
firms. 
Not  all  researchers  agree  that  smaller  boards  are  necessarily  better.  For  example, 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2003) argued that more complex firms, such as diversified 
conglomerates, and firms that rely heavily on debt financing, would require a large 
board in order to obtain the necessary range of skills. 
Clearly,  there  is  not  yet  any  broad  consensus  on  the  optimal  size  of  boards. 
Nevertheless, there are both theoretical and evidential reasons to believe that board 
size matters for firm performance, even if the exact mechanism by which it does so is 
unclear, and so the evolution through time of NZ board sizes is of obvious interest.
2.2.1.1.3 CEO Duality
CEO duality refers to the situation in which the CEO of the firm is also the chairman 
of the board of directors. Based on the agency theory, CEO duality is hostile to the 
firm’s value owing to the insufficiency and incapability of impartial monitoring and 
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control  by  the  board.  As  noted  by  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983),  CEO  chairmanship 
“signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision control, and 
in  our theory,  the organization  suffers  in the  competition  for  survival”.  After  this 
argument,  a  series  of  articles  were  published  in  Fortune discussing  the  issues 
regarding  CEO  duality.  Fromson  (1990)  concluded  that  the  suggestions  of  these 
articles were that fund managers are willing to see an outside director be chairman 
rather than the CEO, who is not trusted to put shareholders’ interests ahead of his 
own.   
In  contrast,  the  stewardship  theory,  which  emphasizes  a  broader  range  of  CEO 
motivations  than  solely  self-interest,  advocates  for  the  CEO  duality  phenomenon 
because of the unity of command it presents. Muth and Donaldson (1998) showed 
obvious support  for the Stewardship theory,  finding a  positive  effect  from having 
CEO chairmanship on firm performance. The reason is that the empowerment of the 
CEO  stimulates  them to  provide  responsible  leadership,  strategy  formulation  and 
implementation. Peng, Zhang and Li (2007) showed great support for the stewardship 
theory for the duality/performance relationship within Chinese companies as well.
The  extensive  existing  literature  regarding  the  CEO  duality/firm  performance 
relationship is inconclusive. Iyengar and Zampelli (2009) have pointed out that CEO 
duality is not related to the marginal performance. Lam and Lee (2008) declared that 
CEO duality fits in a family firm while separation between these two roles provides 
superior results for a non-family firm. Consistently, Faleye (2007) has suggested that 
firm characteristics  should determine  the form of leadership structure used,  which 
would provide the best-fit balance of costs and benefits.
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2.2.1.1.4 Gender Diversity
Increasing  attention  has  been  generated  on  the  effects  of  having  female  workers 
employed within the top management team on the organizational performance. The 
underlying  perception  is  the  unique  value  brought  by  female  directors  from their 
perspectives, experiences and work styles to the corporation (Daily and Dalton, 2003). 
Daily and Dalton argued that it would be advantageous to add female board members 
owing to their inputs for wider customer needs and interests. That is, having female 
directors on the board would allow opinions and insights representing the other half of 
the population. In this way, board decisions could be made in a more comprehensive 
way. Further, a prerequisite of a high level of education (at least a university degree) 
is  normally required for a female to be employed within a top management  team 
(Smith, Smith, and Verner, 2006). Various high standard prerequisites for a female 
presence on boards indicate the high profile possessed by current female directors.  
Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) contributed to the literature by demonstrating a 
positive relationship between a female presence on a board or top management team 
and a firm’s value. Carter et al. further indicated a favourable effect on the firm’s 
value from having minorities, such as African Americans, Asians and Hispanics on 
the  board.  Additionally,  a  positive  relationship  between  the  size  of  the  female 
proportion on the board and the size of the firm and a negative association between 
the proportions of insiders on the board and the female presence are identified. More 
specific to the governance standpoint, Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2009) suggested 
that female quotas on boards are helpful in monitoring a firm with weak governance, 
indicating  female  directors  tend  to  provide  stronger  supervision  for  the  top 
22
management than male directors. It would then be logical to say that firm value can be 
improved  through  better  governance  and  thus  there  is  less  possibility  of 
managerialism. 
Siciliano  (1996)  has  examined  the association  between a  variety  of  diverse board 
members  and  different  types  of  firm performance,  which  are  social  performance, 
fundraising results,  and operating  performance.  Regarding  the  gender  diversity  on 
board, the author’s finding is inconsistent with studies showing enhanced operating 
performance by employing female board members.  The fundraising results are not 
positive  on  having  female  board  members.  However,  a  higher  level  of  social 
performance can be achieved through the female presence on the board. Francoeur, 
Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagne (2008) examined the effect of female board presence 
on firm performance using Canadian data and found insignificant results. Rather, they 
found having female officers assisted good firm performance, not female directors.   
From prior studies regarding female board membership, it  is obvious that they can 
have  extensive  influences  on  the  board’s  decisions.  The  supportive  and  contrary 
conclusions  and the endogeneity  problems making this  an even more  complicated 
topic further justify the importance of investigation into gender diversity on boards.
2.2.1.1.5 Board and Committees Meetings
Board meetings  are  held  for  the board members  to  make  strategic  decisions  with 
regard to the future direction of a company. These meetings are usually held publicly 
and regularly and only the board members can attend. Votes on company decisions 
will be presented by members in the meeting and there must normally be a quorum in 
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order for the meeting to be considered legal. As speculated by Brick and Chidambaran 
(2010),  board  meeting  frequency  would  increase  as  investment  activities  such  as 
mergers or acquisitions increase. Similarly, as one of the board functions is to provide 
strategic  advice  to  management,  the  authors  expect  increased  board  meetings  as 
investment opportunities grow. 
Conger,  Finegold  and  Lawler  III  (1998)  suggested  that  effectiveness  of  board 
performance can be improved through board meetings. Arguably, a board meeting is a 
venue for directors to communicate ideas and exchange values, given that nowadays 
directors  with  multiple  board  appointments  can  be  too  busy  to  efficiently 
communicate with others (Jiraporn, Davidson III., DaDalt and Ning, 2009). A similar 
implication of these articles is that directors need to attend meetings to improve their 
performance in accordance with shareholders’ interests. Additionally, having regular 
meetings could be a mechanism for directors to insulate themselves from litigation 
risk when the firm performs  poorly,  that  is,  to  acknowledge to  shareholders  their 
commitment to the firm (Brick and Chidambaran, 2008). 
Opposing views for frequent board meetings exist as well. Vafeas (1999) argued that 
the  limited  time  for  a  board  meeting  is  hardly  useful  for  directors  to  effectively 
exchange thoughts and especially when the meeting agenda is always set by the CEO. 
In fact, Jensen (1993) advocated that boards be relatively inactive and pointed out that 
boards in badly-performing firms are usually forced to remain at a higher level of 
activity. Brick et al. (2010) correspondingly suggested that increased board meetings 
are simply in compliance with regulation or from fear that shareholder litigation will 
damage firm values as both directors and managements are interrupted from focusing 
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on running firms. 
The study of Vafeas (1999) is probably the earliest investigation of board activity, 
measured  by board meeting  frequency,  in relation  to  firm value.  Vafeas found an 
inverse  relation  between  board  meeting  frequency  and  prior  firm  performance, 
suggesting  that  firms  with  prior  poor  performance  may  require  better  monitoring 
through having more frequent meetings, that is, to be seen as being more engaged. 
Further,  firms  with  prior  poor  performance  improve  strongly  in  the  year  of  an 
abnormally  high  board  meeting  frequency.  This  improvement  in  operating 
performance is even superior when accumulated over the subsequent two and three 
years.
2.2.1.1.6 Staggered Board
A staggered board of directors is a practice allowing the corporation to only elect a 
portion of the directors on the board each year instead of all at a time. Directors are 
classified into a specified class, i.e. Class I, Class II, etc. This practice is famously 
known  as  the  powerful  antitakeover  defence  for  the  corporations.  According  to 
Bebchuk, Coates IV and Subramanian (2002), staggered boards have the effect  of 
protection for boards from hostile takeover through forcing the hostile bidder to wait 
at  least  one  year  to  dominate  the  board,  and  to  win  more  than  one  election  at 
successive shareholder meetings in order to exercise control of the firm. In addition to 
this  increased  power  in  the  negotiation  of  a  takeover,  Koppes,  Ganske  and Haag 
(1999) also promoted that a staggered board brings increased stability and improved 
long-term planning.  As  the  characteristic  of  a  staggered  board  is  to  have  only  a 
portion of directors elected at a time, it retains a level of “institutional memory” in the 
planning and operations of a corporation’s board of directors, and thus increases board 
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stability. Directors certainly will feel accountable for their performance and thus be 
willing to work harder.  With regard to long-term planning,  the three-year  term of 
director board appointments will encourage directors to focus on long-term planning 
and return. Those directors motivated by many factors to strive for professionalism 
would prefer long-term employment to short-term. Thus, staggered boards will allow 
directors the opportunities to fulfil their aspirations. 
On the other hand, staggered boards receive substantial opposition from institutional 
investors. Many academic researchers report the negative association between having 
a staggered board and the firm value (Bedchuk and Cohen, 2005, Guo, Kruse and 
Nohel, 2008, Rose, 2009). Extending the study of Gompers, et al. (2003) in which 
they reported a negative relationship between the index containing 24 management-
favouring governance provisions identified by IRRC and the firm’s value, BeBchuk 
and Cohen (2005) controlled for other governance provisions and found staggered 
boards especially contributing to the low firm value. This negative correlation is not 
only statistically significant but also economically meaningful, and is stronger when a 
staggered  board  provision  is  established  in  the  corporate  charter  than  in  the 
company’s bylaws. The reason for such a negative effect is that the protection might 
hurt shareholders by weakening the coercion of removal and thus allow opportunities 
for  empire-building  and  managerial  entrenchment.  Consistent  with  these  findings, 
Guo et  al.  (2008)  examined  188 firms  with  staggered  boards  whose management 
intends to remove the stagger which report a wealth-creation effect by de-staggering 
boards.  They further  suggest that  firms with better  governance practices  are more 
inclined to remove staggered boards while firms with poison pills prefer the opposite.
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Table 1. Categorized prior studies for board characteristics
Regarding Board Quoted Articles
Board as a whole 　
Board independence Bhagat and Black (1999), Sheppard (1994), Fama and Jensen (1983), Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma (2004), Ryan Jr. and Wiggins III (2004), Beasley (1996), Bonn (2004), Hossain, Prevost and Rao (2001)　
Board Size Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorch (1992), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2005)　
CEO duality Fama and Jensen (1983), Fromson (1990), Muth and Donaldson (1998), Peng, Zhang and Li (2007), Iyengar and Zampelli (2009), Lam and Lee (2008), Fyleye (2007)　
Director Tenure Buchanan, 1974, Vafeas (2003), Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002), Byrd, Cooperman and Wolfe (2010)　
Gender diversity Daily and Dalton (2003), Smith, Smith, and Verner (2006), Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003), Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2009), Siciliano (1996), Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagne (2008)　
Meetings Brick and Chidambaran (2010), Conger, Finegold and Lawler III (1998), Jiraporn, Davidson III., DaDalt and Ning (2009), Brick and Chidambaran (2008), Vafeas (1999), Jensen (1993)　
Staggered board Bebchuk, Coates IV and Subramanian (2002), Koppes, Ganske and Haag (1999), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Guo, Kruse and Nohel (2008), Rose (2009), Gompers, et al. (2003)　
Board Committees 　
Committee existence
Krishnan (2005), Zhang, Zhou and Zhou (2007), Xie, Davidson III and Dadalt (2003), Chau and Leung 
(2006), Boyle and Roberts (2008), Newman and Mozes (1999), Vafeas (2003), Anderson and Bizjak (2003), 
Conyon and Peck (1998), Weir and Laing (2001)　
Committee independence Abbott (2000), Carcello and Neal (2003), Klein (2002), Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal (2009), Anderson and Bizjak (2003), Cotter and Silvester (2003) 　
CEO involvement on 
board committees
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Neal (2009), Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2010), Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2002), Sridharan (1996), Ueng, Wells and Lilly (2000)
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Table 1. Categorized prior studies for board characteristics (continued)
Regarding Directors Quoted Articles
Exogenous Characteristics 　
CEO compensation
Jensen and Murphy (1990), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006), Bryan, Nash and 
Patel (2006), Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001), Guay (1999), Edmans and Liu (2010), Andjelkovic, Boyle 
and McNoe (2002), Elayan, Lau and Meyer (2001), Jin (2002) 　
Chair and director fees Fama and Jensen (1983), Yermack (2004), Cordeiro, Veliyath, and Eramus (2000), Davis (1996), Linn and Park (2005)
Directors' ownership Jensen (1993), Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999), Stulz (1988), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)　
Endogenous Characteristics 　
Directors' Educational and 
Industrial background Jensen (1993)
Directors' Experience Same as Director Tenure　
Multiple directorships Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003), Fama and Jensen (1983), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Sarkar and Sarkar (2009)　
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2.2.1.2 Board Committees
2.2.1.2.1 Committee Existence
One of the responsibilities  of the board of directors is  to establish an audit  and a 
compensation committee for the firm. The audit committee is mainly responsible for 
assisting  with  the  board’s  oversight  of  the  integrity  of  the  company’s  financial 
statements and reporting process, the company’s legal and regulatory compliance, and 
the  performance  and  independence  of  the  auditor.  Key  responsibilities  for  the 
remuneration committee are to set appropriate compensation packages for the board 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) which are aligned with organizational interests, 
mission and strategy, as well as review and oversee the compensation policy. Both 
committees are considered to have increasing importance in their roles to assist the 
board  of  directors.  Particularly  after  the  series  of  corporate  scandals  in  2002,  the 
revised NYSE listing rules mandated the establishment of an audit committee in a 
listed  firm,  while  a  remuneration  committee  is  also  highly  recommended  to 
companies with large boards.
Studies have examined the relationship between the audit committee and corporate 
internal control issues based on comparing firms disclosing such issues with control 
sample firms changing auditor without disclosing such issues (Krishnan, 2005; Zhang, 
Zhou  and  Zhou,  2007).  Both  studies  found  that  the  establishment  of  an  audit 
committee  lessens  the  frequency  of  internal  control  weakness.  These  are  the 
weaknesses in respect to material weakness and reportable conditions. Further, this 
audit  committee  effect  is  especially  prominent  for  audit  committees  comprising  a 
majority  of  independent  members  and  finance  experts.  Also  advocating  for  the 
existence  of  an  audit  committee  but  from  the  earnings  management  angle,  Xie, 
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Davidson III and Dadalt (2003) reported the findings of less manager propensity for 
earnings management from more active board and audit committee activities. Chau 
and Leung (2006) studied the impact of family ownership on audit committees with 
data of Hong Kong firms. It was found that audit committee existence is low when the 
family ownership is at a medium level, about 5% to 25%. However, the existence of 
an audit committee increases significantly when the family ownership is above 25%, 
considered as dominating entrenchment.        
The impact of remuneration committees on corporate control efficiency is also closely 
scrutinized by academic researchers. Legislation or exchange trading rules from many 
countries  recommend  that  the  composition  of  remuneration  committees  be  fully 
independent,  such  as  UK  Cadbury  Committee  and  NYSE  listing  rules  (only  for 
domestic  issuers). Remuneration committees  are considered to have the most  vital 
role in determining and affecting the level of the executive compensation package 
(Boyle and Roberts, 2008). Thus, the composition of the subcommittee is likely to 
affect the corporate governance structure. Newman and Mozes (1999) indicated that 
CEO membership  of the remuneration committee  allows the opportunity for more 
CEO-favoured compensation packages. However, a number of studies failed to report 
similar results (Vafeas, 2003, Anderson and Bizjak, 2003, Conyon and Peck, 1998, 
Weir  and  Laing,  2001).  These  authors  all  reported  evidence  that  remuneration 
committees with executive directors as members do not contribute to inappropriate 
levels of executive compensation or reduce overall incentives.  
Despite the different findings regarding committees’ impact on corporate governance 
efficiency, the prior literature suggests that both audit and remuneration committees 
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play a critical role in assisting boards to protect shareholders’ interests. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to study the evolution of the existence of committees.
2.2.1.2.2 Committee Independence
Apart from the tremendous scrutiny placed on board independence in the past decade, 
committee independence has perhaps been a more popular and focused topic among 
regulators,  economists  and  academic  researchers.  As  the  allocated  vital 
responsibilities  of  each  committee  are  to  maximize  shareholder  value,  their 
independence  would  surely  be  worthy  of  interest  and  examination.  In  particular, 
during  in  the  post-Enron  era,  the  NYSE  mandates  the  independence  of  audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees. The NASDAQ also requires, although it is 
not  compulsory,  board  decisions  regarding  three  committees  to  be  made  by  the 
majority of independent directors on the board. This study only examines the audit 
and  remuneration  committees  and  not  the  nomination  committee,  which  does  not 
reach commonality among firms at the beginning of the chosen examination periods. 
Audit  committee  independence  is  more  frequently  cited  as  the  prerequisite  of  its 
effectiveness now. Abbott  (2000) reported the result  of having an audit committee 
composed of independent directors and holding two or more meetings annually as less 
fraudulent  financial  reporting.  Consistent  with  Abbott’s  study,  Carcello  and  Neal 
(2003) documented the evidence of higher reporting quality associated with oversight 
by independent audit committees. Similarly, Klein (2002) found that audit committee 
independence contributes lower earnings manipulation. Further, bearing in mind the 
question of how much independence is needed for the audit committees to accomplish 
the  quality-reporting  effect,  Bronson,  Carcello,  Hollingsworth  and  Neal  (2009) 
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documented that the benefits could only be realized under the circumstances of 100 
percent independent audit committees. Such results reflect the SOX requirement of 
100 percent independent audit committees.
   
Firm requirements for remuneration committee independence did not take place until 
around 2009 in the US. The US Department of Treasury delivered draft legislation to 
Congress on 16 July 2009 to promote genuine remuneration committee independence, 
not  just  in  name.2 Specifically,  legislation  requires  members  of  a  remuneration 
committee to meet the independence criteria set for audit committees in SOX, and 
compensation  consultants  and  legal  counsel  hired  to  be  fully  independent  from 
management. Possibly owing to the late awareness of the importance of remuneration 
committee  independence,  there  are  much  fewer  studies  examining  the  association 
between the independence of remuneration committees and firm value. Anderson and 
Bizjak (2003) found no significant influence on executive pay when firms established 
remuneration committees that are fully independent. Likewise, Cotter and Silvester 
(2003) did not  find evidence  supporting their  prediction  of a  positive  relationship 
between an independent compensation committee and firm performance. 
All the debates and regulatory terms suggest that along with the importance of the 
independence  of  the  committees,  the  scale  of  their  independence  should  be  of 
consideration  as  well.  Although  there  is  unlikely  to  be  a  universal  optimal 
independence level, committee independence is regarded as an effective mechanism 
to  reduce  collusion  among  managers,  reflecting  the  importance  of  studying  their 
evolution.
2.2.1.2.3 CEO Involvement on Board Committees
2 See article at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg218.htm 
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Board and committee independence are both considered by the public and regulators 
as the most effective mechanisms to maintain impartiality in monitoring management 
behaviour  in order  to  protect  shareholders’  interests.  However,  such independence 
may  become  less  genuine  if  the  CEO  is  involved  in  selecting  audit  committee 
members or influences the operation of the audit committee through their social ties or 
membership  of  the  committees  (Beasley,  Carcello,  Hermanson  and  Neal,  2009). 
Consistently,  Carcello,  Neal,  Palmrose  and  Scholz  (2010)  have  reported  CEO 
involvement in appointing board and audit committee members, though membership 
of a nomination committee will diminish the audit committee’s oversight of financial 
reporting. Arguably, the function of an independent audit committee to help auditors 
confront management regarding financial reporting misstatements would be converted 
back to assisting management (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2002).  
Regarding remuneration committees, Sridharan (1996) would probably be the first to 
report that CEO pay is positively associated with CEO influence over the board, even 
in  badly-performing firms.  A CEO with higher  influence  can be more  capable  of 
increasing  the  compensation  level  than  a  CEO  with  less  influence.  Following 
Sridharan’s  study direction  but  also  including  small  firms  for  examination,  Ueng, 
Wells and Lilly (2000) documented that this CEO influence, meaning this pay effect 
is only applied in large firms but not small firms (asset size less than $250 million). A 
possible reason for such insignificant CEO influence on pay level could be that the 
CEOs of small firms may be the owners or have family ties to the firm where CEO 
influence could be diluted by the co-owners or other family members.  
Apparently,  CEO  involvement  on  board  committees  has  possible  negative 
consequences, mostly less effectiveness brought by CEO influence through exertion 
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of power to accomplish their own goals at shareholders’ expenses. This is reflected by 
many  corporate  governance  rules  mandating  the  full  independence  of  audit 
committees  and a  majority  of  independent  members  on remuneration  committees. 
Hence,  it  would be  interesting  to  look at  changes  in  CEO involvement  on  board 
committees for the past  two decades within which the implementation of the new 
rules occurred.
2.2.2 Regarding Directors
2.2.2.1 Given by Board
2.2.2.1.1 CEO Incentive Compensation
Shareholders elect directors to look after the interests of executives. One of the vital 
responsibilities of directors is to determine the level and structure of compensation for 
top executives. As directors exist to protect shareholders’ welfare, their decisions on 
the level and structure of compensation for top executives aim to align the interests of 
the executives with the shareholders. Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggested that one 
way to  achieve  this  is  to  proportionately  make  executive  compensation  incentive-
based,  that  is,  through stocks or options.  This  is  the criteria  used in this  study to 
identify whether the CEO is paid with incentive compensation or not. Annual reports 
document  their  means  of  remunerating  the  CEO, either  in  a  cash  format  (usually 
salary plus pension) or through incentive packages (either stocks or options). 
One of the aims of shareholders of the firms is to pursue well diversified assets and 
thus  they  may  sometimes  prefer  risk-induction  strategies.  Managers,  on  the  other 
hand, may take conservative approaches (low risk/low return) to protect their position. 
Such  discretion  can  lower  firm  value  and  owners’  wealth.  Jensen  and  Meckling 
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(1976)  suggested  that  the  incentive  effects  of  equity  based  compensation  induce 
executives to undertake riskier investments and ultimately enhance market valuations. 
Specifically,  Jensen  and  Murphy  (1990)  suggested  options  particularly  motivate 
managers  to pursue risky strategies  because of the ability  to align the interests  of 
executives with shareholders. Consistent with Jensen and Murphy, Chen, Steiner and 
Whyte (2006) found an increasing use of stock option-based compensation for top 
managers in the US banking industry owing to its induction of risk-taking. Such risks 
refer to those that boost the firm’s short-term value where the stockholders benefit 
from their call options. As a result,  the welfare of the firm is transferred from the 
bondholders to the stockholders.
Similarly, Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) documented a  positive association between 
the US firms’ values (based on Altman’s Z score) and the equity-based compensation 
structure.  Additionally,  the  level  of  financial  distress  and  thus  the  impact  on  the 
agency costs of debt trigger more use of option-based executive compensation in the 
US. They suggest that firms that are hard to monitor should use larger amounts of 
option-based compensation to resolve shareholder/manager conflicts. Another related 
suggestion from the authors is that large firms or firms with declining performance 
should use more equity-related compensation.  Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001) 
also reported a growing trend in employing incentive compensation for CEOs in Italy.
Not all empirical studies agree with the equity-performance relationship. Guay (1999) 
argued that option compensation does not help with strongly conservative managers 
who may act so as to preserve the value of his or her option grants. Edmans and Liu 
(2010) advocated more efficiency in using inside debt than other means of executive 
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compensation,  such as equity or fixed bonuses. In comparison with fixed bonuses, 
paying off inside debt in bankruptcy is proportional to the liquidation value, not just 
the probability  of default.  Equity compensation,  on the other  hand, is  designed to 
induce  effort  which  could  simply  increase  liquidation  value.  Debt,  instead,  could 
improve effort while deterring risk shifting.    
Unlike the US study of Bryan et al., using NZ data, Andjelkovic, Boyle and McNoe 
(2002) reported that CEO pay is not related to performance in NZ after control for 
firm size, risk, leverage and board structure. Firm size, rather, is the sole determinant 
of variations for CEO pay levels. Similarly, Elayan, Lau and Meyer (2001) found that 
a corporation’s decision on offering an incentive compensation package to executives 
does not depend on firm performance.  Instead,  company size and risk are the two 
primary  determinants  of  executive  compensation  structure.  More  specifically,  Jin 
(2002) reported that prior empirical studies using total risk to examine the relationship 
between risk and CEO compensation structure are not accurate enough. Rather, it is 
the firm-specific risk level that determines the level of incentive pay for the CEO, 
namely, the less firm-specific risks the higher the incentive pay for the CEO. Market 
risk does not relate to CEO pay structure at all.
2.2.2.1.2 Chair and director fees
Fama  and  Jensen  (1983)  recognized  outside  directors’  incentives  to  develop 
reputations as experts in decision control. They would use their directorships to signal 
decision  agents  that  they  are  experts.  Such  signals  are  convincing  when  direct 
payments to outside directors are small. However, Yermack (2004) reported findings 
that  are  in  contrast  to  Fama  and  Jensen’s  conjecture  relative  to  the  after-market 
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incentives regarding the directors’ reputations. He found compensation, turnover, and 
opportunities  give  directors  positive  performance  incentives,  within  which 
compensation and ownership account for more than half of the influence.  In more 
detail,  there  is  a change in director  wealth  of  approximately $285,000 for  each 1 
standard deviation change in the performance of the median sample firm. That is, 
compensation  to  outside  (non-executive)  directors  is  arguably  one  of  the  most 
important incentive mechanisms to shape and drive director behaviour in support of 
the  shareholders.  Yermack’s  findings  are  consistent  with  the  results  of  Cordeiro, 
Veliyath, and Eramus (2000) who reported that director compensation is related to 
firm performance, director effort and external monitoring. 
Yermack’s  viewpoint  regarding  pay-performance  relationship  is  not  that  it  is  all 
greed.  Davis  (1996)  proposed  reasons  for  an  insignificant  pay-performance 
relationship. He suggested that there could be other non-financial reasons that attract 
board services, such as creating interlocks and engaging in possible relationships with 
other  industry leaders.  Linn  and Park  (2005)  also  provided  evidence  that  director 
compensation  is  positively  associated  with  the  investment  opportunities  of  firms. 
Their results are consistent with hypotheses that director compensation is designed to 
attract  directors  whose productivity increased firms’  opportunities,  and to  mitigate 
agency problems.
2.2.2.1.3 Directors’ Ownership
Jensen (1993) advocates equity ownership for board members  owing to the better 
incentives provided. The author writes “this investment would force new members to 
recognize from the outset that their decisions affect their own health as well as that of 
37
remote shareholders, and that over the long term the investment can be made much 
larger by, for example, stock-based compensation” (p.865). This is consistent with the 
findings of Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) that substantial director ownerships can 
lead to better  monitoring.  Further,  they suggested that the higher the board equity 
possession  the  more  likely  a  disciplinary-type  CEO  would  exist  in  a  poorly-
performing  firm.  Better  monitoring  functions  performed  by  the  directors,  and  the 
CEO having a disciplinary role result in a better firm performance.     
Stulz (1988), on the other hand, raised concerns that excessive voting powers held by 
executive  directors  can  lead  to  managerial  entrenchment.  Accordingly,  Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) studied the relationship between deviations on either side 
of optimal  board ownership and firm performance.  They found a  significant  non-
linear relationship between board ownership and firm value. For each 1% increase in 
board ownership between 0% and 5%, Tobin’s Q rises while Q decreases for each 1% 
increase in board ownership between 5% and 25%. When board ownership is beyond 
25%, Q figures  increase  at  a  lower level.  Literally,  board  ownership  has  positive 
effects on firm value, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis of Jensen 
and  Meckling  (1976).  However,  corporations  should  keep  the  level  of  board 
ownership  at  the  pre-determined  optimal  level  to  fully  maximize  firm  values, 
reflecting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis of Morck et al.
Bring to Board
2.2.2.2.1 Directors’ Educational and Industrial Background
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The expertise and experience possessed by each director are the mechanisms helping 
directors to understand the business of the firm and to analyze the performance of the 
CEO. Further, these talents enable directors to create ideas and make decisions for the 
right  corporation  path.  Therefore,  the  educational  and  industrial  background  of  a 
director is a vital  indication of their  qualification.  As suggested by Jensen (1993), 
boards should contain financially literate members who can offer financial planning 
related inputs, particularly the corporate objective and value determinants.   
Jensen’s suggestion was reflected in the legislative reforms of the SOX. This Act 
mandates all listing firms in US to have an audit committee comprising financially 
literate members, and at least one financial expert. Such a new rule in this well-known 
corporate  governance  act  has  further  underlined  the  importance  of  having  board 
members who are highly educated and well experienced.
Educational  and  industrial  backgrounds from each director  are  unique  and helpful 
possessions for them to understand firms’ operations and contribute valuable inputs. 
These talents  enable  directors  to  create  ideas  and  make  decisions  for  the  right 
corporation path. Both Jensen (1993) and corporate governance legislations suggest 
some of the board members to be financially literate. Therefore, director’s educational 
and industrial backgrounds not only indicate directors’ qualification but also help to 
make better decisions. 
2.2.2.2.2 Multiple Directorships
Directors with multiple directorships indicate that they are also  a board member of 
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other companies.  According to Ferris,  Jagannathan,  and Pritchard (2003), directors 
who  are  the  members  of  large  boards  or  employed  by  large  firms  receive  more 
opportunities  for multiple  directorships.  These directors  tend to be older  and non-
affiliated with the firm. The most common reasons for hiring these directors are their 
abilities with regard to management, consultation, and network of external resources. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) proposed the Quality Hypothesis3 referring to the signal of 
director quality possessed by directors with multiple appointments. Consistent with 
Fama and Jensen, Ferris et al. (2003) reported the enhancing firm value associated 
with a high portion of directors with multiple appointments. They further suggested 
that reputational effect in the market for directors in United States has a positive effect 
on  firm  performance  from  having  a  board  largely  constructed  of  members  with 
multiple directorships. However, Ferris et al. did not observe the negative relationship 
between firm performance and the percentage of directors with multiple appointments 
on boards as suggested by the Busyness Hypothesis4. In other words, directors who 
are  deemed as  being  busy through having multiple  directorships  do not  receive  a 
decrease in investors’ confidence in the United States. 
However,  there  are  also  studies  showing  an  adverse  effect  on  firm  values  from 
introducing multiple directorships on boards (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Sarkar and 
Sarkar (2009) extended the existing literature on multiple directorships by examining 
the effect  on firm performance  by companies  operating in  an emerging  economy, 
India.  They  further  sub-categorized  their  sample  firms  into  multiple  directorships 
possessed by inside or outside directors, and within group-affiliated or non-affiliated 
3 Quality Hypothesis: Positive market reaction for appointing directors having multiple board 
appointments as they signal the directors being more experienced, more capable to offer advice, and to 
provide better monitoring.
4 Busyness Hypothesis: directors with many other directorships at the same time are argued to be too 
busy to perform properly and hence the quality of directing is lower. 
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companies.  The authors  discovered a  favourable  reaction from the market  to  non-
affiliated firms that employed independent directors with multiple directorships on the 
board. This implies that the market signals the occurrence of multiple directorships 
within the non-affiliated firms as the directorial quality. On the contrary, a negative 
relationship  was found between the firm’s  performance  and multiple  directorships 
held by inside directors irrespective of the ownership status of the company. 
The uneven results  in various prior research do not definitely show the impact  of 
employing directors with multiple directorships on firm performance. However, it can 
be agreed that multiple directorships are deemed to be one important factor that can 
have influences. Therefore, it is valuable to examine its evolution in NZ listed firms.
2.3 A US study examining transition of board composition   
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007, hereafter C & G) examined the transformation of 
US listed corporate board characteristics from 1997 to 2003, between which times, the 
famous SOX Act came into effect. Since the early 1990s, there has been an increasing 
level  of recognition for the importance  of board oversight  among US institutional 
investors  and  other  entities.  Together  with  the  legislative  requirements  regarding 
board composition, this raised the interest of C&G to investigate the overall picture of 
the  board  characteristics  of  US  listed  firms  and  the  revolution  which  had  been 
undergone.  Data  for  over  a  thousand  firms  were  collected  from  Investor 
Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) for 1997, 2000 and 2003. Variables for each 
board feature  were selected  based on popularity  in  prior  literature.  Differences  in 
changes between each time interval were statistically tested to look for significances. 
The primary results of their study showed trends in decreasing board size, increasing 
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the level of board independence and a growing number of directors with financial 
backgrounds. They also found a decreasing pattern in the frequency of interlocking 
directorships, and in the number of directors with multiple directorships. Regarding 
the  hotly-debated  CEO  duality  phenomenon,  the  authors  did  not  find  significant 
changes during the selected time periods. Another finding of this paper was that the 
changes observed occurred more significantly during 2000 and 2003 than during 1997 
and 2000, suggesting the legislative changes may have had much influence on these 
changes. This study shows valuable insights as to the public perception and market 
trends  of  better  corporate  governance  through  board  characteristics  manipulation. 
Therefore,  not only interesting  but it  is  imperative to do a  New Zealand study in 
similar area.  
2.4 NZ Literature Reviews
There has been little research undertaken on the boards of directors of New Zealand 
companies. Most of this consists of studies regarding the relationship between board 
independence  and  firm  performance  as  well  as  aiming  to  find  out  what  kind  of 
contingencies can lead to more independence for boards. Fox (1996), who extended 
the earlier rare NZ studies regarding CEO duality by Turner (1985) and board size by 
Chandler and Henshall (1982) within the literature context, was the first to conduct an 
investigation  into  the  board  characteristics  of  NZ  companies.  He  presented  the 
changes that occurred in the board structure of New Zealand listed companies from 
1962 to 1993. Interestingly, NZ companies showed a significant non-executive (i.e. 
outsider)  director  dominance  on  boards;  over  80% in  earlier  sample  periods  and 
approximately 75% by 1993. As indicated by these figures, there was a reduction in 
outsiders on boards of New Zealand listed companies. The author suggested that such 
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reduction may indicate that outsiders are “more likely to constitute ‘dead wood’ than 
insiders,  and  are  more  likely  than  insiders  to  have  suffered  legitimacy  problems 
following the sharemarket ‘crash’” (Fox, 1996, p 17). Another finding of this paper 
was the percentage  of the CEO duality phenomenon among NZ listed companies, 
which was only 14.3%. As proposed by the author, NZ companies have an effective 
board leadership structure according to this percentage. 
Research has been conducted into the contingencies  that  contribute  to  a higher or 
lower percentage of independent directors on the boards of NZ listed companies (Mak 
and Roush, 2000, Prevost, Rao and Hossain, 2002). Both papers present a positive 
relationship between board size and the percentage of outside directors, suggesting 
that  independence  can  be  an  effective  corporate  mechanism  to  control  agency 
problems.  In  addition,  a  positive  relationship  is  also  revealed  between  insider 
ownership  and  outside  directors  owing  to  the  ability  of  outsiders  to  mitigate  the 
negative entrenchment effect brought by insider concentration. Interestingly, Prevost 
et  al.  (2002)  suggested  that  the  likelihood  of  growth  of  a  NZ listed  company  is 
negatively correlated with the number of outsiders on the board due to the requisite 
specialised knowledge and skills that the insiders possess to evaluate the complex, 
specialized,  and uncertain nature of their projects. Regarding growth opportunities, 
Mak  and  Roush  (2000)  demonstrated  that  firms  with  relatively  more  growth 
opportunities  are  likely to  use  dual  leadership.  These  two findings  add up  to  the 
negative relationship between CEO duality and number of outsiders, which was also 
confirmed by Prevost et al. Moreover, it is also indicated that the new legislation, the 
Companies Act 1993, is associated with an increase in the percentage of the outsiders 
on boards in New Zealand. It appears that the increased disclosure requirement and 
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emphasis on the fiduciary responsibilities of the board have caused firms to strengthen 
their  corporate  governance  structure  by  increasing  outsider  representation  on  the 
boards. Consistent with previous research (Byrd and Hickman, 1992), Prevost et al 
evidenced  a  positive  association  between  outsider  representation  on  boards  and 
corporate performance.
Executive compensation has also come under scrutiny by researchers in relation to the 
board  characteristics  of  New  Zealand  listed  companies.  Andjelkovic,  Boyle  and 
McNoe (2002) examined the level of executive compensation prior to, during and 
following the  introduction  of  public  disclosure  legislation  in  1997.  These  authors 
reported that CEO pay is not related to performance in NZ after controlling for firm 
size, risk, leverage and board structure. However, firms which voluntarily disclose 
CEO remuneration exhibit positive pay performance sensitivity; but those firms which 
choose not to disclose the information until the last possible dates by legislation do 
not. These together suggest that inefficient executive pay setting existed among NZ 
listed firms prior to the new legislation. Nevertheless, CEO pay has been found to be 
independent from firm performance even after the legislation. Firm size, rather, is the 
sole determinant for variations in CEO pay levels. Cahan, Chua and Nyamori (2005) 
reported a consistent finding that  firm size and board size have higher value-wise 
effect  on executive  pay in NZ public  sector  corporations.  Elayan,  Lau and Meyer 
(2001) have also drawn attention to these two size-related factors. Consistent results 
from the papers of both Cahan et al. and Elayan et al. demonstrate that the business 
risk involved in large companies will create positive impacts on compensation levels. 
Director reputation, which defines the directors’ quality, shows an expected negative 
coefficient with executive compensation level, suggesting a board with more high-
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quality directors is likely to constrain excessive compensation to CEOs. 
The political process can also play a key role as a corporate governance mechanism. 
The Companies Act was revised for New Zealand companies in 1993. Some of its 
provisions  provided  for  an  average  increase  of  approximately  5%  in  outsider 
representation on a board after the introduction of legislation reforms, as reported by 
Cahan and Wilkinson (1999). As discussed and evidenced by previous research that 
an  increase  in  outsiders  on  a  board  enhances  the  firm’s  performance,  one  would 
imagine  a  legislation  change would result  in  an improved firm’s  value.  However, 
according  to  Hossain,  Prevost  and  Rao  (2001),  the  positive  relationship  between 
outsider  representation  and  firm  performance  still  stays  true,  but  the  legislative 
reforms do not seem to much affect such a relationship. 
As can be summarized from the previous two sub sections, board independence, CEO 
duality and CEO compensation have been the three issues receiving most attention 
from financial  professionals  who conduct studies with New Zealand data.  Overall, 
little is known about the overall structure and characteristics of New Zealand boards 
and their evolution. Since the study of Fox (1996), there has been a gap from 1993 to 
the present regarding the transformation of board characteristics.  The focus of this 
study is therefore to fill such a gap by reporting the overall board characteristics and 
the changes occurring from 1995 to 2007.
3 Sample Construction
3.1 Data Collection
Sample  datasets  were  manually  collected  from the  IRG online  archive,  an  online 
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service  providing  a  comprehensive  collection  of  data  about  New  Zealand  listed 
companies, including data from annual reports, prices, charts, forecasts, and indices. 
The periods selected for examination were from 1995 to 2007 and in order to view the 
transitional pictures of board characteristics, time intervals were constructed as 1995, 
2000, and 2007. Hence, these allow enough time for the changes evolving between 
the periods. The reason for choosing 1995 to 2007 is that 1995 is the earliest period to 
gather board information as required by the 1993 Companies Act and 2007 permits 
enough time for changes to happen as a result of those new legislative reforms in the 
NZ Corporate Governance Best Practice Code.  
From the IRG online archive, the number of listed firms on the NZ Stock Exchange 
during 1995, 2000 and 2007 was respectively 99, 113 and 156. However, there are 
two companies whose annual reports do not provide any relevant information, making 
the sample dataset for 1995 consist of only 97 sample firms. All annual reports of the 
listed  firms  provide  relevant  full  or  partial  data  in  2000 and  2007.  Further,  it  is 
necessary to exclude overseas issuers listed on NZX as board characteristics of these 
foreign-owned  firms  (although  listed  in  NZ)  will  arguably  introduce  bias  to  the 
datasets. For this reason, those firms registered overseas are excluded from the dataset 
of each year. Specifically, there are respectively 8, 9 and 14 overseas-registered firms 
in the sample years of 1995, 2000 and 2007. The sample size of firms after excluding 
these firms is then 89, 104 and 142 for 1995, 2000 and 2007. The sample size of 
directorships after excluding these firms is 594 in 1995, 671 in 2000, and 791 in 2007, 
meaning there are total number of 594, 671, and 791 directorships possessed by all the 
directors in the particular year.
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The data gathering process for each firm regarding information on the targeted board 
characteristics involved reading through the firm’s annual report for each year of the 
study. This information was subsequently recorded into separate spreadsheets for each 
firm within each year and became three very detailed databases for the following data 
analyses.    
3.2 Variables Selection and Definition
Using the prior literature, a list of variables that, arguably, are necessary for effective 
corporate governance has been identified and will be examined. These variables are 
the ones which have received popular attention by various scholars, who refer to their 
influence  in  the  corporate  governance  framework.  This  list  includes  director 
independence,  board  size,   multiple  directorships,  staggered  boards,  director  fees, 
CEO compensation, director share ownership, board diversity, director tenure, CEO 
duality,  board  subcommittee  existence  and  independence,  CEO  involvement  on 
committees,  and  meetings  for  boards  and  committees  (See  Table  2  and  3  for  a 
description of the variables and data availability for each variable).
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Table 2. Variables Examined
Variables Description
Board Size (Total directors) Number of directors on the board, including both non-executive, executive directors and CEO (if also a director)
Board Size (Non-executive 
directors only) Number of non-executive directors on the board 
Director independence Number of independent directors on the board according to NZSX listing rule requirement
Director independence % Percentage of independent directors on the board (excluding the CEO as also a board member)5
Director independence %
including CEO Percentage of independent directors on board (including the CEO as also a board member)6
Staggered board The incidence of re-election of a portion of board members every year; a binary variable 
Multiple directorships A director holding more than one board membership at a time, measured by the number of directors on the board having multiple directorships and the average directorships held by each variable. 
CEO compensation Whether the CEO compensation package contains incentive terms or not; a binary variable 
Chair & Director fees The fees received by the chairman and each director
Directors' ownership The percentage of shares (beneficial plus affiliated) owned by each director  
Directors’ total ownership The percentage of shares (beneficial, affiliated plus non-beneficial) owned by each director  
Gender diversity - female directors The number and percentage of firms with female directors (including female CEO) on the board; a binary variable
Educational background
The areas of education that a director has gained certificates in.. Categories chosen: Medical, Law, Finance/Real 
Estate, Arts, Commerce/Business, Engineering, Science/Technology, Accounting, Management/Marketing, 
Computing/IT, Agriculture/Farming, Others
Industrial background
The areas of occupation that a director has worked in. Categories chosen: Legal, Food, Finance, Industry 
/Construction, Management/Marketing, Engineering/Science, Logistics/Transportation, Retailing/Manufacturing, 
Accounting, Agriculture/Farming, IT/Technology, Investment, Government/Politics, Others 
Table 3. Variables Examined (Continued)
5 This variable is calculated as the percentage of independent directors on the board as a portion of board size excluding CEO board membership. For example, if there are 
two independent directors on a five-directors board, of which the CEO is also a board member, the percentage of independent directors is 2/4 = 50%, not 2/5 = 40%.  
6 This variable is calculated as the percentage of independent directors on the board as a portion of board size including CEO board membership. Using the example from 
footnote 2, the independent director ratio is 40%. These two ways of measurement are used to present how much CEO board membership affects the board independence 
ratio, i.e., if board independence, excluding CEO board membership, increases on a larger scale than when including the CEO, it means CEO board membership has become 
more common.
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Director Tenure The number of years a director has been a board member for this NZ listed company. A binary variable.
Director Experience The number of years since the director’s first directorship.
CEO duality The incidence of the board having the same person as both the chairman and the CEO; a binary variable
AC existence The incidence of the board having an audit committee; a binary variable
RC existence The incidence of the board having a remuneration committee; a binary variable
AC independence The number and percentage of independent directors on the audit committee
CC independence The number and percentage of independent directors on the remuneration committee
CEO involvement on board 
committees The incidence of CEO membership on either the audit or remuneration committee; a binary variable
Board Meetings held The number of board meetings held during the financial year
Board meeting attended The average number of board meetings attended by each director
AC meetings held The number of meetings held by the audit committee
AC meeting attended The average number of audit committee meetings attended by each member
CC meetings held The number of meetings held by remuneration committee
CC meeting attended The average number of remuneration committee meetings attended by each member
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Table 4. Data Availability
Variables 1995 (89*) 2000 (104*) 2007 (142*)
Board Size 89 104 142
Board Size including CEO 89 104 142
Director independence 62 103 127
Director independence % 62 103 127
Director independence % including CEO 62 103 127
Staggered board 89 104 142
Multiple directorships 76 104 141
CEO compensation 69 96 126
Chair fees 57 94 126
Director fees 61 102 130
Director ownership 61 103 127
Director total ownership 61 103 127
Gender diversity - female directors 89 104 142
Gender diversity - Female CEO 89 104 142
Ethnic diversity (Asian or African) 89 104 142
Educational background 43 57 93
Industrial background 50 66 98
Director tenure 89 104 142
CEO duality 89 104 142
AC existence 89 104 142
RC existence 89 104 142
AC independence 54 86 126
CC independence 33 69 93
CEO involvement on AC 54 86 126
CEO involvement on RC 33 69 93
Board Meetings held 35 52 93
Board meeting attended 35 52 93
AC meetings held 36 46 75
AC meeting attended 36 46 75
CC meetings held 17 34 47
RC meeting attended 17 34 47
* number of NZ-registered listed firms during this year
3.3 Methods
This study aims to show the trends of movements for each selected variable, i.e. to see 
if  any increasing or decreasing changes  happened during the period from 1995 to 
2007.  Mean,  median,  percentiles,  and  standard  deviations  are  performed  to 
demonstrate the movements. Statistical tests, T and Wilcoxon Z values are then. Total 
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assets are used to determine firm size. These total assets for the full sample size of 
each year are then sorted and split into three groups. The top third of the sorted firm 
sizes are the large firms, followed by middle third being the medium firms and bottom 
third being the small firms. In 1995, 2000 and 2007 respectively, there are 29, 34 and 
47 large firms, 30, 35 and 48 medium firms, and 30, 35 and 47 small firms if the 
variable has no missing data. Otherwise, the sample size for each size group depends 
on data availability and eligibility within each group for each variable. Sample size of 
firms and directorships and explanations for number of missing data are given in the 
results section for each variable. 
3.4 Normality Tests and the Meaning of Median Tests
The Jarque-Bera  Normality  Test  is  performed  for  each  variable,  excluding  binary 
variables,  to  justify if  data  sets  are  normally distributed.  T tests  are  performed to 
justify the significance for differences in means between intervals  while Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests  are  performed for differences  in  medians.  As the distribution  of 
sample data is sometimes skewed for various reasons, median figures might be seen 
as a better indication of tendency than means in these cases. The results of the Jarque-
Bera Normality Test demonstrate that none of the data samples for our non-binary 
variables  are  normally  distributed.  Hence,  Wilcoxon  Z  values  are  very  important 
statistical analysis tools to justify tendencies in this study.
3.5 Endogeneity Issues
When something is determined within the system it is regarded as endogenous and 
exogenous when it  is  determined outside the system.  Endogeneity  issues within a 
51
corporate  governance  system are  considered  to  be  a  relatively  common  problem. 
Academic  scholars  who  examine  governance-performance  relationships  always 
address their methods for controlling endogeneity issues. The fundamental concept of 
this problem is the self-selection bias between governance and performance, i.e. the 
discovered  influences  from  governance  on  performance  might  originally  be 
determined  by  previous  firm  performance.  For  example,  better  performing 
corporations  may  feel  comfortable  appointing  independent  directors,  that  is,  the 
positive  independence-performance  relationship  was  reversely  delivered.  In  other 
words,  there  are  exogenous  relationships  existing  between  governance  and 
performance which  are  uncovered  by  the  commonly  used  Ordinary  Least  Square 
methods.  Such  endogeneity  issues  may  have  implication  on  this  study  as  to  the 
increasing or decreasing trends observed. For example, an increasing pattern of board 
independence does not necessarily reflect the public consensus to positively do so for 
better firm performance. Rather, it could have been a period of booming economy in 
NZ that many companies achieved greater results than before and choose to increase 
level  of  board  independence.  However,  finding  the  true  causality  between  board 
characteristics and firm performance is not an objective for this study, but to merely 
present the revolution of board characteristics.  
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4 Results and Discussions
4.1 Board Size
Table 4 demonstrates the statistics of board size of NZ listed firms in 1995, 2000 and 
2007.  Panel  A  shows  that  the  average  number  of  total  directors  on  NZ  boards 
decreased  from 5.98  in  1995,  to  5.72  in  2000  and  to  5.06  in  2007.  When  only 
counting non-executive directors, the same trend is revealed, from 5.61 to 5.24 and 
then to 4.66 respectively. By the degree of reduction, it is noticeable that number of 
non-executive directors has decreased in a larger scale than number of total directors 
on board. Further into this study, the decrease in average board size between the latter 
two years is larger than between the former two years for total directors. Similar level 
of decrease happened during two intervals for non-executive directors. Panel B shows 
a high statistical significance for the mean and median differences of average total 
board size between 2000 and 2007, and between 1995 and 2007. Same observed for 
non-executive directors. In other words, the significant reductions between 1995 and 
2007 for  both  total  directors  and  non-executive  directors  have  primarily  occurred 
since 2000.
Table 5 Panel A shows the distribution of average board size by different firm sizes. 
The data samples of three years were partitioned into large, medium, and small firms. 
Firms are firstly partitioned according to their firm sizes (Total Assets). Large firms 
are the top one-third, followed by the middle one-third being medium firms and the 
bottom third being small  firms. Panel A also demonstrates  that  both average total 
board size and non-executive directors only have been reducing between 1995 and 
2007 across  all  size  groups.  Comparing  these  three  sub-groups  specifically,  large 
firms  appear  to  have  a  larger  reduction  in  average  board  size  than  the  other  two 
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groups. For total directors, there were on average 1.20 fewer directors on the boards 
of these firms in 2007 than in 1995, whereas medium firms and small firms have been 
reduced  by  0.63  directors  and  0.97  directors  on  average  respectively.  This  is 
unsurprising  insofar  as  large  firms  normally have  larger  boards  than medium and 
small  firms.  For non-executive directors  only,  there were on average 1.30 to 1.40 
directors  reduction  for  all  size  groups  during  1995  and  2007.  Median  values 
demonstrate the same decreasing trends. In Panel D, the decreases from 2000 to 2007 
and from 1995 to 2007 are more significant than from 1995 to 2000 in all size groups 
for both total directors and non-executive directors only.
The reduction in average board size over the sample period must reflect either a fall in 
demand, or a fall in supply, or both. On the demand side, one possible reason is that a 
perception of over-sized boards existed within corporations or related institutions in 
NZ , i.e., NZ listed firms may have come to agree with Jensen’s (1993) argument that 
the problem of coordination outweighs the advantages of having more directors on the 
board and actively sought to reduce board numbers. 
Turning to the supply side, one of the biggest evolutions of New Zealand governance 
legislative reform, the 1993 Companies Act, specifically codified the definition of the 
“standard of care” from directors for the corporation. This Act significantly differs 
from its predecessor (the 1955 Companies Act) mainly in terms of the requirements 
for  the  directors  to  take  on  more  responsibilities,  more  duties  of  care  for  the 
companies. In other words, a director must act in good faith and in what the director 
believes to be in the best interests of the company. Directors must exercise the care, 
diligence,  and  skill  that  a  reasonable  person  would  exercise  in  the  same 
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circumstances. Although these requirements also existed in the 1955 Companies Act, 
shareholders  can  now  actually  bring  direct  legal  action  against  directors.  These 
sharper responsibilities may have deterred potential directors from seeking NZ board 
appointments, or encouraged them to look overseas. 
A final interesting feature of Table 4 is that, although the reduction in average board 
size  is  consistent  with  the  US  findings  of  Chhaochharia  and  Grinstein  (2007),  a 
sharper decrease is observed in this study than in that of Chhaochharia and Grinstein. 
They found, on average, only 0.2 directors fewer for 2000 than 1997, and for 2003 
than  2000,  compared  with  the  1.01  average  falls  in  NZ between  1995 and 2007. 
Turning to the size sub-groups, reductions in board sizes in each group are observed 
in both our study and the study of Chhaochharia and Grinstein. 
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Table 4
Board Size
This table reports the summary statistics for board size. Panel A gives yearly descriptive statistics for the sample sizes of both listed firms and total directorships, means and 
medians for both total directors and non-executive directors only. 25th and 75th percentiles are also shown in Panel A for two measurements. Standard deviations are given in 
brackets. Panel B reports the results of parametric and non parametric tests for differences in mean and median of board size across the years. The t value and the Wilcoxon z 
value are provided for the parametric and non parametric tests respectively. A normality test is performed using the Jarque-Bera method (if the statistic for JB does not have 
any * underneath, it means normality is rejected).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Year
N
Firms
N
Directorships
(Total)
N
Directorships
(Non-Exe)
Mean
(Total)
Mean
(Non-Exe)
Median
(Total)
Median
(Non-Exe)
25th 
Percentile
(Total)
25th
Percentile
(Non-Exe)
75th
Percentile
(Total)
75th
Percentile
(Non-Exe)
Jarque-
Bera   Mean 
(Total)
1995 89 532 499 5.98 5.61 6 5 4 4 7.25 7 3.28
(1.98) (2.13)
2000 104 595 545 5.72 5.24 5 5 4 4 7 6 2015.32
(1.93) (1.97)
2007 142 718 662 5.06 4.66 5 5 4 3 6 6 145.26
(1.73) (1.75)
Panel B: Tests of difference in Mean (excl CEO)
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Ttest
(Total)
Ttest
(Non-Exe)
Wilcoxon
(Total)
Wilcoxon
(Non-Exe)
Ttest
(Total)
Ttest
(Non-Exe)
Wilcoxon
(Total)
Wilcoxon
(Non-Exe)
Ttest
(Total)
Ttest
(Non-Exe)
Wilcoxon
(Total)
Wilcoxon
(Non-Exe)
-0.91 -1.24 -1.00 -1.20 -2.82 -2.43 -2.52 -2.07 -3.72 -3.67 -3.51 -3.23
*** ** ** ** **** **** **** ****
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 5
Board Size by Firm Size
Panel A presents summary statistics for the sample size of both listed firms and total directors, means, medians and percentiles of board size, both including the CEO and 
excluding the CEO, across different firm sizes. Panel B reports the results for parametric and non parametric tests for differences in mean and median.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size
Year
Firm 
Size
N
Firms
N
Directorship
s
N
Directorships
(Non-Exe)
Mean
(Total)
Mean
(Non-Exe)
Median
(Total)
Median
(Non-Exe)
25th 
Percentile
(Total)
25th
Percentile
(Non-Exe)
75th
Percentile
(Total)
75th
Percentile
(Non-Exe)
1995 Large 29 207 202 7.14 6.97 7 7 5.75 5 9 8.25
(2.01) (2.16)
2000 Large 34 238 219 7.00 6.44 7 6 5 5 8 8
(2.00) (2.00)
2007 Large 47 279 259 5.94 5..51 6 6 5 5 7 6
(1.66) (1.85)
1995 Medium 30 177 154 5.90 5.13 6 5 5 4 7 7
(1.56) (1.83)
2000 Medium 35 185 163 5.46 4.97 5 5 4 4 6.75 6
(1.70) (1.92)
2007 Medium 48 247 224 5.27 4.79 5 5 4 4 6 6
(1.57) (1.52)
1995 Small 30 148 143 4.93 4.77 5 4.5 4 3 6 6
(1.74) (1.76)
2000 Small 35 166 152 4.74 4.34 5 4 4 3 6 5
(1.42) (1.76)
2007 Small 47 192 179 3.96 3.68 4 3 3 3 4.75 4
(1.37) (1.35)
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Table 5
Board Size by Firm Size (continued)
Panel D: Tests of difference
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Firm Size
Ttest
(Total)
Ttest
(Non-Exe)
Wilcoxon
(Total)
Wilcoxon
(Non-Exe)
Ttest
(Total)
Ttest
(Non-Exe)
Wilcoxon
(Total)
Wilcoxon
(Non-Exe)
Ttest
(Total)
Ttest
(Non-Exe)
Wilcoxon
(Total)
Wilcoxon
(Non-Exe)
Large -0.27 -1.00 -0.37 -1.14 -2.61 -2.16 -2.30 -2.02 -2.82 -3.12 -2.76 -3.02
** ** ** ** *** *** *** ****
Medium -1.09 -0.35 -1.22 -0.43 -0.52 -0.48 -0.37 -0.07 -1.73 0.89 -1.72 -0.77
* *
Small -0.49 -1.10 -0.25 -0.79 -2.53 -2.19 -2.55 -2.18 -2.74 -3.05 -2.57 -2.72
** ** ** ** *** **** *** ***
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.2 Board Independence 
Table 6 contains statistics on director independence in NZ listed firms for 1995, 2000 
and 2007. The sample size for each of these three years is less than the board size 
which represents the complete sample. For the years 2000 and 2007, the firms’ annual 
reports  advise  if  a  director  is  qualified  as  an  independent  director.  As  director 
independence  did not  receive  enough awareness in 1995 to  be entered into force, 
many annual reports only classify directors into executive and non-executive. As the 
new definition for an independent director in NZ Corporate Governance – Principles 
and Guidelines7 is a director who is not an employee of the entity and who does not 
represent a substantial shareholder and who has no other direct or indirect interest or 
relationship that could reasonably influence their judgement and decision making as a 
director,  I  classify  independent  directors  in  1995 listed  firms  to  be non-executive 
directors  with less  than  5% shareholding.  Therefore,  there  are  27 missing  sample 
firms in 1995 because the information for either director  independence or director 
ownership or both, has not been disclosed. Regarding the 1 and 15 missing sample 
firms  in  2000  and  2007,  they  are  all  for  the  same  reason,  non-disclosure  of 
information.
Panel  A  shows  that  the  average  number  of  independent  directors  on  NZ boards 
decreased from 3.90 in 1995, to 3.77 in 2000 and then decreased to 3.35 in 2007. The 
median  number  of  independent  directors  correspondingly  grew  from  3  to  4  and 
decreased to 3 again. However, percentage may be a better mechanism to demonstrate 
director  independence  than  number  as  the  latter  is  a  function  of  board  size.  The 
variable Mean % (incl CEO) clearly shows that the ratio of independent directors has 
7http://www.fma.govt.nz/keep-updated/reports-and-papers/handbook-corporate-governance-in-nz-
principles-and-guidelines/
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been increasing from 55.63% in 1995, to 58.73% in 2000 and to 59.75% in 2007. 
When CEO board members are excluded, the same trend is revealed between 1995 
and 2007 but conflicting results appear. Further, the variable Majority Independent % 
both with and without CEO on the board has also increased from 1995 to 2007. 
Interestingly,  the  average  percentage  of  independent  directors  on  the  board  is 
significantly higher in 2000 than in 1995 but the difference between 2000 and 2007 is 
tiny. Panel B shows high statistical significance for the difference in the percentage of 
director  independence  between  1995  and  2007.  It  can  be  interpreted  that  the 
percentage of independent directors on NZ listed boards has increased significantly 
from 1995 to 2007.
Table  7  shows the  distribution  of  average  independent  directors  by different  firm 
sizes. It demonstrates that the percentage of independent directors increased in large 
and small firms from 1995 to 2007 while medium firms behaved the opposite way. 
Interestingly,  the  percentage  of  independent  directors  of  large  and  medium  firms 
experienced an increase between 1995 and 2000, and then a decrease between 2000 
and 2007, while this percentage continued to grow inside small  firms.  Clearly this 
means the number of non-independent directors actually reduced. Among these three 
size groups, small firms experienced the most significant change in the level of board 
independence, from 56.68% to 76.23% between 1995 and 2000. Large firms showed 
an approximately two percentage points increase while medium firms show reduction 
of two percentage points.  Panel D reveals  that  only the changes happening inside 
small firms are statistically significant. 
One  possible  reason  for  the  increase  in  the  average  percentage  of  independent 
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directors between 1995 and 2000 is that recognition of higher board independence 
leading to better firm performance existed within corporations in NZ. NZ listed firms 
may  have  come  to  agree  with  Fama  and  Jensen’s  argument  about  the  important 
corporate  governance  functions  of  board  independence  through  increasing  the 
effectiveness of board oversight and actively sought to increase board independence. 
Fama  and  Jensen’s  viewpoint  has  been  highly  regarded  in  many  countries.  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US required company boards to be 
dominated by independent directors. According to Hossain et al. (2001), the former 
SEC Chairman Harold Williams even suggested companies have a board on which the 
CEO is the only executive director. Similar legislation was imposed in 1998 on the 
developing country of India. The Confederation of Indian Industry required any listed 
companies with a turnover of Rs.100 crores and above to have independent directors, 
who should constitute at least 30% of the board if the Chairman is a non-executive 
director; or at least 50% of the board if the Chairman and Managing Director is the 
same  person.  The  Australia  Investment  and  Financial  Services  Association  also 
recommended that listed firms have a board comprising mainly independent directors. 
All these legislative requirements or recommendations further reflect  the important 
functions of independent directors. Although NZ did not have a compulsory board 
independence  ratio  from the  Companies  Act  1993,  the series  of  global  legislative 
changes may have influenced recognition by NZ firms of the necessity to increase the 
demand for independent directors on a board. 
The increase in board independence between 1995 and 2000 is difficult to explain 
from a supply point of view.  Under the standards imposed by the Companies and 
Financial Reporting Acts 1993, boards are legally required to increase their caution in 
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preventing  managers’  exploitation  of  shareholders’  wealth.  This  increased 
responsibility is perceived by the financial professionals as being disproportionately 
borne by independent  directors.  Arguably,  it  should reflect  a fall  in the supply of 
independent directors. Even though the average number of independent directors has 
dropped for large and medium numbers, this is also true of the board size for both 
firms during this period. Therefore, it is not reasonable to suggest that the Companies 
and  Financial  Reporting  Acts  1993  have  caused  a  decrease  in  the  supply  of 
independent directors. Rather, the average percentage of independent directors would 
be the appropriate measurement. However, the increasing percentage of independent 
directors  on  boards  between  1995  and  2000  did  not  mirror  the  expectation  of  a 
decrease in the supply of independent directors, meaning the decrease in supply either 
did not occur or occurred in later periods.
However, the above discussed legislative effect on the supply of independent directors 
appears untrue even for the later periods. Even though the figures demonstrate drops 
in the average percentage of board independence between 2000 and 2007 for large 
and medium firms,  they are statistically insignificant,  meaning that the Companies 
and Financial  Reporting Acts  1993 did not  influence  board independence.  This  is 
consistent with the study of Hossain et al. (2001).
Comparing the study with that of Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) using US data, 
the definition in US for an independent director is similar to that in NZ.8 Moreover, 
the US corporate governance regime, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, requires boards to have 
8 Sarbanes Oxley: Section 301: An independent director is defined as one who (i) cannot accept any 
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer. (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer 
or any subsidiary thereof.
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a majority of independent directors rather than a third in NZ.9 Overall both NZ and the 
US  display  increases  in  average  board  independence  during  the  sample  period. 
However, US firms generally have a higher independence percentage, as expected, 
than NZ firms across all size groups. Large and medium firms in NZ actually started 
to decrease their independence ratio while US firms still kept increasing after 2000. 
However, small firms in both NZ and US revealed the most significant increase in 
board independence after 2000.
9 NYSE Rule 303A: Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors.
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Table 6
Director Independence
This table reports the summary statistics for independent directors expressed as average number and average percentage of the board size. Panel A gives yearly descriptive 
statistics for the sample size of both listed firms and total directorships, means and medians of independent directors, both in numbers and percentages. The 25 th and 75th 
percentiles and majority independent percentage are also shown in Panel A. Standard deviations are given in brackets. Including CEO means the variable is measured when 
including the CEO as a board member whereas excluding CEO means the variable is measured when excluding the CEO as a board member. Panel B reports the results of  
parametric and non parametric tests for differences in mean and median percentages of independent directors across the years. The t value and the Wilcoxon z value are 
provided for the parametric and non parametric test respectively. A normality test is performed using the Jarque-Bera method (if the statistic for JB does not have any *  
underneath, it means normality is rejected).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics      
Year
N
Firms
N
Director
-ships
Mean
#
Median
#
Mean
%
(incl 
CEO)
Mean
%
(excl 
CEO)
Median
%
(incl 
CEO)
Median
%
(excl 
CEO)
25th
Percentile
#
75th
Percentile
#
Majority
ind %
(excl 
CEO)
Majority
Ind %
(incl 
CEO)
Jarque-
Bera 
Mean % 
(excl 
CEO)
1995 62 402 3.90 3.00 55.63 61.34 50.00 57.14 2.00 5.00 53.62 67.67 3.69
(2.01) (20.22) (21.30)
2000 103 585 3.77 4.00 58.73 66.84 57.14 66.67 3.00 5.00 79.41 72.00 5.34
(1.81) (21.53) (24.19)
2007 127 611 3.35 3.00 59.75 67.04 60.00 66.67 2.00 4.00 89.08 79.00 3.12
(1.44) (19.97) (22.41)
Panel B: Tests of difference of Mean and Median %  (excl CEO)
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Ttest Wilcoxon
            Tte
st Wilcoxon  Ttest Wilcoxon
1.48 1.56 0.07 0.12  1.67 1.74
　 　 　 * *
Significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 7
Director Independence by Firm Size
Panel A presents summary statistics for the sample size of both listed firms and total directors, means and medians of independent directors, both in numbers and percentages  
across different firm sizes. Panel B reports the results for parametric and non parametric tests for differences in mean and median %.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics     
Year Firm Size
N
Firms
N
Director
-ships
Mean
#
Median
#
Mean
%
Median
%
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Majority
Independence 
%
1995 Large 23 153 4.70 4.00 63.66 62.50 3.00 6.00 80.00%
(2.52) (18.97)
2000 Large 34 234 4.83 4.00 67.42 64.58 3.50 6.00 82.86%
(2.36) (25.63)
2007 Large 43 251 3.93 4.00 65.32 66.67 3.00 5.00 72.09%
(1.71) (25.57)
1995 Medium 23 174 4.00 4.00 62.26 57.14 3.00 5.00 80.95%
(1.58) (22.43)
2000 Medium 35 185 3.63 3.00 65.92 66.67 3.00 4.00 74.29%
(1.66) (21.79)
2007 Medium 45 191 3.19 3.00 60.73 57.14 2.00 4.00 78.57%
(1.07) (20.15)
1995 Small 16 75 3.05 2.00 56.68 50.00 2.00 5.00 83.33%
(1.56) (23.39)
2000 Small 34 166 3.38 3.00 67.20 66.67 2.00 5.00 80.00%
(1.63) (25.73)
2007 Small 39 169 2.90 2.00 76.23 71.43 2.00 3.00 97.62%
(1.27) (18.33)
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Table 7
Director Independence by Firm Size (continued)
Panel B: Tests of difference of Mean and Median % 
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
       
Firm Size Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
Large 0.60 0.54 -0.36 -0.27 0.27 0.22
Medium 0.62 0.76 -1.10 -1.26 -0.28 -0.23
Small 1.39 1.51 1.74 1.68 3.31 2.97
 　 　 * * **** ****
Significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.3 Multiple Directorships
Table 8 Panel A exhibits the information on multiple directorships of NZ listed firms 
in 1995, 2000 and 2007. # pp represents the number of directors on the board who 
have multiple directorships during the financial year. Measurement ave/pp stands for 
the average number of directorships held by each director on the board.  The other 
directorships held by each director are identified from the firms’ annual reports, which 
report other directorships held by each director, both in listed and private firms. These 
directorships both in listed and private  firms are collected in this study.  For those 
annual reports that do not reveal this information, the NZ Companies Office website 
is used as the alternative to search for information by director name.10
Clearly, both # pp and avg/pp experienced a notable fall during the former two years. 
Such a decrease persists for # pp while avg/pp is followed by a slight increase during 
the latter two years. # pp fell from 5.75 in 1995 to 5.35 in 2000, and then to 4.48 in 
2007. As a percentage of board size, the percentage of directors on board who have 
multiple directorships decreased from 86.21% in 1995 to 82.95% in 2000, and then to 
80.43% in 2007. Avg/pp reduced from 9.71 in 1995 to 6.95 in 2000, and slightly 
increased to 7.07 in 2007. Medians for #pp persist at around 5 while avg/pp displays 
reductions  overall.  Put  differently,  the  number  of  directors  with  other  board 
appointments has decreased as a portion of board size and the number of directorships 
held by each director has reduced.    
Statistical tests in Panel B of Table 8 report that the reduction in # pp between 2000 
and 2007, and between 1995 and 2007 are significant at the 0.5% level respectively. 
10 http://www.business.govt.nz/companies 
67
However, the percentage measurement indicates a lesser degree of significance for the 
decrease  between  1995  and  2007,  and  no  signal  of  specific  time  of  occurrence. 
Moreover, the decreases in avg/pp between 1995 and 2000, and between 1995 and 
2007  are  significant  at  the  0.5%  level  according  to  Wilcoxon  Z  values.  As  the 
significant  reductions  for  #pp  could  be  attributed  to  reductions  in  board  size, 
significances for avg/pp would be a better mechanism to justify changes. Therefore, 
the significance results for avg/pp justify average directorships per director started to 
fall during 1995 and 2000.
In the results conditioned by group sizes in Panels A, C and E of Table 9, all three 
size groups exhibit diminution in the number of directors with multiple directorships 
within the period of 1995 to 2007. The same trends are observed with the percentage 
measurement. However, the second measurement, average number of directors with 
multiple  directorships,  suggests  a  different  structure.  The  average  number  of 
directorships currently held by each director in large (medium) firms decreased from 
6.48 (8.50) directorships to 5.89 (5.82) during 1995 and 2000, and then increased to 
6.84 (6.22) in 2007, while small firms show a continuous fall from 14.05 directorships 
in 1995 to 9.49 in 2000, and then to 8.25 in 2007. From these figures, it is easy to 
identify that directors in small firms hold around five or six more directorships in each 
sample year than large firms or medium firms respectively. Additionally, small firms 
also have the largest shrinking in average directorships held by each director among 
all size groups during 1995 and 2007.
Table 9 Panels  B,  D and F present  the statistical  tests  of  difference  in mean and 
median  for  #  pp,  #  pp  (%)  and  avg/pp  between  three  time  intervals.  Although 
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decreases  in  the  number  of  directors  with  multiple  directorships  reveal  high 
significance  for both large  and medium groups between 1995 and 2007, but  as  a 
percentage of board size the decrease in percentage is only significant in small firms. 
An obvious reason for this inconsistency is that significance decreases indicated by # 
pp (number-wise) could be contaminated by board size. Instead, # pp (percentage-
wise)  reveals  a  more  genuine  movement.  Other  significant  figures  appear  at  the 
number of directorships held by each director on the boards of medium and small 
firms between 1995 and 2007. 
Possible  reasons  for  the  diminution  in  the  number  of  directorships  held  by  each 
director between 1995 and 2007 could be drawn from demand, or supply, or both. A 
logical notion has long existed among many corporations, shareholder activists and 
institutional investors that having too many external board appointments could reduce 
the ability of directors to perform effective monitoring functions on management. For 
example, a few days after the report from the Wall Street Journal on December 28th 
2000 regarding  Elaine  Chao’s  prospective  cabinet  appointment  for  President-elect 
George Bush, a journal article revealed the increasing tendency among US firms to 
restrict  directors’  external  board  appointments  owing to  the  perceived  detrimental 
effect on corporate governance from having directors with multiple directorships on 
board.  As  a  result,  Ms  Chao  resigned  six  of  her  other  directorships  eventually. 
Similarly,  a  perception  by  corporations  or  investors  has  existed  in  NZ  that  the 
busyness  of  directors  having  too  many  board  memberships  is  likely  to  reduce 
directors’ working efficiency. Following this logic, in 1995, directors of NZ firms on 
average having more than nine external board memberships were possibly recognised 
by  the  public  as  being  too  busy  to  have  adequate  ability  to  perform their  duties 
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effectively.  Thus, it  is  logical  to say that  the demand for directors  with too many 
board appointments was reduced.      
The above incident of Ms Chao could also reflect the possible reason for a fall in the 
supply of directors with too many board appointments. In other words, there could be 
the  possibility  of  a  loss  of  precious  board  membership  opportunities  because  the 
director  is  perceived  as  fully  occupied  with  other  directorships.  Consequently, 
directors  seeking  high  quality  board  memberships  would  voluntarily  reduce  the 
number of jobs to a more appropriate level. More importantly, as discussed before, as 
the NZ 1993 Companies Act reform created less comfortable working conditions for 
directors,  they  may  have  willingly  left  unnecessary  jobs  in  order  to  avoid  legal 
charges from shareholders.
Another  noteworthy  point  from  the  tables  above  is  that  both  this  study  and  the 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) study using US data indicate that a decrease in 
board  members  multiple  directorships.  Although  the  US  paper  does  not  mention 
whether they only examine other board memberships in listed firms or both listed and 
private firms, the same tendency is observed in this study, which examines both listed 
and private firms. Moreover, it was revealed that large firms in US had the biggest 
reduction in mean board memberships while in NZ it was the small firms.
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Table 8
Multiple Directorships
This table reports the summary statistics for multiple directorships. # pp is the variable representing the 
number of directors on the board who have multiple directorships during the financial year. Avg/pp is 
the average directorships held by each director on the board. Panel A gives yearly descriptive statistics 
for the sample size of firms and directorships on the board, means (expressed in both number and 
percentage  of  total  board  size),  medians  and  25th  and  75th  percentiles  across  years.  Standard 
deviations are given in brackets. Panel B reports the results of parametric and non parametric tests for 
differences in mean and median percentages of independent directors across the years. The t value and 
the  Wilcoxon  Z  value  are  provided  for  the  parametric  and  non  parametric  tests  respectively.  A 
normality test is performed using the Jarque-Bera method (if the statistic for JB does not have any * 
underneath, it means normality is rejected).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　
Year MD
N
Firm
s
N
directorships
Mean
#
Mean
% Median
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Jarque- 
Bera
(Mean #)
199
5 # pp 89 532 5.75 86.21% 6.00 4.00 7.00 0.68
(2.04)
200
0 # pp 104 595 5.35 82.95% 5.00 4.00 7.00 1.94
(2.23)
200
7 # pp 142 718 4.48 80.43% 5.00 3.00 6.00 26.07
(1.77)
199
5 avg/pp 89 532 9.71 - - 4.50 11.50 148.87
(8.01)
200
0 avg/pp 104 595 6.95 - - 3.71 6.90 8526.98
(9.18)
200
7 avg/pp 142 718 7.07 - - 4.00 7.00 745.32
(6.35)
Panel B: Tests of difference in mean and median 　 　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
MD Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
# pp -1.31 -1.16 -3.43 -3.54 -5.08 -4.73
**** **** **** ****
# pp (%) -1.65 n/a -0.30 n/a -2.17 n/a
**
avg/pp -2.18 n/a 0.08 n/a -2.77 n/a
　 ** 　 　 ***
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 5
Multiple Directorships by Firm Size
This table exhibits summary statistics for the sample size of both listed firms and total directorships, 
mean  (expressed  in  both  number  and  percentage  of  total  board  size),  median  and  25th  &  75th 
percentiles for both # pp and avg/pp by firm sizes. Panels A and B present summary statistics and 
statistical tests for large firms respectively, followed by Panels C and D for medium firms and Panels E 
and F for small firms.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　
Large Firms
Year MD
N
Firms
N
Directorship
s
Mean
#
Mean
% Median
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
1995 # pp 29 207 6.79 84.88% 6.00 6.00 8.00
(2.18)
2000 # pp 34 238 6.62 86.76% 6.00 5.00 7.00
(2.20)
2007 # pp 47 279 5.13 79.80% 5.00 4.25 6.00
(1.76)
1995 avg/pp 29 207 6.48 - 5.40 4.16 8.01
(3.33)
2000 avg/pp 34 238 5.89 - 5.35 4.00 6.50
(3.38)
2007 avg/pp 47 279 6.84 - 5.17 4.18 6.94
(5.15)
Panel B: Tests of difference in mean and median 　 　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Firm 
Size Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
# pp -1.53 -1.59 -2.68 -2.99 -5.62 -4.80
*** ** **** ****
# pp % 0.32 n/a -0.39 n/a -1.12 n/a
avg/pp -0.78 -0.56 1.31 0.56 0.32 0.13
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 9 
Multiple Directorships by Firm Size (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size
Medium Firms
Year MD
N
Firms
N
Director
-ships
Mean
#
Mean
% Median
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
1995 # pp 30 177 5.67 70.88% 6.00 4.00 7.00
(1.65)
2000 # pp 35 185 5.09 66.71% 5.00 4.00 6.00
(1.77)
2007 # pp 48 247 4.40 68.43% 4.50 3.00 5.00
(1.51)
1995 avg/pp 30 177 8.50 - 7.38 4.50 10.00
(6.47)
2000 avg/pp 35 185 5.82 - 5.00 3.20 6.00
(4.82)
2007 avg/pp 48 247 6.22 - 4.75 3.67 6.17
(5.78)
Panel D: Tests of difference in mean and median 　 　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Firm 
Size Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
# pp -1.36 1.24 -1.91 -1.85 -1.84 -2.15
* * * **
# pp % -0.83 n/a -1.13 n/a -0.50 n/a
avg/pp -1.91 -2.81 0.34 0.65 -2.39 -2.71
* ** ** **
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 9 
Multiple Directorships by Firm Size (continued)
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　
Small Firms
Year MD
N
Firms
N
Director
-ships
Mean
#
Mean
% Median
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
1995 # pp 30 148 4.83 60.38% 5.00 4.00 6.00
(1.82)
2000 # pp 35 166 4.32 56.62% 4.50 3.00 6.00
(2.02)
2007 # pp 47 192 3.68 57.23% 3.00 3.00 5.00
(1.52)
1995 avg/pp 30 148 14.05 - 10.13 6.29 23.50
(10.52)
2000 avg/pp 35 166 9.49 - 5.29 3.33 9.80
(14.92)
2007 avg/pp 47 192 8.25 - 5.75 4.00 9.50
(7.74)
Panel F: Tests of difference in mean and median 　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
# pp -1.08 -0.75 -1.67 -1.84 -1.74 -1.45
* * *
# pp % -2.00 n/a 0.75 n/a -2.11 n/a
** **
avg/pp -1.40 -3.08 -0.49 -0.60 -2.38 -3.16
　 ** ** **
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.4 Incidence of CEO Equity-based Compensation
Table  10  exhibits  the  summary statistics  for  CEO compensation.  Panel  A reports 
figures of CEO compensation structure,  measured in both number and percentage. 
Zero represents the situations in which CEOs of firms receive incentive compensation 
such as stocks or options etc. One, on the other hand, features CEOs who only receive 
cash benefits such as a cash salary, bonus etc. Annual reports normally have a section 
outlining the executive remuneration,  which explains how the seniors or executive 
management are compensated. This is where the relevant information for this variable 
is identified. As NZ listed firms are not mandated to disclose executive compensation 
prior to 1 July 1997, the sample size for 1995 is limited. For 2000 and 2007, not every 
firm  specifically  discloses  CEO’s  salary  package  composition.  However,  annual 
reports disclose whether or not senior executives are issued with incentive packages 
through equities. In this case, it is presumed that CEO is paid with an equity incentive 
package. This assumption enlarges the sample size of this variable to a full sample for 
2000 and 2007.    
Percentages of Zero shown exhibit  a continuous reduction in the number of firms 
which use incentive compensation for their CEOs while percentages of One show a 
persistent increase in the number of firms which only offer cash benefits for CEOs in 
NZ. In a comparison of the sample years, more than half (64.71%) of the listed NZ 
firms offered incentive salary packages to their CEOs in 1995, while this ratio fell to 
just  below  half  (47.12%)  in  2000  and  somewhat  below  half  (42.96%)  in  2007. 
Moreover,  the  decrease  in  the  percentage  of  Zero  between  2000  and  2007  (5 
percentage  points)  is  about  one-third  of  the  scale  between  1995  and  2000  (17 
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percentage  points).  Furthermore,  Table  10  Panel  B  reveals  that  the  falls  in  the 
percentage of CEOs with incentive packages between 1995 and 2000, and between 
1995 and 2007, are both significant at the 5% level.
Table  11  Panel  A  reports  the  summary  statistics  of  CEO  compensation  across 
different firm sizes. The percentages of CEOs employed who receive incentive based 
compensation  persist  in  a  decreasing  pattern  across  all  three  groups.  Given  the 
statistical  tests  in Panel  B, the percentage of large firm CEOs receiving incentive 
benefits  fell  significantly  from  76.00%  in  1995  to  48.94%  in  2007.  A  similar 
significant reduction occurred for small firms between 1995 and 2007, from 68.42% 
to 38.30%. Medium firms exhibited the same trend but with an insignificant decrease 
of 10 percentage points.
In  New Zealand,  public  disclosure of  executive  compensation  was not  mandatory 
prior to 1997. This would arguably deepen the conflicts between principal and agents 
owing to reduced board incentives to effectively monitor the executive compensation 
structure. Consequently, the CEO will have more power to exert on influencing pay 
levels. The compulsory disclosure of executive compensation could have reflected the 
growing recognition of the risk associated with generous pay settings within NZ listed 
firms. Incentive benefits, such as issuing large stock shares or options as a mechanism 
to align CEO interests with the shareholders’ were also deemed to be risky because 
they encourage executives to focus on short-term performance rather than strategic 
views. Therefore, the continuous reduction in the percentage of NZ listed firms with 
CEOs  who  receive  incentive  benefits  could  possibly  be  explained  by  the  social 
awareness of the risk in doing this. Rather, corporations would choose cash benefits 
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such as salary and bonuses to reward CEOs. As such, the long-term performance of 
CEO is also being monitored.
On 16 February 2004, the New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC) published 
Corporate  Governance  in  New Zealand  Principles  and Guidelines.  This  document 
specifically instructs  that  the principle of remuneration of directors be transparent, 
fair, and reasonable. Option or share benefits should be offered in efforts to focus on 
making a contribution to future investor returns rather than only on short term gains. 
When NZSC surveyed the participants regarding whether executives should receive 
remuneration in the company’s stocks or options, many responded negatively owing 
to the issues of compromising judgment, options diluting existing share holdings, and 
the  possibility  of  abuse.  Those  who  supported  some  payment  in  shares  strongly 
suggested that  this  be fully disclosed and approved by the shareholders.  All  these 
responses  reflect  the  market  consensus  on  exercising  caution  in  issuing  incentive 
packages  to  executive  directors  including  CEOs.  Accordingly,  a  reduction  in  the 
percentage of listed firms issuing incentive benefits to their CEOs would be expected.
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Table 10
Incidence of CEO Equity-based Compensation
This table exhibits the summary statistics for CEO compensation. This is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 0 if the CEO of the firm receives incentive benefits, such as stocks, options etc; otherwise it  
takes the value of 1. Panel A gives yearly descriptive statistics for the sample size, the number of firms 
in which CEOs are, and are not, receiving incentive packages, and the percentage of firms in which 
CEOs are, and are not, receiving incentive benefits. Panel B reports the results of parametric and non 
parametric tests for differences in median percentages of incidences in which CEOs receive incentive 
packages across the years. The Wilcoxon z values are provided for in the non parametric test. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics    
Year
N
Firms # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 68 24 44 35.29% 64.71%
2000 104 55 49 52.88% 47.12%
2007 142 81 61 57.04% 42.96%
Panel B: Tests of difference of in mean percentage
   
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
    
Payment type Z value Z value Z value
   
0 -2.26 -0.65 -2.95 
 **  **
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 11
Incidence of CEO Equity-based Compensation by Firm Size
Panel A presents summary statistics for the number and percentage of firms in which the CEO receives incentive benefits across 
different firm sizes. Panel B reports the results of non parametric tests for differences in the percentage.
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size   
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage 
0
1995 Large 25 6.00 19.00 24.00% 76.00%
2000 Large 34 18.00 16.00 52.94% 47.06%
2007 Large 47 24.00 23.00 51.06% 48.94%
1995 Medium 24 12.00 12.00 50.00% 50.00%
2000 Medium 35 17.00 18.00 48.57% 51.43%
2007 Medium 48 28.00 20.00 58.33% 41.67%
1995 Small 19 6.00 13.00 31.58% 68.42%
2000 Small 35 20.00 15.00 57.14% 42.86%
2007 Small 47 29.00 18.00 61.70% 38.30%
       
Panel D: Tests of difference in mean percentage 0
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Firm Size Z value Z value Z value
Large 2.24 -0.17 2.22
** **
Medium -0.11 0.88 0.67
Small 1.80 0.42 2.22
* **
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.5 Non-executive Director and Chair fees
Summary statistics regarding non-executive chair fees and non-executive director fees 
are shown in Panel A and Panel C of Table 12 respectively for the three sample years. 
Director fees refer to the fees received by individual directors who are non-executive. 
Chair fees refer to fees paid to chairmen who are non-executive. Sample data for these 
two variables are limited mainly because only non-executive fees are collected.  In 
addition,  owing  to  the  fact  that  NZ  listed  firms  were  not  required  to  disclose 
compensation for their directors until 1 July 1997, sample data for 1995 exhibit the 
largest  number  of  missing  observations.  Only 40  out  of  89 sample  firms  provide 
information  for  non-executive  director  fees,  and  38  for  non-executive  chair  fees. 
Director  fees  are  missing  for  the  following  reasons:  1.  Only  aggregate  fees  are 
provided11; 2. Firms do not disclose any information regarding compensation paid to 
their  directors12.  Apart  from  these  missing  firms,  a  further  two  firms  have  been 
removed  from  the  sample  data  for  chair  fees  for  these  reasons:  1.  Executive 
chairman13; 2. CEO duality14.     
Similarly in the 2000 sample data, there is one missing firm for director fees and ten 
missing firms for chair fees. The only one missing firm for director fees is attributed 
to only aggregate fees having been provided. For the other nine missing firms for 
chair fees, six are due to CEO duality, two are due to an executive chairman, and one 
is due to chair  fees reported incorporating more rewards than solely fees,  such as 
allowances.  In  2007,  four  sample  firms  have  not  recorded their  director  fees  and 
11 Aggregate fees mean only collective director fees are provided in the financial statement section 
within the annual report so one cannot determine specific levels of payments for director and chair fees. 
There are 39 missing firms for this reason. However, these cases do not necessarily indicate the 
chairman of these firms is not non-executive. 
12 10 firms are missing for this reason.
13 1 firm is missing for this reason.
14 Payment to the chairman incorporates rewards for his CEO position. 1 firm is missing for this reason.
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thirteen sample firms have not included their chair fees data. Apart from one firm that 
did  not  disclose  information  about  director  fees,  all  the  other  three  firms  only 
provided aggregated director fees. Five out of the remaining nine firms with chair fees 
missing have CEO duality, four of which are due to an executive chairman. 
Regarding the minimum level of payment to chairmen, zero fees, they are paid solely 
by stocks/options but no fees. One firm in 2000 and two firms in 2007 adopted this 
form of remuneration to the CEO. For zero directors’ fees, one firm paid no director 
fees  or  other  remuneration  packages  to  their  directors  in  both  2000  and  2007 
respectively.
The mean represents the average amount of fees received by the chairman and each 
director  of  the  listed  firm in  NZ.  These  fees  have  all  been  adjusted  with  annual 
inflations (base year 2007). Panel A shows the fluctuated average level of chair fees 
during the periods examined while Panel C reports continuing increases for means 
and medians, that is, the levels of payments to chairmen fluctuate while payments to 
directors have been growing through all these years in NZ listed firms. It is worth 
noting that average fees paid to chairmen increased from $45,298 in 1995 to $71,373 
in 2007. However, the median of chair fees only increased from $33,433 to $50,000. 
The magnitude of the increase in director fees is much smaller than that for chairmen, 
from $26,178 in 1995 to $40,493 in 2007 only. A lesser degree of increase is observed 
for the median of director fees, only from $20,660 in 1995 to $32,250 in 2007.   
Table 12 Panels B and D display the results of the T test and Wilcoxon Z test for chair 
fees and director fees. Z values of 2.36 and 3.58 correspondingly report that increases 
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in salary levels of chairmen and directors are significant at the 5% and 0.5% level 
between  1995  and  2007.  Thereby,  both  statistical  tests  evidence  the  significant 
increases in levels of fees paid to chairmen and directors in NZ during 1995 to 2007. 
Table 13 Panels A and C both present the trend in the level of salary paid to chairmen 
and directors across different firm size groups between 1995 and 2007. Panels B and 
D separately display the results  of statistical  tests  regarding the mean and median 
changes between sample periods. With regard to chair fees, between 1995 and 2007, 
the average  amount  awarded increased from $64,639 to  $108,768 for  large  firms, 
from $41,451 to $58,723 for medium firms, and from $29,508 to $42,484 for small 
firms.  The  Z  value  of  1.97  indicates  that  the  increases  in  the  compensation  to 
chairmen between 1995 and 2007 are significant at 5% for medium firms. Such an 
increase  occurred  during  1995  and  2000  (z  value  of  2.21  and  t  value  of  2.06). 
However, statistical tests do not confirm the significance of the increase in the level of 
payments  to  chairmen  of  large  and  small  firms  during  these  sample  years.  Even 
though the T statistic of 1.68 implies that the increase in the level of payments to 
chairmen between 1995 and 2007 for large firms is significant at the 10% level, with 
the normality rejection for the sample data it means T results are not reliable.  
For director fees, the growth in the level of salary is on a much smaller scale than 
chair fees. Panel C of Table 13 shows the average level of fees paid to each director in 
large firms was $39,645 in 1995, $46,849 in 2000, and $60,002 in 2007. Average 
director fees paid by medium firms increased from $28,002 in 1995 to $37,095 in 
2000,  and  then  decreased  to  $34,277 in  2007.  Directors  working  for  small  firms 
received fees averaging $11,638 in 1995, which increased to $19,660 in 2000, and 
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then to $27,023 in 2007. Median values for all size groups present the same trend as 
the mean values except for medium firms, which is a continuous increase while its 
mean  fluctuates.  According  to  the  statistical  results  in  Panel  D,  the  increases  in 
director’s salary levels in large and small firms are significant, indicating this growth 
is genuine. Significant Z values in other intervals indicate that increase for large firms 
occurred  during  1995  and  2000  while  occurred  within  both  the  first  and  second 
intervals for small firms.   
The NZ Securities Commission advocates adequate remuneration as a mechanism to 
attract, retain and motivate potential directors. The level of compensation should be 
fair and reasonable in a competitive market for the skills, knowledge and experience 
required by the entity. Such remuneration is expected to be positively correlated with 
entity performance. Executive and non-executive directors are different in terms of 
their roles and incentives. Therefore, their remuneration packages are supposed to be 
distinguished. Non-executive directors in NZ are usually paid by way of fees.      
The increase in levels of directors’ and chairmen’s compensation could be explained 
from both  demand  and  supply  sides.  From the  demand  side,  as  discussed  in  the 
Director  Independence  section,  NZ  directors’  responsibilities  for  monitoring 
management  receive  high  scrutiny  from  the  public.  Such  responsibilities  are 
considered  to  rest  particularly  on  non-executive  directors’  shoulders.  The  public 
attention and more restricted legislation create for the directors the risk of both losing 
their jobs and facing legal charges. Under such working conditions, it is logical that 
directors may request an increase in the level of remuneration.   
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From the supply side,  participants  in the consultation of Corporate  Governance in 
New Zealand Guidelines and Principles 2003 raised concerns that current levels of 
remuneration for non-executive directors were too low to attract  and retain people 
who  can  make  a  contribution  to  the  company,  regarding  the  responsibilities, 
expectations, and risks associated with being a director. This implies that the current 
average  director  remuneration  is  generally  considered  to  be  under  the  appropriate 
level in NZ. Corporations may seek to raise payments in order to attract, retain, and 
motivate directors to fully contribute.
Table 12
Non-Executive Chair Fees and Directors’ Fees
This table shows the summary statistics for chair and directors’ fees. These fees are all adjusted with 
annual inflation and the base year is 2007. Panel A gives yearly descriptive statistics for the sample size 
of listed firms (i.e., number of chairmen), means, medians, percentiles, minimum and maximum values 
across years. The mean represents the average amount of fees received by the chairman of the board 
84
across the three sample years. Median figures, the 25th and 75th are also measured. Medians for non-
executive directors are based on sample of directorships. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
Panel B reports the results of parametric  and non parametric  tests for differences  in the mean and 
median of the amount of fees for chairmen. The t value and the Wilcoxon Z value are provided by the 
parametric and non parametric test respectively. Panels C & D respectively present summary figures 
for average fees received by each director, and statistical tests for differences in mean and median of 
director fees. Jarque-Bera measurements are performed to justify if data are normally distributed or not 
(if result for JB does not have any * underneath, it means normal distribution is rejected).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　
Chair Fees
Year
N
Firm
s Mean Median
25th
Percentile 
75th
Percentile
Min 
value
Max 
value
Jarque – Bera 
(Mean)
199
5 38 $45,298 $33,433 $21,639 $64,917 $8,656 $123,651 2.62
($28,192)
200
0 94 $80,988 $56,685 $34,973 $73,831 $0 $245,591 28731.02
($229,056)
200
7 129 $71,373 $50,000 $30,000 $88,500 $0 $410,500 10.09
($69,853)
Panel B: Tests of difference 　 　 　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　
Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
0.96 1.98 -0.45 -0.68 2.36 2.36
　 **　 　 　 ** **
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 12
Non-Executive Chair Fees and Directors’ Fees (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics
Director fees / pp
Year
N
Firms
N
Non-exe
Directorship
s Mean Median
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Min 
value Max value
Jarque – 
Bera 
(Mean)
1995 40 213 $26,178 $20,660 $13,132 $29,495 $2,061 $108,710
($22,886)
2000 103 545 $34,390 $28,901 $20,447 $40,316 $0 $258,951
($30,334)
2007 138 648 $40,493 $32,250 $20,600 $50,000 $0 $180,531 159.24
($30,091)
Panel D: Tests of difference
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
1.56 2.50 1.55 1.74 2.80 3.58
** * ** ****
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 13
Non-Executive Chair Fees and Directors’ Fees by Firm Size 
Panels A and C respectively present summary statistics for the average fees received by the chairman and each director on the board across different firm sizes. These fees are 
all adjusted with annual inflation and the base year is 2007. Panels B and D separately report the results for parametric and non parametric tests for differences in the chair 
fees and the directors’ fees. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　 　
Chair Fees
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s Mean Median
25th
Percentile 
75th
Percentile
Min 
value Max value
1995 Large 13 $64,639 $70,257 $31,822 $88,101 $12,400 $123,651
($35,553)
2000 Large 32 $146,080 $71,888 $48,962 $93,261 $0 $2,245,591
($386,527)
2007 Large 45 $108,768 $50,750 $41,750 $83,464 $0 $410,500
($92,397)
1995 Medium 11 $41,451 $41,423 $26,276 $53,367 $18,548 $74,190
($18,621)
2000 Medium 31 $57,770 $58,288 $40,802 $69,581 $0 $106,581
($24,766)
2007 Medium 44 $58,723 $32,000 $77,500 $77,500 $15,000 $135,500
($27,312)
1995 Small 9 $29,508 $21,639 $13,511 $37,681 $8,656 $83,959
($26,721)
2000 Small 31 $37,016 $29,727 $22,004 $46,630 $0 $97,924
($23,993)
2007 Small 40 $42,484 $22,000 $25,000 $50,000 $0 $143,944
($32,662)
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Table 13
Non-Executive Chair Fees and Directors’ Fees by Firm Size (continued)
Panel B: Tests of difference 　 　 　 　
Chair Fees
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Firm Size Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
Large 0.75 0.74 0.62 0.68 1.68 1.51
*
Medium 2.06 2.21 0.16 0.07 2.06 1.97
** ** ** **
Small 0.96 1.29 0.78 0.38 1.33 1.53
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 13
Chair Fees and Directors’ Fees by Firm Size (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　 　 　 　
Director fees / pp
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s
N
Non-exe
Directors Mean Median
25th
Percentile 
75th
Percentile Min value Max value
1995 Large 12 132 $39,645 $28,557 $20,969 $51,439 $14,641 $108,710
($28,061)
2000 Large 34 211 $46,849 $40,331 $31,475 $58,288 $15,406 $108,217
($22,610)
2007 Large 46 245 $60,002 $47,923 $35,000 $58,288 $0 $180,531
($37,146)
1995 Medium 14 53 $28,002 $24,800 $15,876, $33,406 $8,037 $82,679
($18,313)
2000 Medium 34 143 $37,095 $29,144 $23,315 $38,179 $0 $258,951
($41,246)
2007 Medium 47 205 $34,277 $32,000 $23,792 $39,799 $10,417 $106,608
($17,684)
1995 Small 9 41 $11,638 $11,430 $6,789 $16,396 $2,061 $20,608
($6,741)
2000 Small 35 134 $19,660 $19,002 $9,341 $23,315 $0 $73,443
($14,900)
2007 Small 45 156 $27,023 $22,000 $13,750 $33,125 $0 $105,625
($21,345)
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Table 13
Chair Fees and Directors’ Fees by Firm Size (continued)
Panel D: Tests of difference 　 　 　 　
Director Fees
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Firm Size Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
Large 0.89 1.74 1.83 1.50 1.77 2.29
* * * **
Medium 0.82 1.38 -0.42 -0.51 1.19 1.66
*
Small 1.87 2.02 1.74 1.70 2.55 3.00
* ** * * ** ***
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5 %
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4.6 Directors’ Ownership
Sample data for board ownership are limited. As annual reports are the only sources 
of information  for  this  variable,  for  those firms that  do not report  their  directors’ 
ownership,  data  will  be  missing.  There  are  specifically  7,  0  and 3  missing  firms 
respectively in 1995, 2000 and 2007. Table 14 Panel A describes the statistics for 
directors’  ownership  across  the  three  sample  years.  The  mean  is  the  variable 
calculating average beneficial and associate shareholding held by each director across 
three  sample  years.  Mean total  also  includes  non-beneficial  shareholding.  Median 
values are medians of all the median shareholding on each board. It is obvious that the 
mean shareholding held by each director in NZ remained at around 20% for the earlier 
two sample  years,  and  then  decreased  to  13.50% in  2007.  A similar  pattern  was 
observed with mean total  figures  from around 23% during first  two intervals  and 
decreased to 17.31% in 2007. The 25th and 75th percentiles both exhibit decreasing 
trends as well. However, it is interesting that median and median total reveal opposite 
patterns;  median  total  shows  continuous  increase.  Moreover,  the  big  difference 
between means and medians reflects that the sample is skewed by several cases of 
very high holdings.
Table 14 Panel B reveals the statistical significance regarding differences in Mean and 
Median percentages  of board shareholding.  Apart  from three significant  T values, 
none of the Wilcoxon Z statistics is significant, meaning there has been no change in 
the mean of directors’ possession in firm equity between all these years in NZ. 
Means  and  medians  of  board  ownership  across  the  three  sample  years  are 
subsequently divided into large, medium and small firms. Summary figures are shown 
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in Table 15 Panel A. Both large and medium firms had increased average directors’ 
ownership between 1995 and 2000 and subsequent reduction between 2000 and 2007 
to an even lower level than 1995. Small firms, however, revealed continual reduction 
during  all  these  years.  Nevertheless,  all  three  groups present  generally  decreasing 
trends in average directors’ ownership between 1995 and 2007. However, none of the 
T  and  Wilcoxon  Z  figures  in  Panel  B  of  Table  8  is  significant,  indicating  no 
meaningful changes in the mean and median of directors’  ownership across group 
sizes in these three sample years.      
The above steadiness  of  levels  of  board ownerships in  NZ listed  firms  is  not  too 
surprising.  Board  composition  characteristics  have  long  been  one  of  the  hottest 
debates within corporate governance fields in NZ, with most of the attention being 
placed  on  board  size,  board  independence,  outstanding  committees  and  directors’ 
compensation etc. However, the level of board ownership did not seem to be of as 
much  concern  as  the  other  issues.  Since  the  major  global  corporate  governance 
reforms,  NZ  has  had  many  legislative  reforms  regarding  board  composition  and 
characteristics recently. However, neither the well-known Corporate Governance Best 
Practice Code nor the Corporate Governance in NZ Principles and Guidelines paid 
much attention to the level of board ownership in NZ listed firms. It may be true that 
the current level of total directors’ possession of equities is considered appropriate by 
the  public  and  academics.  Therefore,  the  analysed  stability  of  NZ  directors’ 
shareholdings is just according to expectation. 
Compared with Chhaochharia and Grinstein’s (2007) study using US data, this paper 
demonstrates  a  relatively  high  consistency.  Both  studies  find  a  slight  increase  in 
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directors’ ownership during the first period of examination and a subsequent sharper 
decrease  in  the  following period.  However,  statistical  tests  in  both  studies  do not 
present  any  significance  regarding  the  changes  in  directors’  ownership  between 
sample years. It seems that board ownership in both countries is keeping at a level 
compatible with local corporate governance requirements.
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Table 6
Board Ownership
This table exhibits the summary statistics for board ownership. Panel A gives yearly descriptive statistics for the sample size of both listed firms and total directorships, 
means, medians and percentiles. The mean represents the average beneficial and associate shareholding held by all directors across three sample years. The mean total also 
includes non-beneficial shareholding. Panel B reports the results of parametric and non parametric tests for differences in mean and median percentages of the shareholding  
of directors. The t value and the Wilcoxon z value are provided for in the parametric and non parametric test respectively. Jarque-Bera measurements are performed to justify 
if data are normally distributed or not (if result for JB does not have any * underneath, it means normal distribution is rejected).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics        
Year
N
Firm
s
N
Director
-ships
Mean
(%)
Mean
Total
(%)
Median
(%)
Median
Total
(%)
25th
Percentile
(%)
25th 
(Total)
Percentile
(%)
75th
Percentile
(%)
75th 
(Total)
Percentile
(%)
1995 82 21.43 24.24 3.61 4.23 0.29 0.37 36.78 43.97
(27.70) (21.78)
2000 104 19.80 22.28 3.91 5.51 0.23 0.28 33.41 43.97
(26.12) (27.25)
2007 138 13.50 17.31 3.44 6.27 0.25 0.70 20.51 22.88
(19.95) (23.67)
Panel B: Tests of difference          
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
           
Ttest T Total Wilcoxon W Total Ttest T Total Wilcoxon W Total Ttest T Total Wilcoxon W Total
-0.47 -0.57 0.51 0.64 -2.01 -1.34 -1.22 0.54 -2.41 -1.86 -1.57 1.07
** ** *
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 75
Directors’ Ownership by Firm Size
Panel A presents summary statistics for the average percentage held by directors across different firm sizes. Panel B reports the results of parametric and non parametric tests  
for differences in the percentage.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size       
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s
N
Director
-ships Mean %
Mean
Total % Median %
Median
Total %
25th
Percentile % 
25th (Total)
Percentile % 
75th
Percentile %
75th (Total)
Percentile %
1995 Large 27 16.82 17.30 3.81 3.81 0.10 0.23 32.08 32.08
(23.23) (23.16)
2000 Large 34 17.58 18.82 1.39 3.14 0.08 0.08 24.11 24.44
(26.55) (27.17)
2007 Large 47 9.92 16.31 0.75 1.20 0.03 0.06 10.73 22.68
(17.92) (26.65)
1995 Medium 29 23.03 27.71 3.40 4.11 0.33 0.37 45.42 53.28
(29.47) (33.76)
2000 Medium 35 23.58 26.58 7.81 16.49 0.22 0.27 40.28 50.64
(28.84) (30.18)
2007 Medium 47 12.69 15.43 4.03 7.26 0.62 0.78 20.5 21.74
(18.58) (20.29)
1995 Small 26 24.44 27.57 4.69 14.58 1.36 1.45 55.85 65.99
(30.29) (31.02)
2000 Small 35 17.65 20.03 4.37 6.12 0.71 0.71 26.59 40.83
(23.05) (24.21)
2007 Small 43 18.19 20.20 8.78 12.07 1.06 1.68 31.36 35.76
(22.80) (23.84)
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Table 15 
Directors’ Ownership by Firm Size (continued)
Panel B: Tests of difference in mean and median         
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Firm Size Ttest
Ttest 
Total Wilcoxon W Total Ttest
Ttest 
Total Wilcoxon W Total Ttest
Ttest 
Total Wilcoxon W Total
Large 0.12 0.23 -0.07 -0.20 -1.54 -0.42 -1.39 -0.52 -1.42 -0.16 -1.29 -0.51
Medium 0.07 -0.14 0.19 -0.15 -2.07 -2.00 -1.07 -0.96 -1.88 -1.98 0.79 062
** ** * *
Small -0.99 -1.07 -0.63 -0.91 0.18 0.14 0.38 0.60 -0.90 -1.02 -0.35 -0.51
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.7 CEO Duality
NZ firms are mandated to disclose the names of chairmen and CEO in the annual 
reports, from which CEO duality can be identified by the employees’ names. Table 16 
Panel A reports the frequency of CEO duality across three sample years.  Panel B 
displays  the  results  of  statistical  tests  for  differences  of  incidences  of  CEO 
chairmanship between years. It is necessary to make it clear that the sample size of 
firms in Table 11 Panel A indicates 32 non-executive chairmen in 1995 while Table 
16 Panel A reports 88 non-CEO chairmen in 1995.  A non-CEO chairman does not 
necessarily mean a non-executive chairman. 
Only one firm employed  the same person as the CEO and the chairman in 1995, 
which accounts for just 1.12% of the sample size. This percentage jumps to 8.65% in 
2000 and shrinks back to 3.52% in 2007. The pattern shows a big fluctuation during 
these three years, that is, a significant increase (z value of -2.35) in the number of 
firms having CEO duality during 1995 and 2000, and a sharp decrease (z value of 
1.72) during 2000 and 2007.     
In order to show a clearer picture for the trend of CEO duality frequency across three 
sample years, the sample firms are subsequently categorized into large, medium and 
small sizes. Table 17 Panel A reports the CEO chairmanship phenomenon inside firms 
of different sizes across three sample periods. The first noticeable part of this Panel is 
that  CEO duality is  drastically unpopular in medium firms,  as only one incidence 
occurred in 1995 with none in 2000 and 2007. Another noteworthy fact is that both 
large and small firms have an up-and-down trend regarding the frequency of firms 
having  CEO duality.  More  specifically,  the  number  of  firms  employing  the  same 
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person as their CEO and chairman increased from 0% in 1995 in large firms and small 
firms to 8.82% and 17.14% in 2000 respectively.  Subsequently between 2000 and 
2007 in both group firms, CEO duality occurrences fell largely, especially for large 
firms which fell back to 0% again while for small firms the drop is only 10.64%.         
Panel B exhibits the results of a z test for differences in percentage. Z value -2.38 
indicates the significant increase in the number of firms having CEO chairmanship in 
small  firms between 1995 and 2000. However,  z value 2.08 reports  that  the CEO 
duality phenomenon significantly reduced between 2000 and 2007 in large firms. On 
the other hand, CEO duality occurrences exhibited an increasing trend in small firms 
between 1995 and 2000, and between 1995 and 2007. 
According to the Corporate Governance in New Zealand Principles and Guidelines, 
there is a strong advocacy in public for the separation of CEO and chairperson in an 
entity.  However, some participants from the consultation process indicated that this 
general agreement, i.e. CEO/chair separation should not be prescribed. There might 
still be cases in which CEO duality is the best choice for the company owing to the 
specialist skills and attributes. According to the Stewardship theory, a CEO with the 
willingness to truly take care of the corporation will perform better with condensed 
power. Therefore, the significant increase in the incidence of CEO duality between 
1995 and 2000 might be due to the increasing number of CEOs who want to work for 
firms  offering  power  to  them.  Another  possible  explanation  for  the  significant 
increase is the growth in the number of firms which demand a union of CEO and 
chairman because the CEO is the best choice for the position.   
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The significant reduction in the occurrence of CEO duality between 2000 and 2007 
can be interpreted as the social  recognition of the importance of the separation of 
CEO  and  chairman.  The  public  consultation  for  Corporate  Governance  in  New 
Zealand  Principles  and  Guidelines  raised  questions  on  the  fundamentality  of 
separating CEO and chairman. The question: “How can the same person provide an 
interface?” is being asked. As the chairman is the key person to monitor management, 
it would be necessary for a relatively sized company to separate these two positions to 
ensure effective scrutiny of the CEO is being performed. As the average size of NZ 
listed  firms  is  larger  than  before,  the  requirement  for  the  separation  of  CEO and 
chairman would presumably be higher.  This could possibly explain the significant 
reduction between 2000 and 2007.  
Compared  with  US firms,  NZ firms  show greater  change  in  separating  CEO and 
chairman.  Chhaochharia  and  Grinstein  (2007)  reported  a  slight  decrease  in  the 
frequency of CEO duality inside US listed firms between 1997 and 2000, followed by 
a small increase between 2000 and 2007. However, the number of firms having CEO 
duality in US is much more common than in NZ. Around 75 - 80% of the US listed 
firms employ the same person as CEO and chairman, while the percentage remains 
below 18% in NZ.
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Table 86
Incidence of CEO Duality
This table exhibits the summary statistics for CEO duality. This is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board; otherwise it takes the value of 0. Panel A 
gives yearly descriptive statistics for the sample size, number of firms of which the CEO is holding the 
chairmanship or not, and the percentage of each occasion. Panel B reports the results of parametric tests 
for differences in the median percentage of incidences of CEO duality across the years.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　
Year
N
Firms # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 89 1 88 1.12% 98.88%
2000 104 9 95 8.65% 91.35%
2007 142 5 137 3.52% 96.48%
Panel B: Tests of difference of percentage for CEO duality
　 　 　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　
Duality Z value Z value Z value
　 　 　
1 -2.35 1.72 -1.11 
　 ** * 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 97
Incidence of CEO Duality by Firm Size
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　 　
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s # 1 # 0
Percentage 
1
Percentage 
0
1995 Large 29 0.00 29.00 0.00% 100.00%
2000 Large 34 3.00 31.00 8.82% 91.18%
2007 Large 47 0.00 47.00 0.00% 100.00%
1995 Medium 30 1.00 29.00 3.33% 96.67%
2000 Medium 35 0.00 35.00 0.00% 100.00%
2007 Medium 48 0.00 48.00 0.00% 100.00%
1995 Small 30 0.00 30.00 0.00% 100.00%
2000 Small 35 6.00 29.00 17.14% 82.86%
2007 Small 47 5.00 42.00 10.64% 89.36%
　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Panel B: Tests of difference in percentage 1
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Firm Size Wilcoxon Wilcoxon Wilcoxon
Large -1.64 2.08 n/a
**
Medium 1.08 n/a 1.27
Small -2.38 0.85 -1.85
** *
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.8 Female Presence on Boards
Panel A of Table 18 displays the number and the percentage of firms involving gender 
diversification, that is, a female director or female CEO board presence across three 
sample  periods.  #  1  is  the  symbol  representing  a  firm  appointing  female  board 
members  or  a  female  CEO,  otherwise  shown  as  #  0.  Data  for  this  variable  are 
identified from either the name or profile picture or both of the directors. Panel A 
exhibits incessant growth in the percentage of firms having female directors or a CEO 
on the board. More specifically, the percentage of NZ listed firms that have female 
board appointments rose from 12.36% in 1995 to 18.27% in 2000, and then to 30.28% 
in  2007.  Regarding  the  incidence  of  firms  having  female  CEOs,  the  percentage 
increase  between  the  latter  two  years  is  much  larger  than  the  former  two  years, 
indicating recognition of the importance of having gender diversity on boards in NZ 
listed firms during 2000 and 2007. Using the measurement of total number of female 
directors  or  CEOs as  a  percentage  of  total  directorships,  the  frequency of  female 
board membership jumps from 2.63% in 1995 to 3.87% in 2000, and then to 7.80% in 
2007. Average number of female directors or CEO has almost tripled between 1995 
and 2007. Altogether these facts advise that NZ needs more female directors or CEOs. 
Panel B presents the Z tests for the differences in the percentages of firms having 
female directors or female CEOs between the sample years. A Z value of 2.14 further 
reflects the significance of the increase in board presence of female directors between 
2000 and 2007. A larger Z value, 3.13, indicates that the growth between 1995 and 
2007 is even more significant. A similar significance of the increasing tendency is 
revealed  in the  total  number  (%) measurement,  with addition  of higher  degree of 
significance for the increase between 2000 and 2007.
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Turning  to  Table  19,  Panel  A  shows  the  summary  statistics  for  the  number  and 
percentage of firms appointing female directors or female CEOs on boards across 
different firm sizes. Panel A reports large and nonstop escalation in the percentage of 
firms with director  gender diversification across three group sizes. In terms of the 
scale of growth between years, large firms show superior development during the first 
time  interval  (15  percentage  points)  while  the  second  time  interval  shows  more 
advanced development for both medium (27 percentage points) and small firms (19 
percentage points). Comparing group sizes, firm size is positively correlated with the 
percentage of firms having female board appointments. Shown by the measurement of 
total  number  as  a  percentage  of  total  directorships,  the  pattern  reveals  again  the 
continuous increasing trend among all size groups. Panel B justifies the significance 
of the growth in the percentage of firms having female directors. The increase for 
small firms is statistically significant at the 5% level and medium firms show even 
more significant growth, at the 0.5% level, between 1995 and 2007, within which the 
increase occurred during 2000 and 2007 (z value of 2.33 for percentage 1 and 2.86 for 
total number %).    
Such  an  increasing  trend  in  female  board  presence  in  NZ  listed  firms  is 
understandable. NZ was the first country where women were able to vote, implying 
social  recognition  of  their  skills  and  talents.  On  15  April  2010,  the  Minister  of 
Woman’s  Affairs,  the  Hon.  Pansy  Wong,  expressed  her  appreciation  in  the 
Momentum of  Change15 for  the  support  of  the  Women  on Boards  initiative  from 
various organisations. The Prime Minister, the Hon. John Key, launched the Women 
on  Boards  initiative  in  May  1995,  promoting  the  outperformance  achieved  by 
corporations  with  a  female  presence  in  the  boardroom.  Within  1995,  their 
15 See http://beehive.govt.nz/speech/momentum-change-institute-directors-new-zealand-agm 
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investigation showed that the top 25 percent of the firms with most female directors 
had returns 53 percent higher on equity, 42 percent higher on sales and 66 percent 
higher on invested capital than the bottom 25 percent of the firms. 
Australia  also  has  changed  its  system  requiring  businesses  listed  on  the  stock 
exchange  to  disclose  the  gender  diversity  of  their  boardroom.  Similarly,  Norway 
legislation mandates 40% of board memberships to be owned by females. The routes 
taken  may  vary  from  country  to  country,  but  these  together  reflect  the  global 
recognition of the constructive contribution that can be brought into the boardroom by 
women. Although there is no legislation in NZ mandating the quota for women board 
presence, it is possible that the international implication regarding the importance for 
women to be involved in the top management of businesses has long alerted the NZ 
corporations and reminded them to change according to their needs. Thus, this could 
be a possible explanation for the significant increase in the female presence on the 
boards of NZ listed firms during our sample periods.
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Table 10
Incidence of Female Directors / CEO presence
This table exhibits the summary statistics for female directors / CEOs. A dummy variable is used for 
both variables each taking the value of 1 if the board contains a female director / CEO; otherwise it 
takes the value of 0. Panel A gives yearly descriptive statistics for the sample size of both listed firms 
and  total  directorships,  the  number  of  firms  which  employ  female  directors  /  CEOs and  not,  the 
percentage  of  each  occasion,  and  the  total  number  of  female  directors  /  CEOs on  the  board  as  a 
percentage  of  total  directorships  each  year.  Panel  B  reports  the  results  of  parametric  tests  for 
differences in the median percentage of incidences of female directors / CEOs across the years. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　 　
Year
N
Firm
s
N
directorships # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
Avg 
number 
per 
board
Total
number
(%)
1995 89 532 11 78.00 12.36% 87.64% 0.28 2.63% 
2000 104 595 19 85.00 18.27% 81.73% 0.44 3.87% 
2007 142 718 43 99.00 30.28% 69.72% 0.78 7.80% 
Panel B: Tests of difference of mean percentage 1 and total number %
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 Z value Z value Z value
Percentage 1 1.13 2.14 3.13 
** ****
Total number 1.17 2.98 3.93
     (%) 　 **** ****
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 11
Incidence of the Presence of Female Directors / CEOs by Firm Size
Panel A presents summary statistics for the number and percentage of firms employing female directors 
across different firm sizes. Panel B reports the results for non parametric tests for differences in the 
percentage.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　 　 　
Year
Firm 
Size
N
Firm
s
N
Director
-ships # 0 # 1
Percentage
0
Mean
Percentage
1
Avg 
number 
per 
board
Total
number
(%)
199
5 Large 29 207 23 6 79.31% 20.69% 0.28 3.92%
200
0 Large 34 238 22 12 64.71% 35.29% 0.44 6.29%
200
7 Large 47 279 30 17 63.83% 36.17% 0.45 7.58%
199
5 Medium 30 177 27 3 90.00% 10.00% 0.10 1.69%
200
0 Medium 35 185 30 5 85.71% 14.29% 0.17 3.22%
200
7 Medium 48 247 30 18 62.50% 37.50% 0.54 10.49%
199
5 Small 30 148 28 2 93.33% 6.67% 0.10 2.03%
200
0 Small 35 166 30 5 85.71% 14.29% 0.14 2.95%
200
7 Small 47 192 35 12 74.47% 25.53% 0.28 6.85%
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Panel B: Tests of difference in mean percentage 1 and Total Number (%)
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size
Z value
(P 1)
Z value
(T %)
Z value
(P 1)
Z value
(T %)
Z value
(P 1)
Z value
(T %)
Large 1.28 1.12 0.08 0.57 1.43 1.68
*
Medium 0.52 0.94 2.33 2.86 2.66 3.55 
*** **** **** ****
Small 0.99 0.52 1.24 1.68 2.09 2.07 
　 　 　 　 　 * ** **　
significance * 10%    ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.9  Staggered Board
Table  20  Panel  A  outlines  the  summary  statistics  regarding  the  number  and 
percentage  of  listed  firms  having  staggered  boards  in  NZ.  #  1  indicates  that  the 
number  of  firms having staggered  boards increased continuously during 1995 and 
2007, from 52 to 63.  However,  the better  justification,  the percentage,  shows that 
staggered boards have become less and less favourable,  i.e.  a reduced percentage, 
during  1995 and 2007.  The  percentage  of  listed  firms  in  NZ that  have  staggered 
boards reduced from 58.43% in 1995 to 50.96% in 2000, and then to 44.37% in 2007, 
that  is,  an  over  5%  reduction  between  adjacent  years.  Panel  B  of  this  table 
demonstrates  the  statistical  significance  of  the  difference  in  the  percentage  of 
staggered boards between sample years. Only the reduction between 1995 and 2007, 
an approximate 14 percentage points, is significant (Z value of 2.08).  
Similarly  to  the  previous  provisions  examined,  sample  data  for  staggered  boards 
across three sample years are subsequently categorized into large, medium and small 
firms.  From Panel  A of  Table  21,  three groups each show different  trends  in  the 
popularity of staggered boards within firms. For large firms, the percentage reduced 
from 68.97% in 1995 to 55.88% in 2000, and to 48.94% in 2007. Medium firms also 
display a reduction but to a greater degree between 1995 and 2000 than large firms, 
from 66.67% to 48.57%. However, this ratio increased back to 50% in 2007. Small 
firms,  on the other  hand,  reveal  exactly  the opposite  trend to  medium firms.  The 
percentage rose from 40.00% in 1995 to 48.57% in 2000, and then fell to 34.04% in 
2007. Regarding the statistical significance of these movements, only the reduction in 
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large firms between 1995 and 2007 is significant.
An aforementioned characteristic of staggered boards is its ability to be an effective 
mechanism to defend hostile takeovers, but at the same time a staggered board is also 
a potential device to help management escape from exposure to the corporate control 
market. In other words, it might cause management entrenchment. After the shocking 
corporate  scandals,  there  has  been  a  worldwide  calling  for  better  corporate 
governance  structures  in  terms  of  more  effective  monitoring  of  managements. 
However,  staggered  boards  may seem to  create  the  opposite  effects  because  they 
reduce shareholders’ power over the removal of management. 
From the 1990s to the present, all of the corporate governance legislation such as the 
Companies  Act  1993,  the Corporate  Governance  Best  Practice  Code 2003-04 and 
many  other  related  legislative  reforms  reveal  the  resolution  for  better  corporate 
governance structures in NZ. As one of the studies opposing the use of staggered 
boards, Guo et al. found that firms tending to drop the stagger are the ones considered 
to have better corporate governance and/or stricter monitoring of managers/directors. 
Therefore, the significant decreases in the number of firms having staggered boards in 
NZ might  reflect  the  negative  effects  of  staggered  boards  on firm values  and the 
wealth creation from de-staggering. Another finding of Guo et al.  (2008) was that 
firms  with  a  higher  proportion  of  independent  directors  are  more  inclined  to  de-
stagger. As reported earlier in this study, the ratio of independent directors on boards 
has been increasing significantly during the periods examined. It is uncertain that if 
such an increase in independent directors contributed to the reduction in the use of 
staggered boards, but it  does not contradict  the finding of Guo et al.  (2008). This 
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conjecture could be used for future research.
Table 12
Incidence of Staggered Boards
This table displays the summary statistics for incidences of staggered boards within NZ listed firms. A 
dummy variable is used taking the value of 1 if the board is staggered; otherwise it takes the value of 0. 
Panel  A  gives  yearly  descriptive  statistics  for  the  sample  size,  the  number  of  firms  which  have 
staggered  boards  and do not,  and  the percentage  of  each  occasion.  Panel  B reports  the  results  of 
parametric tests for differences in the percentage of incidences of staggered boards across the years. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　
Year
N
Firms # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 89 52 37 58.43% 41.57%
2000 104 53 51 50.96% 49.04%
2007 142 63 79 44.37% 55.63%
Panel B: Tests of difference of mean percentage
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 Z value Z value Z value
　 　 　
1 1.04 1.02 2.08 
　 　 　 **
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 13
Incidence of Staggered Boards by Firm Size
Panel  A exhibits  summary  statistics  for  the  number  and  percentage  of  firms employing  staggered 
boards across different firm sizes. Panel B reports the results for parametric tests for differences in the 
percentages.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 Large 29 20 9 68.97% 31.03%
2000 Large 34 19 15 55.88% 44.12%
2007 Large 47 23 24 48.94% 51.06%
1995 Medium 30 20 10 66.67% 33.33%
2000 Medium 35 17 18 48.57% 51.43%
2007 Medium 48 24 24 50.00% 50.00%
1995 Small 30 12 18 40.00% 60.00%
2000 Small 35 17 18 48.57% 51.43%
2007 Small 47 16 31 34.04% 65.96%
　 　 　 　 　 　
Panel B: Tests of difference in mean percentage 1
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size Z value Z value Z value
Large 1.07 0.62 1.71
*
Medium 1.47 -0.13 1.44 
Small -0.69 1.33 0.53 
　 　 　 　 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.10 Director Tenure
Director  tenure  is  defined  as  the  length  of  time  a  director  has  held  a  board 
membership.  Both social  and financial  researchers have scrutinised director  tenure 
regarding its impact on firm performance (Buchanan, 1974, Vafeas, 2003). Buchanan 
discovered  that  prolonged  tenure  for  directors  reflected  their  importance  to  the 
organization and thus enhances hard working directors’ organizational commitment. 
Accordingly,  Vafeas  developed  an  expertise  hypothesis  suggesting  a  positive 
relationship  applies  to  tenure  and  firm-  and  industry-specific  knowledge  and 
environment,  and  thus  better  monitoring  by  long-term  directors.  Additionally, 
Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) also suggested that long-term members are more 
inclined to criticize the CEO than new board members who tend to be deferential to 
the CEO. In short, lengthy-tenure directors, who have accumulated extensive relevant 
knowledge and experience for the organization and the willingness to point at  the 
CEO, would provide a positive contribution to the corporation.  
On the other hand, there are also concerns regarding relationship building between 
directors  and the management  over  time.  The management  friendliness  hypothesis 
suggested by Vafeas (2003) highlights the possibility of compromising monitoring of 
the CEO by directors as their relationships developed. In other words, it is possible 
that long-serving board members, who may have constructed close relationships with 
the  CEO,  might  be  inclined  to  shift  their  interest  in  protecting  shareholders  to 
accommodating  CEO  wishes.  Byrd,  Cooperman  and  Wolfe  (2010)  reported  that 
compensation  of  long-tenure  CEOs  is  positively  related  to  the  median  tenure  of 
outside directors, indicating the CEO allegiance hypothesis. Similarly, Vafeas (2003) 
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also found that directors with twenty years or more of board membership were more 
likely to be classified as “grey” directors, suggesting a tendency to compromise their 
impartiality in supervising the management. 
Table 22 reports the number and percentage of listed firms within which the majority 
of the board members are long-term directors. A long-term director is defined in this 
study as one who has served the board for five years or longer.  Panel A shows a 
continuous increase in both the number and percentage of listed firms having a long-
term board. Percentage 1 represents the boards filled with a majority of long-time 
directors. Regarding percentage, in particular 1, it increased from 20.22% in 1995 to 
36.54% in 2000, and then to 47.18% in 2007. In other words, there is a huge growth 
of  27  percentage  points  between  1995  and  2007,  in  which  the  increase  of  16 
percentage points between 1995 and 2000 accounts for the major portion. Further, the 
last  column  of  Panel  A  confirms  the  fact  that  there  is  an  increasing  number  of 
directors  with lengthy tenure.  The percentage  of  the total  number  of  long-serving 
directors grew from 33.84% in 1995 to 45.52% in 2000, and then to 50.95% in 2007.
Panel B shows the statistical test for the difference in percentage 1 and percentage 1 
(#) across sample  years.  It  reveals  that  the huge increase  of  27 percentage  points 
between 1995 and 2007 for percentage 1 is significant  at the 0.5% level,  and this 
increase  started  occurring  between  1995  and  2000.  A  similar  significance  for 
percentage 1 (#) is observed also, but to a lower level.
When the full sample is partitioned into large,  medium and small  firms,  the same 
trend is exhibited for each size group. Table 23 shows the summary figures for each 
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group. All three size groups display a continuous increase in percentage 1 across three 
years, within which the increase between the former two years is superior to the latter 
two years. Across the sample years, medium firms exhibit the highest percentage 1 
(30.00%) in 1995 and in 2000 (40.00%). Small firms take the lead in 2007 (51.06%). 
Turning to size groups, large firms have the largest increase (40 percentage points) in 
percentage 1 during the full sample period followed by small firms (38 percentage 
points) and medium firms (15 percentage points). Percentage 1 (#) records the total 
number of long-serving directors as a percentage of board size at around 30% to 40% 
for large firms, 40% to 50% for medium firms, and above 50% for small firms across 
these years. The tendency of movement for this percentage fluctuates for large and 
medium firms while it continuously decreases for small firms. 
Z values in Panel B of Table 23 further justify the significance of these increases. Z 
values of -3.45 and -1.97 indicate that the increase in percentage 1 for large firms 
between 1995 and 2007 and between 2000 and 2007 are significant at the 0.5% and 
5% levels  respectively.  Similar statistics are observed for small  firms.  Z values of 
-3.36  and  -1.95  indicate  the  significant  increases  in  percentage  1  for  small  firms 
between 1995 and 2007 and between 1995 and 2000 correspondingly.      
The constitution of NZX Listing Rules do not provide for a maximum fixed term for a 
director or a mandatory retiring age. However, Rule 3.3.816 of the NZX listing rules as 
of May 2006 constitutes the rotation of director requirement.  Directors will normally 
be elected at an annual meeting for a term of three years. Continuation of appointment 
is contingent on re-election at annual shareholders’ meetings. The reasonable expected 
16 Rules 3.3.8: Subject to Rule 3.3.9, at least one third of the Directors or, if their number is not a multiple of three, then 
the number nearest to one third, shall retire from office at the annual meeting each year, but shall be eligible for re-
election at that meeting. Those to retire shall be those who have been longest in office since they were last elected or 
deemed elected.
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tenure for a director will be two terms (i.e. two terms of generally three years each) 
following first election at an annual meeting. 
It is clear from the above legislation that director tenure has not had a strict limit in 
NZ. Even though the new legislative reform requires a director to rotate for retirement 
every three years, it still allows continuation of appointment. This suggests a culture 
in NZ that does not perceive long tenure of directors as harmful to board performance. 
Taking ING Property Ltd as an example, their current annual report says: “The Board 
does not impose a restriction on the tenure of any Director as it considers that such a 
restriction may lead to the loss of experience and expertise from the Board”. This 
example  reflects  the  conjecture  of  the  Expertise  Hypothesis  indicated  by  Vafeas 
(2003) earlier in this study. If a director can supply needed knowledge or experience 
to the board,  i.e.  help the board improve its  performance,  a sudden cut to  his/her 
service  would  be  a  loss  to  the  firm.  Knowing  there  is  a  deadline  for  board 
membership, a director might not be willing to make great efforts but simply wait for 
the term to end. Therefore, the culture of keeping long-serving directors on boards of 
NZ listed firms could be interpreted as the firms placing a high valuation on the 
expertise and contribution brought by directors. Such expertise and contribution are 
gained by many years of service on a board.
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Table 14
Director Tenure
This table reports the figures for the number of firms in which a majority of the board members have lengthy tenure. Lengthy tenure is defined as five years or more. A 
dummy variable is used taking the value of 1 if the board contains a majority of long-serving directors; otherwise it takes the value of 0. Panel A gives yearly descriptive 
statistics for the sample size of both listed firms and total directorships, the number of firms which have lengthy board tenure (Percentage 1) and not (Percentage 0), and the 
percentage of each occasion. It also displays the percentages of the total number of directors with lengthy-tenure (Percentage 1 (#)) and not (Percentage 0 (#)) each year.  
Panel B displays the results of parametric tests for differences in the percentage of incidences of lengthy board tenure across the years. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　 　
Year
N
Firms
N
Director
-ships # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
Percentage
1 (#)
Percentage
0 (#)
1995 89 532 18 71 20.22% 79.78% 33.84% 66.16%
2000 104 595 38 66 36.54% 63.46% 45.52% 54.48%
2007 142 718 67 75 47.18% 52.82% 50.95% 49.05%
Panel B: Tests of difference of mean percentage
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 Z value Z value Z value
　 　 　
1 -2.49 -1.67 -4.13 
*** * ****
1 (#) -1.65 -0.84 -2.55 
　 　 * 　 **
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 15
Director Tenure by Firm Size
Panel A exhibits summary statistics for the number and percentage of firms employing lengthy boards across different firm sizes. The percentages of the total numbers of  
long-serving directors on boards are also displayed across different firm sizes in each year. Panel B reports the results for parametric tests for differences in the percentage.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　 　 　
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s
N
Director
-ships # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
Percentage
1 (#)
Percentage
0 (#)
1995 Large 29 207 5 24 17.24% 82.76% 29.87% 70.13%
2000 Large 34 238 12 22 35.29% 64.71% 41.00% 59.00%
2007 Large 47 279 27 20 57.45% 42.55% 30.67% 69.33%
1995 Medium 30 177 9 21 30.00% 70.00% 40.77% 59.23%
2000 Medium 35 185 14 21 40.00% 60.00% 54.42% 45.58%
2007 Medium 48 247 22 26 45.83% 54.17% 42.05% 57.95%
1995 Small 30 148 4 26 13.33% 86.67% 55.63% 44.37%
2000 Small 35 166 12 23 34.29% 65.71% 52.71% 47.29%
2007 Small 47 192 24 23 51.06% 48.94% 41.90% 58.10%
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Table 23
Director Tenure by Firm Size (continued)
Panel B: Tests of difference in mean percentage 1
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size Z value Z value Z value
Large -1.61 -1.97 -3.45
** ****
Medium -0.84 -0.53 -1.39 
Small -1.95 -1.51 -3.36 
　 　 ** 　 ****
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.11 Director Experience
A director’s experience is defined in this paper as the number of years of the longest 
board memberships of such director. In other words, it is the length of time that a 
director  has  been  a  board  member  for,  i.e.  director  tenure.  The  supportive  and 
opposing opinions promoted by prior academic studies regarding director tenure are 
presented in  section 4.10.  A director  with lengthy experience  as a  director  would 
arguably be more qualified as a professional director than those with short-serving 
tenure. The difference between this section the above section is that Director Tenure 
discusses  the  length  of  time  of  employment  for  the  listed  firm  while  Director 
Experience examines the length of time of the longest employment.
Data for this variable are manually collected from the Companies Office website17. 
PDF files are retrieved from the website when searching director names. These files 
contain names and dates of the companies that  each director was appointed to the 
board  of  directors.  The  time  length  difference  between  the  earliest  date  of 
appointment and year  of examination is then collected as director experience.  One 
limitation of using the information from the Companies Office is that this website was 
restructured in 1993 and date  of director  appointment  prior  to this  period may be 
affected by the date of data being entered in the database18. However, this is the only 
reliable data source found for this variable. 
Table 24 Panel A reports the summary statistics of average tenure per directors on 
board. Out of 594, 671 and 791 directors employed by listed firms in 1995, 2000 and 
17 http://www.business.govt.nz/companies/ 
18 Statement that appears in all firms' records: "Where appointments are prior to February 1993 the date 
shown may relate to when the information was entered on this database."
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2007,  average  longest  tenure  per  director  is  7.85,  10.30  and  14.97  respectively. 
Median values have increased at the similar pace, from 6 in 1995 to 10 in 2000, and to 
15 in 2007. Same patterns are observed for percentiles. Panel B shows high statistical 
significances in each interval, suggesting directors with long-serving board experience 
have become more and more popular being employed in NZ listed firms.
Firm size  is  subsequently  used to  partition  the  yearly  datasets.  Table  25 Panel  A 
shows descriptive statistics of conditioned datasets. Taking a quick glance over Mean 
and Median values, both columns contain continuous increasing trends for each group 
size. Among these group sizes, large firms display the biggest increase during both 
1995  and  2000  (from 6.50  to  9.97),  and  during  2000  and  2007  (then  to  15.09). 
Medium and small firms have very similar trends; average director’s longest board-
serving time jumped from around 8 to 10 and then to 15 years during 1995, 2000 and 
2007. Z values  in Panel  B of Table  25 confirm that the increases  among all  size 
groups during each interval are highly significant. T values present similar findings 
except for the insignificant increase for medium firms between 1995 and 2000.
The above statistics and results of statistical analyses further indicate that directors 
with longer directing experiences are recognised as more qualified and professional 
directors in NZ. These kind of directors is more likely to be employed in NZ listed 
firms. Possibly the most critical reason for this tendency is due to the sophisticated 
experiences and skills possessed by these directors through the years of commitment 
to directorships. These precious and unique backgrounds from each director are surely 
a valuable asset to the firm.
Table 24
Director Experience
119
This table presents the figures for the director experience, measured by average longest time of being a 
director among the directors on board. Panel A gives yearly descriptive statistics for the sample size of 
both listed firms and total directorships, means and medians of average tenure per director. 25th and 75th 
percentiles are also shown. Standard deviations are given in brackets. Panel B reports the results of 
parametric and non parametric tests for differences in means and medians across the years. The t value 
and the Wilcoxon z value are provided for the parametric and non parametric test respectively. Jarque-
Bera measurements are performed to justify if data are normally distributed or not (if result for JB does 
not have any * underneath, it means normal distribution is rejected).
  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　
Year
N
Firms
N
Director
-ships Mean Median
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Jarque - 
Bera
1995 89 532 7.85 6.00 5.00 9.00 1199.44
(4.62)
2000 104 595 10.30 10.00 9.00 11.00 3.96
(2.47)
2007 142 718 14.97 15.00 13.00 18.00 15.43
(4.10)
Panel A: Tests of difference in Mean (excl CEO)　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　
Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
4.68 6.55 10.37 9.43 12.20 10.21
**** **** **** **** **** ****
　 　 　 　 　 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
Table 16
Director Experience by Firm Size
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Panel A exhibits summary statistics for the average longest  director  experience per director  across 
different firm sizes. The percentages of the total numbers of long-serving directors on boards are also 
displayed across different firm sizes in each year. Panel B reports the results for parametric tests for 
differences in the percentage.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　 　
Year Firm Size
N
Firms
N
Director
-ships Mean Median
25th
Percentile 
75th
Percentile
1995 Large 29 207 6.50 6.00 4.50 8.00
2000 Large 34 238 9.97 10.00 8.00 11.00
2007 Large 47 279 15.09 15.00 13.00 18.00
1995 Medium 30 177 9.03 7.00 6.00 9.00
2000 Medium 35 185 10.57 11.00 9.00 12.00
2007 Medium 48 247 15.56 15.00 14.00 17.00
1995 Small 30 148 8.03 7.00 6.00 10.00
2000 Small 35 166 10.06 10.00 9.00 11.00
2007 Small 47 192 14.32 15.00 12.00 18.00
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Panel B: Tests of difference in mean and median values 　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon Ttest Wilcoxon
Large 5.65 4.65 6.13 5.51 14.22 7.14 
**** **** **** **** **** ****
Medium 1.26 3.20 6.83 5.81 4.26 5.03 
**** **** **** **** ****
Small 3.05 3.29 5.53 5.16 5.53 5.28 
　 **** **** **** **** **** ****
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
121
4.12  Committee Existence
The evolution of the establishment of audit committees and remuneration committees 
in NZ is shown in Table 26. Panel A and C each specifically report the evolution of 
the existence of audit and remuneration committees in NZ listed firms. Apart from the 
explicit increasing frequencies for both committees during sample periods, it is more 
worthwhile  to  mention  that  the  percentage  of  firms  establishing  remuneration 
committees in 2007 almost doubled in 1995. As shown in Panels A and C specifically, 
Percentage 1 for audit committees increased from 60.67% in 1995 to 82.69% in 2000, 
and then to 88.73% in 2007, while this percentage also grew from 37.08% in 1995 to 
66.35% in 2000, and then to 66.20% in 2007 for remuneration committees. Another 
similar observation comparing these two committees is that the scale of growth for 
both committees during 1995 and 2000 is much larger than during 2000 and 2007, 
accounting for more than 95% of the total growth during 1995 and 2007. Z values of 
-3.42 and -4.06 in Panels B and D further confirm the significance of the increases 
during 1995 and 2000 for both audit and remuneration committees. These figures are 
both  significant  at  the  0.5% level.  Moreover,  the  rises  in  percentage  1  for  both 
committees during 1995 and 2007 are even more significant.
When sample firms for audit committee existence are partitioned into different size 
groups, the continuity in growth can be observed in all  three subgroups, shown in 
Panel A of Table 27. Within these increases, small firms have the most prominent 
increases  (almost  doubled),  from 40.00% in  1995 to  78.72% in  2007.  Large  and 
medium firms have smaller  degrees of increase compared with small  firms during 
1995 and 2007; from 68.97% to 93.62% for large firms and from 73.33% to 93.75% 
for medium firms. Z values in Panel B report the increases in Percentage 1 for audit 
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committees  within  different  group  sizes.  All  firms  display  significant  growth  in 
Percentage 1 during 1995 and 2007, within which the changes occurred mainly during 
1995 and 2000 for large and small firms. Medium firms, on the other hand, only show 
significant growth between 1995 and 2007 without indicating the time of occurrence. 
Panels C and D display the summary statistics of remuneration committee existence 
across  group  sizes  and  statistical  significance  for  differences  in  Percentage  1. 
Surprisingly, only medium firms show a continuous increase in Percentage 1 whereas 
increases in large and small firms only exist during 1995 and 2000, and then remain at 
similar  levels  in  the  subsequent  period  of  examination.  During  1995  and  2007, 
Percentage 1 grows from 41.38% to 78.72% for large firms, from 50% to 72.92% for 
medium firms, and from 20.00% to 46.81% for small firms. Z values in 
anel  D  justify  all  these  increases  in  each  size  group  during  1995  and  2007  as 
statistically significant, and the time of occurrence started during 1995 and 2000.        
The increases for board committees are understood to be predictable given that their 
characteristics  are  to  promote  efficient  operation  of  the  board  by  facilitating 
distribution  of the board’s  workload and to  enable  more  detailed  consideration  of 
matters by directors who have specific skills. The CEO of the Institute of Directors, 
Dr Crauford, specifically indicated in an article he published in 2006 entitled: “The 
Role of Board Committees”,19 that the purpose of using board committees is not to 
increase monitoring of management but to add value to the board, which will be more 
effective  in  constructing  the  right  corporate  governance  framework  inside  the 
19 The Role of Board Committees, (Dominion Post 16/01/2006) Dr Crauford, CEO of the Institute of 
Directors. Article available at webpage 
http://www.iod.org.nz/Home/Articles/Press_Releases/Archived_news_and_articles/Dominion_Post_-
_Board_Committe.aspx
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company.  Similarly,  the  Corporate  Governance  Best  Practice  Code  advocates 
establishment of board committees as well, with audit committees being more like an 
assumed structure in the firms.
However, the uniqueness of the New Zealand market, meaning that business is small 
in scope and owner-operated in nature,  does not allow regulations  to mandate  the 
existence of board committees. Arguably, the board’s role of ensuring management 
performance  and  accountability  is  represented  for  small  business  by  the  owners 
looking in the mirror and assessing their own performance. The capital of the business 
is after all their own. Despite the nature of NZ businesses, the importance of board 
committees has long been treated with high recognition by regulatory bodies. As Dr 
Crauford  said  in  the  above  article:  “This  is  not  a  sudden  proliferation  of  new 
committees  but  more  an  increased  focus  on the  operation  and importance  of  key 
committees  such  as  audit,  finance  and  remuneration.”  These  interpretations  of 
importance  of  both  audit  and  remuneration  committees  can  probably  explain  the 
significance of increases in the establishment of both committees during the sample 
periods.     
The  proliferation  of  remuneration  committees  is  relatively  smaller  than  audit 
committees during the sample periods in New Zealand. A possible reason is that a 
remuneration  committee  is  more  appropriately  established  for  large  boards,  where 
more complicated compensation packages need to be designed. On the other hand, 
regardless  of  board  size,  monitoring  of  a  company’s  financial  statements  and 
reporting  process,  the  company’s  legal  and  regulatory  compliance,  and  the 
performance and independence of the auditor are required to be accomplished.
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Table 17
Committee Existence
This table reports the figures for the number of firms that have established subcommittees. A dummy 
variable is used taking value of 1 if the board contains the specific committee; otherwise it takes the 
value of 0. Panels A and C correspondingly gives  yearly  descriptive statistics for the sample size, 
number of firms which have audit and remuneration committees and not, and the percentage of each 
occasion for each committee. Panels B and D respectively display the results of parametric tests for 
differences in the percentage of incidences of audit and remuneration committees across the years. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　
Audit Committee
Year
N
Firms # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 89 54 35 60.67% 39.33%
2000 104 86 18 82.69% 17.31%
2007 142 126 16 88.73% 11.27%
Panel B: Tests of difference of mean percentage
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Audit Z value Z value Z value
　 　 　
1 -3.42 -1.36 -5.00 
　 **** 　 ****
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　
Remuneration Committee
Year
N
Firms # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 89 33 56 37.08% 62.92%
2000 104 69 35 66.35% 33.65%
2007 142 94 48 66.20% 33.80%
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Table 26
Committee Existence (continued)
Panel D: Tests of difference of mean percentage
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Remuneration Z value Z value Z value
　 　 　
1 -4.06 0.02 -4.33 
　 **** 　 ****
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
Table 18
Committee Existence by Firm Size
Panels A and C each exhibit summary statistics for the number and percentage of firms establishing 
audit and remuneration committees across different firm sizes. Panel B reports the results of parametric 
tests for differences in the percentage. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　
Audit Committee
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 Large 29 20 9 68.97% 31.03%
2000 Large 34 31 3 91.18% 8.82%
2007 Large 47 44 3 93.62% 6.38%
1995 Medium 30 22 8 73.33% 26.67%
2000 Medium 35 31 4 88.57% 11.43%
2007 Medium 48 45 3 93.75% 6.25%
1995 Small 30 12 18 40.00% 60.00%
2000 Small 35 24 11 68.57% 31.43%
2007 Small 47 37 10 78.72% 21.28%
Panel B: Tests of difference in mean percentage 1
Audit Committee
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size Z value Z value Z value
Large -2.24 -0.41 -2.86
** ****
Medium -1.58 -0.84 -2.52 
**
Small -2.31 -1.08 -3.44 
　 　 ** 　 ****
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 27
Committee Existence by Firm Size (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　
Remuneration Committee
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 Large 29 12 17 41.38% 58.62%
2000 Large 34 27 7 79.41% 20.59%
2007 Large 47 37 10 78.72% 21.28%
1995 Medium 30 15 15 50.00% 50.00%
2000 Medium 35 25 10 71.43% 28.57%
2007 Medium 48 35 13 72.92% 27.08%
1995 Small 30 6 24 20.00% 80.00%
2000 Small 35 17 18 48.57% 51.43%
2007 Small 47 22 25 46.81% 53.19%
　 　 　 　 　 　
Panel D: Tests of difference in mean percentage 1
Remuneration Committee
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size Z value Z value Z value
Large -3.10 0.08 -3.30
**** ****
Medium -1.77 -0.15 -2.05 
* **
Small -2.40 0.16 -2.38 
　 　 *** 　 ***
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.13 Committees Independence
The evolution of committee independence in NZ listed firms during 1995 and 2007 is 
shown in Table 28. Sample size shown in this table for each committee is limited 
owing  to  the  frequency  of  existence.  Panel  A  shows  non-stop  increases  for  the 
independence  percentage  of  both  committees  during  these  examination  periods. 
Committee independence is defined as the proportion of independent directors as a 
percentage of committee size. The same patterns are observed for all the percentiles. 
For audit committees, the independence percentage increased from 67.06% in 1995 to 
76.07% in 2000, and then to 78.61% in 2007. Similarly,  remuneration committees 
have become more and more independent during these years as well, from 69.67% in 
1995 to 69.81% in 2000, and then 72.34% in 2007. Comparing the two time intervals, 
the increase in audit committees is larger during the former interval while the increase 
in remuneration committees is larger during the latter interval. From the results of T 
and Wilcoxon Z tests  in  Panel  B,  it  is  clear  that  the  increase  in  audit  committee 
independence during 1995 and 2007 is significant within NZ listed firms. Again, Z 
values  indicate  genuine  movements  as  Jarque-Bera  shows  rejected  normality. 
Although  the  T  value  of  1.96  seems  to  indicate  that  audit  committees  started  to 
increase their independence during 1995 and 2000, the corresponding Z value is not 
significant,  suggesting  uncertain  times  of  occurrence  for  the  significance  increase 
during 1995 and 2007.    
The increasing trends are also displayed for different size groups in Table 29. Apart 
from the decrease in remuneration committee independence during 1995 and 2007 for 
large and small firms, all other size groups exhibit the same increasing patterns. For 
audit committees in 1995 and in 2007, the independence ratio increased from 69.67% 
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to 78.59% for large firms while  it  increased from 64.02% to 79.04% for medium 
firms,  and  grew  from  68.31%  to  77.63%  for  small  firms.  The  evolution  in 
remuneration  committee  independence  shows  interesting  patterns  among  different 
size groups. Contrary to both large and small firms, which exhibit first-down-then-up 
trends in independence ratio, medium firms have exactly the opposite movements, i.e. 
first  up then down. Regarding median figures,  most  of the median  values in  both 
committees  demonstrate  an  increasing  pattern.  Panel  B  of  Table  25  displays  the 
significances  for  the  aforementioned  evolution  in  committee  independence  ratios. 
Only  the  movements  of  audit  committee  independence  in  medium  firms  are 
significant, particularly during 1995 and 2000.  
A  growing  percentage  of  independent  board  committees  in  NZ  listed  firms  is 
inevitable. Excluding the fact that board independence has been the most attention-
drawing aspect of a good corporate governance framework since the US corporate 
scandals, board committees as the keys to enhancing effectiveness in key areas for the 
board would no doubt be in high demand for their independence, in order to maintain 
impartiality and functioning. Following the US legislative requirement mandating an 
independence ratio on board committees, the Securities Commission of New Zealand 
announced guidelines for audit committees to fully comprise non-executive directors 
in 2004, a majority of whom are independent and the chairman must be independent. 
This was expected for the core reason that the collapse of Enron and other corporate 
scandals were caused by a close alignment between the management and the auditor. 
Such contaminated activity has triggered public awareness of carefully examining the 
auditing part around the globe. Independence of audit committees is the major way to 
help oversee and maintain impartiality and the performance of the auditors. 
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Although  the  new rules  do  not  mandate  the  independence  ratio  for  remuneration 
committees  in  NZ  public-traded  firms,  one  of  the  key  findings  from  public 
consultation for Corporate Governance in New Zealand – Principles and Guidelines – 
is to have a remuneration committee comprising a majority of independent directors, 
reflecting the social recognition that an independent remuneration committee is also 
very important. However, the loose legislative requirement for the independence ratio 
on remuneration  committees  may indicate  that  the most  important  change for  NZ 
listed firms is to increase the level of independence on audit committees. Corporations 
may choose to increase the level of independence on remuneration committees once 
the relevant legislation takes effect. 
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Table 19
Committees Independence
This table reports the summary statistics for both audit and remuneration committees expressed as average percentages of the board size. Panel A gives yearly descriptive 
statistics for the sample size of both committees and total directorships on comittees, means and medians of independent directors on both committees in percentages. AC 
stands for audit committee and CC stands for compensation (remuneration) committee. 25th and 75th percentiles are also shown. Standard deviations are given in brackets. 
Panel B reports the results of parametric and non parametric tests for differences in mean and median percentages of independent directors across the years. The t value and 
the Wilcoxon z value are provided for the parametric and non parametric test respectively. Jarque-Bera measurements are performed to justify if data are normally distributed 
or not (if result for JB does not have any * underneath, it means normal distribution is rejected).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　
Year
N
AC
N
Directorship
s
on AC
Mean
AC
Median
AC
25th
Percentile
AC
75th
Percentile
AC
Jarque-Bera 
(AC)
1995 54 133 67.06% 66.67% 50.00% 100.00% 2.03
(28.22)
2000 86 256 76.07% 66.67% 50.00% 100.00% 6.23
(27.08)
2007 126 396 78.61% 75.00% 66.67% 100.00% 8.37
(20.82)
Year
N
CC
N
Directorship
s
on CC
Mean
CC
Median
CC
25th
Percentile
CC
75th
Percentile
CC
Jarque-Bera 
(CC)
1995 33 74 69.67% 66.67% 50.00% 100.00% 2.28
(28.94)
2000 69 210 69.81% 66.67% 50.00% 100.00% 5.25
(25.40)
2007 94 294 72.34% 66.67% 66.67% 100.00% 5.78
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(25.42)
Table 28
Committees Independence (continued)
Panel B: Tests of difference of independence percentage 　 　 　 　 　 　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
T (AC) T (CC) W (AC) W (CC) T (AC) T (CC) W (AC) W (CC) T (AC) T (CC) W (AC) W (CC)
1.96 0.10 1.60 0.09 0.64 0.45 1.06 0.64 3.00 0.44 2.58 0.53
*　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 **** 　 *** 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 20
Committees Independence by Firm Size
Panel A presents summary statistics for the means and medians of independent directors in percentages on both committees across different firm sizes. Panel B reports the 
results for parametric and non parametric tests for differences in mean and median %.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Year Firm Size
N
AC
N
Directors 
on AC
N
CC
N
Directors 
on CC
Mean
AC
Mean
CC
Median
AC
Median
CC
25th
Percentile
AC 
25th
Percentile
CC
75th
Percentile
AC
75th
Percentile
CC
1995 Large 20 59 12 37 69.67% 77.43% 66.67% 65.83% 50.00% 65.83% 100.00% 100.00%
(25.93) (20.86)
2000 Large 31 105 27 93 72.91% 69.53% 66.67% 67.00% 50.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(23.20) (24.92)
2007 Large 44 147 37 118 78.59% 74.24% 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 100.00% 100.00%
(19.07) (23.15)
1995 Medium 22 55 15 35 64.02% 57.33% 66.67% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 100.00% 91.67%
(30.36) (32.57)
2000 Medium 31 87 25 72 80.17% 74.42% 100.00% 75.00% 50.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(23.61) (25.49)
2007 Medium 45 152 35 119 79.04% 67.44% 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(19.63) (27.46)
1995 Small 12 19 6 10 68.31% 85.00% 60.00% 100.00% 41.67% 60.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(24.57) (25.71)
2000 Small 24 64 17 45 76.28% 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(34.13) (26.60)
2007 Small 37 97 22 57 77.63% 74.29% 75.00% 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 100.00% 100.00%
(24.21) (26.05)
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Table 29
Committees Independence by Firm Size (continued)
Panel B: Tests of difference 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size T (AC) T (CC) W (AC) W (CC) T (AC) T (CC) W (AC) W (CC) T (AC) T (CC) W (AC) W (CC)
Large 0.47 -0.95 0.42 0.86 1.18 0.75 1.05 0.73 1.55 -0.42 1.36 0.28
Medium 2.14 1.81 1.74 1.45 -0.22 -0.95 0.05 0.82 2.38 1.09 1.94 1.11
** * * ** *
Small 0.70 -1.53 0.50 1.29 0.19 1.01 0.88 1.15 1.10 -0.93 0.99 0.70
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4.14 CEO Involvement on Board Committees
The summary statistics of firms within which CEOs are involved in board committees 
are displayed in Table 30. Panels A and C each report the sample size, number and 
percentage  of  firms with CEO involvement  in  audit  and remuneration  committees 
across three sample years. Sample size for this variable is limited by the number of 
firms that actually have these committees. For both committees, there has been a large 
fluctuation in both number and percentage of firms whose CEO is a member of the 
board committee. From 1995 to 2000 and then to 2007, the percentage of listed firms 
in which the CEO sits on the audit committee increased from 9.26% to 16.28% and 
then decreased to 7.94%, while the percentage of firms with CEO membership of 
remuneration committees rose from 9.09% to 23.19% and then fell to 10.64%. 
Panels B and D respectively display statistical results for the differences in Percentage 
1  for  audit  and  remuneration  committees  across  sample  years.  Remuneration 
committees  exhibit  a  statistically  significant  increase during the first  time interval 
followed by a statistically significant decrease during the second time interval, while 
the same applies for audit committees in the second interval. In other words, there had 
been an increasing trend of CEO involvement  on remuneration committees during 
1995 and 2000 in NZ. However, from 2000 until 2007, an opposite trend is displayed 
for both committees, and the reduction during this time period brings the percentage 
back to the beginning level.
When sample data for both committees are partitioned into different group sizes as 
shown in  Table  31,  similar  trends  are  observed  for  large  and  small  firms  across 
sample  years,  i.e.  CEO involvement  firstly  increases  and then decreases.  Medium 
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firms,  on  the  other  hand,  present  a  general  decreasing  tendency.  In  1995,  the 
percentage of large firms that allowed the CEO to sit on audit committees was 10.00% 
while  it  was  13.64% for  medium firms  and none  for  small  firms.  In  2000,  these 
percentages jumped to 12.90% for large firms and 25% for small firms. Subsequently 
during 2000 and 2007, small firms experienced the sharpest fall in CEO membership 
on audit committees. Percentage 1 fell to only 2.70% and 6.82% for small and large 
firms while it fell to 8.89% for medium firms. Statistical test results show that only 
the increase for small firms during 1995 and 2000 and the decrease during 2000 and 
2007 are significant. Other aforementioned movements inside each size group are not 
significant.
On the other hand, CEO membership of remuneration committees shown in Panel C 
also exhibits the up-and-down trends across large and small firms while medium firms 
show exactly the opposite position. Similar to audit committees, the most prominent 
change happened in small  firms; Percentage 1 skyrocketed from 0.00% in 1995 to 
35.29% in 2000 and then quickly shrank back to 9.09% in 2007. Large firms followed 
the same pattern but to a lesser degree; from 8.33% in 1995 to 25.93% in 2000 and 
then back to 8.11% in 2007. Percentage 1 for medium firms shrank from 13.33% in 
1995 to 8% in 2000 and remains at this level onwards. Panel D figures show low 
significance of the changes happening within large and small firms. 
The dramatic drop in the number of firms within which CEOs are involved in board 
committees seems to be anticipated given how prominent the independence theory is 
within  the  corporate  governance  fields.  Plus,  CEO  power  exertion  on  board  or 
committees is already proven to have negative impacts on board performance when 
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the CEO has too much influence, not to mention having them as a member of the 
committees. Additionally, the global listing rules regarding full independence on audit 
committees  and  at  least  a  majority  of  independent  members  on  remuneration 
committees have further emphasized the importance of the independence of board 
committees,  which means no management  sitting as members.  Specifically in NZ, 
SEC  especially  advocated  for  total  independence  of  audit  committees  in  2003. 
Therefore,  the  significant  fall  in  the  frequency  of  CEO  involvement  in  board 
committees is just according to expectation.
However, the significant increase in CEO membership on board committees during 
1995  and  2000  is  unexpected.  Possibly  owing  to  the  lack  of  vivid  regulatory 
requirements regarding committee independence and because firm sizes are generally 
small in NZ, having CEOs sitting on board committees could have been a common 
practice especially on small boards. This could well be a possible research area in the 
future. 
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Table 21
CEO Involvement on Board Committees
This  table  reports  the  summary  statistics  for  CEO  involvement  on  both  audit  and  remuneration 
committees.  A dummy variable  is  used  taking  the  value  of  1  if  the  CEO sits  on  the  committee; 
otherwise it takes the value of 0. Panels A and C correspondingly give yearly descriptive statistics for 
the sample size, number of firms which have CEO membership on audit or remuneration committee 
and not, and the percentage of each occasion for each committee. Panels B and D respectively display 
the results of parametric tests for differences in the percentage of incidences of audit and remuneration 
committees across the years. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　
Audit Committee
Year
N
Firms # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 54 5 49 9.26% 90.74%
2000 86 14 72 16.28% 83.72%
2007 126 10 116 7.94% 92.06%
Panel B: Tests of difference of mean percentage
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Audit Z value Z value Z value
　 　 　
1 -1.18 1.88 0.29 
　 * 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　
Remuneration Committee
Year
N
Firm
s # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 33 3 30 9.09% 90.91%
2000 69 16 53 23.19% 76.81%
2007 94 10 84 10.64% 89.36%
Panel D: Tests of difference of mean percentage
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
Remuneration Z value Z value Z value
　 　 　
1 -1.71 2.16 -0.25 
　 * ** 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 22
CEO Involvement on Board Committees by Firm Sizes
Panels A and C each exhibit summary statistics for the number and percentage of firms within which 
the CEO sits on either the audit or remuneration committee across different firm sizes. Panel B reports 
the results for parametric tests for differences in the percentage.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size
Audit Committee
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 Large 20 2 18 10.00% 90.00%
2000 Large 31 4 27 12.90% 87.10%
2007 Large 44 3 41 6.82% 93.18%
1995 Medium 22 3 19 13.64% 86.36%
2000 Medium 31 3 28 9.68% 90.32%
2007 Medium 45 4 41 8.89% 91.11%
1995 Small 12 0 12 0.00% 100.00%
2000 Small 24 6 18 25.00% 75.00%
2007 Small 37 1 36 2.70% 97.30%
Panel B: Tests of difference in mean percentage 1
Audit Committee
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size Z value Z value Z value
Large 0.31 0.56 0.14
Medium 0.45 0.12 0.60
Small -1.90 2.67 -0.58
　 　 * ***
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 31
CEO Involvement on Board Committees by Firm Sizes (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size
Remuneration Committee
Year Firm Size
N
Firm
s # 1 # 0
Percentage
1
Percentage
0
1995 Large 12 1 11 8.33% 91.67%
2000 Large 27 7 20 25.93% 74.07%
2007 Large 37 3 34 8.11% 91.89%
1995 Medium 15 2 13 13.33% 86.67%
2000 Medium 25 2 23 8.00% 92.00%
2007 Medium 35 3 32 8.57% 91.43%
1995 Small 6 0 6 0.00% 100.00%
2000 Small 17 6 11 35.29% 64.71%
2007 Small 22 2 20 9.09% 90.91%
Panel D: Tests of difference in mean percentage 1
Remuneration Committee
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　
Firm Size Z value Z value Z value
Large -1.26 1.94 0.02
*
Medium 0.54 -0.08 0.51 
Small -1.69 2.01 -0.77 
　 　 * ** 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.15 Director Meeting Frequencies
Table 32 displays the summary statistics for the frequency of board and committee 
meetings  held  and  attended.  Data  are  collected  from annual  reports  where  firms 
voluntarily disclose relevant information. The sample sizes for committee meetings 
are much smaller than the board meetings, the reason being that it is less mandatory 
for board sub-committees to exist than the board itself. Therefore, the data availability 
for this variable in Table 2 is limited for these two reasons. Specifically, for the non-
available information within small firm sizes in 1995, it is because only one firm falls 
into the small firm category that provides details of meetings held and attended. Such 
limited data cannot reveal a tendency.  
Table  32  Panels  A,  C  and  E  each  represent  meeting  figures  for  board,  audit 
committee, and remuneration committee respectively.  Panels B, D and F separately 
reveal the results of the parametric and non-parametric statistical tests for each group 
meeting.  As  for  board  meetings  in  Panel  A,  the  numbers  of  meetings  held  and 
attended have both been decreasing continuously during the sample periods. From 
Panel A, on average, there were 11.09 meetings held in NZ listed firms in 1995; such 
frequency reduced to 11.04 in 2000 and then to 9.88 in 2007. Director attendance 
decreased from 10.88 in 1995 to 10.61 in 2000, and then to 9.52 in 2007. The same 
trend was observed for median statistics and percentiles. Comparing time intervals, 
the reduction within the latter interval is larger than the former interval. Z values in 
Panel B still justify that the reduced frequency in the number of board meetings both 
held and attended are statistically significant. Further, statistical test results are also 
significant  for  reduction  during  2000  and  2007,  suggesting  the  number  of  board 
meetings held and attended started to drop during this period. 
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When the sample for board meetings is partitioned into different size groups measured 
by total assets, it can be observed in Panel A of Table 33 that both large and medium 
firms experienced a continuous decrease in both meetings held and attended while 
small firms experienced up and down. Median and percentile figures display exactly 
the same patterns as mean statistics. According to Panel B of Table 32, the reductions 
in the number of meetings held and attended in both large and medium firms during 
1995 and 2007 are significant (at 10% or higher level), suggesting small firms did not 
experience changes in the frequency of meetings either held or attended during these 
years.          
Interestingly,  the trends in the frequency of committee meetings held and attended 
show different patterns from board meetings. Panels C and E of Table 32 respectively 
report  the  average  frequency of  meetings  held and attended by members  of  audit 
committees and remuneration committees in the three sample years. The numbers of 
meetings held and attended by audit committee and remuneration committee members 
have both increased incessantly during 1995 and 2007. Audit committees in NZ listed 
firms averagely held almost 2.75 meetings annually in 1995, around 3.24 in 2000, and 
almost  3.56 in 2007. Attendance for these meetings  in each sample year  is nearly 
100%. The number  of remuneration  committee  meetings  held during each sample 
year  is  averagely 0.4 less than audit  committee  meetings.  Similarly,  attendance at 
remuneration committee meetings is almost 100% in each sample year. Median values 
and percentiles both show the same tendencies. Z values in Panels D and F indicate 
that the increases in the average number of meetings held and attended by both audit 
and remuneration committee members are significant at 5% and higher during 1995 
and  2007.  Furthermore,  statistical  values  are  also  significant  for  remuneration 
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committees  during  1995  and  2000,  reflecting  the  starting  periods  for  growth  in 
remuneration committee meetings.
Like  board meetings,  firm size is  used to  partition  the sample  data  for  audit  and 
remuneration committee meetings across the three sample years, shown in Panels C 
and D of Table 33. Comparing year 2007 to 1995, meetings held and attended by 
audit and remuneration committee members have both increased in each size group. 
Frequency of meetings held for both committees are positively related to firm size, i.e. 
large firms have more meetings held than the other two groups. On an average basis, 
audit committee meetings are held more frequently than quarterly in large firms while 
they  are  held  just  about  quarterly  for  medium firms  and small  firms.  Turning  to 
remuneration committees, the number of meetings held and attended averages at less 
than quarterly for both large and medium firms in 1995, around quarterly in 2000, and 
more  frequently  than  quarterly  in  2007.  Regarding  statistical  significance  for  the 
difference in the frequency of meetings shown in Panels D and F, both committees in 
large firms held more meetings during 1995 and 2007, and meetings were attended 
more frequently during 1995 and 2007 for medium firms.                  
The purpose of the existence of boards of directors is to guide the strategic direction 
of the entity,  and to  direct  and oversee management.  The Securities  Commission, 
economists and the public investors in NZ require the boards to have a balance of 
skills,  knowledge,  experience  and perspectives  from directors  to  work effectively. 
Official charters setting out the responsibilities and roles of the board and directors, 
including any formal delegations to management, are required to be constructed and 
viewed by the public. To ensure the accomplishment of specific responsibilities and 
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effective  communication  between  board  members,  board  meetings  are  necessarily 
held  regularly  as  a  venue  to  exchange  ideas  and  raise  challenges  to  each  other. 
However, given that board meetings are limited by time length and frequency, it is not 
possible to make arrangements for all directors to state their thoughts, not even to 
attempt a deep discussion of all of their ideas. This is one of the major reasons to 
establish  board  committees,  that  is,  to  divide  up  and  apportion  specialised  board 
responsibilities. However, the accountability of the board as a whole is maintained, 
including in relation to work undertaken by committees. Thus, this logic may be able 
to explain the significant reduction in the number of board meetings held and attended 
in NZ listed firms during the sample periods. In other words, a portion of the burden 
on the board as a whole is passed onto the outstanding committees, where directors 
are grouped according to their relevant qualifications and experience, and so that the 
discussion can be more effective. 
Board committees are viewed by the Securities Commission and the public in NZ as 
entities  that  can enhance the effectiveness  of the board through closer scrutiny of 
issues  and  provide  more  efficient  decision  making  in  key  areas  of  board 
responsibility. This is especially true for audit committees. Remuneration committees 
are  increasingly  being  recognized  as  important,  particularly  for  large  boards. 
Committee  meetings  are  held  for  the  issues  from specific  areas  to  be  raised  and 
discussed  among  a  group  of  directors  with  similar  knowledge  and  background. 
Consequently, time wasted on communication between a large number of people can 
be saved.  More importantly,  the  participation  of  each  director  is  allowed,  helping 
ideas  to  penetrate  more  and  become  consolidated.  Therefore,  the  increase  in 
committee  meetings  can  probably  be  explained  by  this  notion.  Furthermore,  the 
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results of the statistical test indicate that the increases in committee meetings occurred 
during 1995 and 2000 while the reduction in board meetings happened during 2000 
and 2007. It may reflect the fact that assigning partial board duties to committees has 
helped with the efficiency of decision making by the boards so board meetings are 
subsequently reduced.
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Table 23
Meeting Frequency 
This table reports the figures for frequency of meetings held and attended by each firm. Panels A, C and E each give yearly descriptive statistics for the sample size, number 
of meetings held and attended for board, audit committee, and remuneration committee meetings. Attendance % is the percentage of total number of meetings attended out of 
total number of meetings held. The 25th and 75th percentiles of each year are given as well. Standard deviations for mean frequency are shown in parentheses. Panels B, D, F 
and G respectively display the results of parametric and non parametric tests for differences in the frequency of meetings held and attended for board, audit committee and 
remuneration committee meetings across the years. Jarque-Bera measurements are performed to justify if data are normally distributed or not (if result for JB does not have 
any * underneath, it means normal distribution is rejected).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Board Meeting
Year
N
Held
N
Attended
Mean
Held
Mean
Attended
Attendance
%
Median
Held
Median
Attended
25th
Percentile
Held 
25th
Percentile
Attended
75th
Percentile
Held
75th
Percentile
Attended
Jarque-Bera
Mean Held
1995 35 35 11.09 10.88 98.18% 11.00 11.00 10.00 10.00 13.00 12.80 0.70
(2.45) (2.39)
2000 52 52 11.04 10.61 94.53% 11.00 10.70 9.00 8.69 12.25 12.00 10.05
(3.89) (3.82)
2007 93 93 9.88 9.52 94.81% 10.00 9.50 8.00 7.50 12.00 12.00 1.55
(3.31) (3.21)
Panel B: Tests of difference 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Board Meeting
1995 - 2000 2000 - 2007 1995 - 2007
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
0.06 0.21 -0.29 -0.78 -2.05 -1.87 -1.95 -1.76 -1.96 -2.10 -2.29 -2.62
** * * * * ** ** **
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 32
Meeting Frequency (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Audit Committee Meeting
Year
N
Held
N
Attended
Mean
Held
Mean
Attended
Attendance
%
Median
Held
Median
Attended
25th
Percentile
Held 
25th
Percentile
Attended
75th
Percentile
Held
75th
Percentile
Attended
Jarque-Bera
Mean Held
1995 36 36 2.75 2.71 98.48% 2.50 2.25 2.00 2.00 3.25 3.25 4.72
(1.05) (0.97)
2000 46 46 3.24 3.15 96.34% 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 25.01
(1.39) (1.30)
2007 75 75 3.56 3.49 98.99% 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 224.82
(1.95) (1.93)
Panel D: Tests of difference 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Audit Committee Meeting
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
1.59 1.41 1.48 1.23 1.21 0.98 1.31 0.91 2.39 2.25 2.34 2.08
** ** ** **
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 32
Meeting Frequency (continued)
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Remuneration Committee Meeting
Year
N
Held
N
Attended
Mean
Held
Mean
Attended
Attendance
%
Median
Held
Median
Attended
25th
Percentile
Held 
25th
Percentile
Attended
75th
Percentile
Held
75th
Percentile
Attended
Jarque-Bera
Mean Held
1995 17 17 1.82 1.79 98.10% 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.46
(1.01) (1.00)
2000 34 34 2.91 2.78 94.48% 2.00 2.00 1.25 1.25 4.00 3.38 16.47
(2.18) (2.06)
2007 47 48 3.26 3.18 96.48% 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 28.98
(2.15) (2.05)
 
Pane F : Tests of difference 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Remuneration Committee Meeting
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
1.96 1.66 1.88 1.77 0.82 1.08 0.98 1.15 2.66 2.69 2.70 2.71
* * * * *** *** *** ***
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
Table 32
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Meeting Frequency (continued)
Panel G: Tests of difference in attendance percentage    
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
T test Wilcoxon Z T test Wilcoxon Z T test Wilcoxon Z
Board -1.53 -2.55 0.30 0.02 -1.43 -2.99
** **
Audit Committee -1.22 -0.56 0.78 0.13 -0.85 -0.74
Remuneration Committee -0.30 -0.07 -0.01 -0.72 -0.52 -0.65
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 24
Meeting Frequency by Firm Size
Panels A, C and E exhibit summary statistics for the frequency of meetings held and attended across different firm sizes. Panels B, D and F report the results of parametric 
and non parametric tests for differences in frequency.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Board Meeting
Year Size
N
Held
N
Attended
Mean
Held
Mean
Attended
Attendance
%
Median
Held
Median
Attended
25th
Percentile
Held 
25th
Percentile
Attended
75th
Percentile
Held
75th
Percentile
Attended
1995 Large 14 14 11.79 11.50 97.59% 11.50 11.50 10.25 10.25 13.75 13.00 
2.52 2.21 
2000 Large 25 25 11.40 10.68 93.22% 11.00 9.71 9.00 8.67 13.00 12.00 
4.17 4.02 
2007 Large 36 36 9.92 9.45 93.53% 9.50 9.00 8.00 7.79 12.00 12.00 
3.32 3.27 
1995 Medium 14 14 10.79 10.57 97.97% 11.00 11.00 10.00 10.00 12.75 12.45 
2.29 2.47 
2000 Medium 16 16 10.56 10.38 98.24% 11.00 10.70 9.75 9.75 12.00 11.68 
3.83 3.83 
2007 Medium 21 21 9.00 8.83 97.99% 9.00 8.75 8.00 7.50 11.00 11.00 
2.85 2.80 
1995 Small 7 7 10.29 10.29 98.80% 10.00 10.00 9.00 9.00 11.00 11.00 
2.63 2.63 
2000 Small 11 11 10.91 10.81 98.60% 11.00 11.00 9.00 9.00 12.50 12.50 
3.56 3.67 
2007 Small 36 36 10.36 9.99 96.44% 10.50 10.00 8.00 7.30 12.00 11.63 
3.52 3.37 
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Table 33
Meeting Frequency by Firm Size (continued)
Panel B: Tests of difference 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Board Meeting
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　
Firm 
Size
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Large -0.56 -0.84 -378.00 -1.26 -1.14 -1.09 -0.81 -0.82 -1.90 -2.24 -1.67 -2.25 
* ** * **
Medium 1.04 1.03 0.64 0.53 -2.44 -2.51 -2.50 -2.48 -1.56 -1.60 -2.18 -2.21 
** ** ** ** ** **
Small 0.04 -0.34 0.28 0.08 0.36 0.57 0.46 0.55 0.34 0.04 0.50 0.24 
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 33
Meeting Frequency by Firm Size (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Audit Committee Meeting
Year Size
N
Held
N
Attended
Mean
Held
Mean
Attended
Attendance
%
Median
Held
Median
Attende
d
25th
Perce
ntile
Held 
25th
Percentile
Attended
75th
Percentile
Held
75th
Percentile
Attended
1995 Large 15 15 3.33 3.27 98.20% 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 
(1.11) 0.96 
2000 Large 17 17 3.29 3.11 94.53% 3.00 3.00 2.25 2.25 4.00 4.00 
(1.61) 1.35 
2007 Large 27 27 3.56 3.45 96.91% 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 
(1.79) 1.72 
1995 Medium 16 16 2.31 2.28 98.70% 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 
(0.79) 0.77 
2000 Medium 18 18 2.94 2.93 99.66% 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 
(0.94) 0.96 
2007 Medium 26 26 3.65 3.58 98.08% 4.00 3.50 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 
(2.06) 2.06 
1995 Small 5 5 2.40 2.40 100.00% 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.50 2.50 
(0.89) 0.89 
2000 Small 13 13 3.38 3.29 97.34% 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 
(1.61) 1.68 
2007 Small 17 17 3.52 3.50 99.43% 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 
(2.18) 2.19 
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Table 33
Meeting Frequency by Firm Size (continued)
Panel D: Tests of difference 　 　 　 　 　 　　 　　 　
Audit Committee Meeting
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　
Firm 
Size
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Large -0.08 -0.37 -0.21 -0.30 0.50 0.70 0.42 0.53 0.45 0.39 0.18 0.50 
Medium 2.11 2.14 1.78 1.79 1.36 1.25 1.17 0.94 2.49 2.41 2.64 2.51 
** ** * * ** ** *** **
Small 1.28 1.11 1.38 1.18 0.20 0.29 0.07 0.16 1.28 1.09 1.37 1.37 
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 33
Meeting Frequency by Firm Size (continued)
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics
Remuneration Committee Meeting
Year Size
N
Held
N
Attended
Mean
Held
Mean
Attended
Attendance
%
Median
Held
Median
Attended
25th
Percentile
Held
25th
Percentile
Attended
75th
Percentile
Held
75th
Percentile
Attended
1995 Large 7 7 2.29 2.26 98.69% 3.00 2.81 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00
1.25 1.24
2000 Large 14 14 3.14 2.91 92.68% 2.50 2.50 1.00 1.00 5.00 4.00
1.96 1.75
2007 Large 20 20 3.63 3.48 95.87% 3.00 3.00 2.50 2.25 4.50 4.33
1.90 1.79
1995 Medium 9 9 1.67 1.62 97.20% 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
0.50 0.48
2000 Medium 13 13 2.77 2.74 98.92% 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00
1.95 1.73
2007 Medium 14 14 3.79 3.76 99.21% 3.50 3.50 1.00 1.00 4.00 4.00
2.91 2.84
1995 Small 1 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2000 Small 1 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2007 Small 1 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Table 33
Meeting Frequency by Firm Size (continued)
Panel F: Tests of difference 　 　 　　 　 　 　
Remuneration Committee Meeting
1995-2000 2000-2007 1995-2007
　 　 　 　 　 　
Firm 
Size
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Wilcoxon
Attended
Ttest
Held
Ttest
Held
Wilcoxon
Held
Ttest
Attended
Large 1.05 0.88 0.78 0.71 0.78 0.91 0.89 0.86 1.76 1.66 1.52 1.23 
*
Medium 1.18 1.22 0.77 0.93 0.93 0.95 1.21 1.21 2.14 2.22 1.86 1.89 
** ** ** ** * *
Small n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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4.16 Director Educational and Industrial Background
Panels A and C of Table 34 respectively report the summary statistics of the evolution 
of  director  educational  and  industrial  backgrounds  in  NZ.  Panels  B  and  D  each 
displays the statistical significance of differences in the percentage of educational and 
industrial backgrounds across the three sample years. Educational background refers 
to the areas of education accomplished by each director while industrial background 
indicates the industry(s) each director has worked in. Categories are chosen for each 
background according to frequency of occurrence in annual reports. Again, the sample 
sizes for this variable are not full because not every firm in the sample years reports 
this information. For those who disclose, data are collected from the annual reports.  
For educational background, Panel A shows different trends in each category, that is, 
there have been increases and decreases in different education areas from directors 
across these years. According to the statistical results in Panel B, however, areas such 
as finance, real estate, engineering, and accounting have shown significant changes 
across the three sample years.  Specifically,  the number of directors who have had 
education in finance, real estate, and accounting increased significantly, particularly 
in  the  accounting  area  where  the  increase  happened  between  2000  and  2007. 
Engineering, on the other hand, has been the area that receives less and less interest. 
All increases in finance, real estate, and accounting and the decrease in engineering 
are significant at the 5% level or even higher.   
Regarding industrial background, various patterns are observed for each category as 
well.  Within  those  categories  having  statistically  significant  changes  during  these 
years,  management/marketing,  and  agriculture/farming  display  increases  in 
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popularity. In other words, there have been growing board appointments of directors 
who have worked in management/marketing and agriculture/farming areas in NZ. On 
the  contrary,  the  number  of  directors  with  working  experience  in  accounting, 
logistics/transportations,  industry/construction,  business,  investment  and 
government/politics went through a significant reduction during these years. All the 
significance levels are 5% or even higher.        
Results are more difficult to interpret for both educational and industrial backgrounds 
after group sample data are sorted into different sectors. Sectors categories are derived 
from NZ Companies Research website.20 Sector 2, 7 and 9 are removed from analyses 
section  due  to  data  insufficiency.  There  were  either  one  or  two,  sometimes  zero 
companies  providing  relevant  data  within  these  sectors.  Some  of  the  sectors  are 
combined together for data analyses due to the data availability for each sector is not 
enough to be examined individually. Sectors similar to each other are grouped into 
one  category.  Panels  A and C of  Table  35  separately  document  the  evolution  of 
director educational and industrial background in different sectors during 1995 and 
2007. Industry sectors are presented with codes in the tables.21 
For sector of Agriculture and Fishing, numbers of directors with degrees in business 
and agriculture have both increased while those with degrees in law have decreased. 
Numbers  of  directors  with occupational  experience  in  legal  or  food and beverage 
industries  have  increased  while  decreasing  for  those  who  have  worked  in  the 
commercial or accounting industries before.
20 http://companyresearch.nzx.com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/deep_ar/
21 1= Agriculture & Fishing; 2 = Building Materials & Construction; 3 = Consumer; 4 = Energy 
Processing; 5 = Finance & Others Services; 6 = Food & Beverages; 7 = Forestry & Forest Products; 8 
= Investments; 9 = Leisure & Tourism; 10 = Media & Telecommunication; 11 = Mining; 12 = Ports; 13 
= Property; 14 = Textiles & Apparel; 15 = Transport; 16 = Intermediate & Durables.
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Companies in the Consumer and Textile and Apparels sectors tend to employ more 
directors  with  degrees  in  accounting  or  law,  but  fewer  directors  with  business  or 
engineering qualifications. Directors who have worked in the legal or management 
and marketing sectors have a greater demand for their services while the opposite is 
true for directors who have worked within accounting or government environments 
before. 
Regarding sectors of energy processing and mining, directors with a business degree 
are  more  welcomed  while  directors  with  law  degree  are  less  demanded.  Work 
experiences in finance or industrial and construction will improve the likelihood of 
directors  being  appointed.  On the  other  hand,  directors  with  work  experiences  in 
accounting or management & marketing are less in demand.
In the finance and others and property sectors, directors with degrees in law, Business, 
accounting or finance are more likely to be appointed. Conversely, directors who have 
studied  management  and  marketing  or  engineering  are  less  in  demand  for  board 
appointments.  Directors  who  have  been  employed  in  legal  or  management  and 
marketing environments  are  more  welcomed while  accounting  and agriculture  and 
farming working experiences do not promote board appointments.
On boards in the food and beverages and media and telecommunications sectors, the 
number of directors with degrees in law or accounting has increased while the number 
of directors  with degrees  in  business or  engineering  has shrunk. Those who have 
worked in commercial, Consulting or management and marketing firms have a higher 
possibility  of  being  appointed  as  directors  while  those  were  employed  within 
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accounting or industrial and construction firms do not.
In boards in the Investment sector, directors with finance or accounting degrees are 
more  popular  for  appointment  while  those  with  business  or  management  and 
marketing degrees are not. Similarly, employment experience in accounting or finance 
firms helps directors to be appointed while commercial and IT firms experiences do 
not.
In the transport and ports sectors, companies tend to appoint directors with degrees in 
Finance or business, but not in law, arts or IT. Directors with working experiences in 
consulting  or  legal  are  more  sought  after  while  directors  who  have  worked  in 
industrial and construction or accounting firms are not.
With respect to companies in the Intermediate and Durables sectors, the number of 
directors who have studied business or science degrees has increased while directors 
with law or accounting degrees have become fewer. Directors who have worked for 
management and marketing,  medical and healthcare or engineering firms are more 
likely to be appointed as board members while those who have worked for industrial 
and construction and accounting firms are not.
It would be difficult to suggest possible reasons for all of these ups and downs in the 
trends in each category for educational and industrial backgrounds. Sometimes they 
may only be attributed to the corporation’s requirements. Aside the firm’s individual 
specific  needs,  some  changes  can  be  explained  by  the  New  Zealand  Corporate 
Governance Best Practice Code. The 2003 legislative reform required that there be at 
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least one director with chartered accountant qualifications, or another recognized form 
of financial  expertise on an audit committee.  Similarly,  the Code also requires the 
board to have a range of relevant skills and experience. This requirement may have 
encouraged  corporations  in  New Zealand  to  appoint  board  members  with  various 
qualifications and experiences, and may further explain the ups and downs in each 
category presented above.
160
Table 25
Director Educational and Industrial Background
This table displays the summary statistics for director educational and industrial background. Each category adds one if one of the directors on board is qualified. Panels A 
and C correspondingly report yearly descriptive statistics for educational and industrial background regarding the sample size of both listed firms and total directorships, and 
percentages of each category accounted for. Panels B and D respectively display the results of parametric tests for differences in the percentage of each category across the 
years. Fin/RE stands for Finance or Real Estate, Com/Busi stands for Commerce or Business, Engi stands for Engineering, Sci/Tech starnds for Science or Technology,  
Mgmt/Mkt stands for Management or Marketing, Comp/IT stands for Computing or Information Technology, Agri/Far stands for Agriculture or Farming, Food/Bever stands 
for  Food  or  Beverage,  Logis/Transp  stands  for  Logistics  or  Transportation,  Retailing/Manuf  stands  for  Retailing  or  Manufacturing,  Invmt  stands  for  Investments,  
Govt/Politics stands for Government or Politics.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for educational background　 　 　
　Year
N
Firms
N
Director
-ships Medical Law Fin/RE Arts Com/busi Engi
1995 43 309 0.29% 10.95% 0.86% 6.92% 21.61% 11.82%
2000 57 400 1.31% 10.11% 1.31% 6.18% 25.66% 7.30%
2007 93 532 0.70% 9.24% 4.34% 4.20% 24.79% 5.32%
Sci/Tech Acc Mgmt/Mkt Comp/IT Agri/Far Others
6.05% 16.71% 16.71% 3.75% 2.02% 2.31%
7.68% 17.23% 15.92% 2.25% 2.06% 3.00%
7.42% 23.53% 13.73% 2.52% 2.94% 1.26%
Panel B: Z values of difference of percentage for educational background 　 　 　 　
　 Medical Law Fin/RE Arts Com/busi Engi Sci/Tech Acc
Mgmt/mk
t Comp/IT Agri/Far Others
1995 - 2000 -1.56 0.40 -0.61 0.43 -1.37 2.28 -0.92 -0.20 0.31 1.31 -0.04 -0.62
**
2000 - 2007 1.09 0.52 -3.08 1.58 0.35 1.44 0.17 -2.71 1.08 -0.31 -0.97 2.17
**** *** **
1995 - 2007 -0.84 0.88 -3.02 1.89 -1.14 3.78 -0.82 -2.54 1.29 1.11 -0.88 1.27
**** * **** *** *
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 34
Director Educational and Industrial Background (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for industrial background　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Year
N
Firms
N
Director
-ships Legal
Food / 
bever Finance
Industrial/
Construction Business
Medical/
Health Consultant Mgmt/Mkt Engi/Sci
1995 50 362 4.32% 1.88% 14.82% 7.32% 12.76% 1.88% 9.01% 7.13% 2.44%
2000 66 440 4.11% 2.99% 13.22% 7.98% 12.97% 2.62% 8.73% 6.61% 2.99%
2007 98 578 4.72% 2.76% 14.35% 5.08% 9.71% 2.32% 9.36% 9.89% 2.85%
Logis / 
Transp
Retailing/
Manuf Account
Agri/
Far IT/Tech Invmt
Govt/
Politics Telecom Media Others
3.75% 3.00% 9.38% 5.82% 1.69% 3.94% 6.19% 0.94% 1.31% 2.44%
1.62% 3.12% 1.15% 3.62% 2.37% 6.11% 3.12% 1.12% 1.50% 3.74%
1.87% 4.19% 6.06% 16.67% 1.78% 1.96% 1.52% 0.89% 0.98% 3.03%
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Table 34
Director Educational and Industrial Background (continued)
Panel D: Z values of difference of percentage for industrial background
Year Legal
Food/ 
bever Finance
Industrial /
Construction Business Medical/Health Consultant Mgmt/Mkt Engi/Sci
1995 - 2000 0.18 -1.27 0.83 -0.44 -0.11 -0.88 0.17 0.37 -0.60
2000 - 2007 -0.64 0.30 -0.71 2.58 2.24 0.42 -0.47 -2.54 0.18
** ** **
1995 - 2007 -0.37 -1.08 0.26 1.82 1.87 -0.57 -0.23 -1.84 -0.48
* * *
Panel D: Z values of difference of percentage for industrial background
Year
Logis /
Transp
Retailing/
Manuf Account
Agri /
Farm IT/Tech Invmt
Govt /
Politics Telecom Media Others
1995 - 2000 2.46 -0.12 -1.21 1.90 -0.85 -1.74 2.70 -0.32 -0.28 -1.32
** * * ***
2000 - 2007 -0.41 -1.22 4.24 -8.94 0.90 4.76 2.37 0.51 1.03 0.86
*** **** **** **
1995 - 2007 2.30 -1.18 2.45 -6.10 -0.14 2.36 5.19 0.09 0.61 -0.68
** ** **** ** ****
163
Table 26
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors
Panels A and C each exhibit summary statistics for the percentage of categories of education and industry within which directors are qualified and worked, conditioned by 
sectors defined by NZX. 1= Agriculture & Fishing; 2 = Building Materials & Construction; 3 = Consumer; 4 = Energy Processing; 5 = Finance & Others Services; 6 = Food 
& Beverages; 7 = Forestry & Forest Products; 8 = Investments; 9 = Leisure & Tourism; 10 = Media & Telecommunication; 11 = Mining; 12 = Ports; 13 = Property; 14 =  
Textiles & Apparel; 15 = Transport; 16 = Intermediate & Durables. Panels B and D each reports the results of parametric tests for differences in the percentage across sample  
years.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Educational Background
Year Sector
N
Firm
s
N
Director
-ships Medical Law Fin/RE Arts
Com/
busi Engi Sci/Tech Acc
Mgmt/mk
t Comp/IT Agri/Far Others
1995 1 4 24 0.00% 13.95% 4.65% 4.65% 13.95% 0.00% 6.98% 23.26% 13.95% 4.65% 6.98% 6.98%
2000 1 5 19 0.00% 6.90% 3.45% 0.00% 27.59% 0.00% 3.45% 24.14% 13.79% 3.45% 13.79% 3.45%
2007 1 8 33 0.00% 6.85% 2.74% 1.37% 28.77% 1.37% 10.96% 17.81% 15.07% 2.74% 12.33% 0.00%
1995 3 & 14 8 34 0.00% 7.35% 1.47% 4.41% 33.82% 10.29% 4.41% 14.71% 20.59% 2.94% 0.00% 0.00%
2000 3 & 14 6 33 1.56% 12.50% 0.00% 6.25% 28.13% 3.13% 4.69% 23.44% 17.19% 1.56% 1.56% 0.00%
2007 3 & 14 13 50 3.00% 10.00% 3.00% 5.00% 27.00% 2.00% 7.00% 24.00% 16.00% 1.00% 2.00% 0.00%
1995 4 & 11 4 15 0.00% 26.09% 0.00% 4.35% 17.39% 13.04% 8.70% 17.39% 13.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2000 4 & 11 7 37 0.00% 10.77% 3.08% 7.69% 13.85% 16.92% 16.92% 10.77% 13.85% 0.00% 0.00% 6.15%
2007 4 & 11 10 51 0.00% 9.38% 3.13% 6.25% 25.00% 10.42% 10.42% 20.83% 11.46% 1.04% 1.04% 1.04%
1995 5 & 13 9 50 1.14% 5.68% 0.00% 7.95% 17.05% 14.77% 6.82% 21.59% 17.05% 4.55% 2.27% 1.14%
2000 5 & 13 12 53 2.06% 10.31% 1.03% 5.15% 28.87% 9.28% 6.19% 16.49% 17.53% 1.03% 1.03% 1.03%
2007 5 & 13 23 86 0.63% 10.69% 6.92% 3.77% 25.16% 2.52% 5.66% 28.30% 9.43% 4.40% 2.52% 0.00%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Educational Background (continued)
Year Sector
N
Firm
s
N
Director
-ships Medical Law Fin/RE Arts Com/busi Engi Sci/Tech Acc
Mgmt/mk
t Comp/IT Agri/Far Others
1995 6 & 10 6 23 0.00% 7.69% 0.00% 2.56% 35.90% 10.26% 12.82% 12.82% 15.38% 2.56% 0.00% 0.00%
2000 6 & 10 10 53 1.01% 11.11% 2.02% 8.08% 31.31% 7.07% 6.06% 15.15% 15.15% 1.01% 1.01% 1.01%
2007 6 & 10 10 37 0.00% 16.67% 2.08% 6.25% 22.92% 0.00% 10.42% 29.17% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1995 8 0 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2000 8 5 23 0.00% 5.56% 1.85% 5.56% 29.63% 0.00% 11.11% 14.81% 22.22% 1.85% 0.00% 7.41%
2007 8 12 52 0.00% 6.74% 6.74% 3.37% 22.47% 2.25% 3.37% 26.97% 16.85% 5.62% 1.12% 4.49%
1995 12 & 15 5 24 0.00% 17.50% 0.00% 10.00% 10.00% 12.50% 5.00% 17.50% 7.50% 5.00% 5.00% 10.00%
2000 12 & 15 8 40 2.30% 11.49% 0.00% 9.20% 19.54% 3.45% 6.90% 18.39% 12.64% 6.90% 3.45% 5.75%
2007 12 & 15 5 23 0.00% 8.33% 5.56% 2.78% 19.44% 8.33% 8.33% 19.44% 11.11% 0.00% 8.33% 8.33%
1995 16 5 20 0.00% 14.63% 0.00% 12.20% 9.76% 17.07% 0.00% 21.95% 17.07% 4.88% 0.00% 2.44%
2000 16 4 18 2.56% 7.69% 0.00% 0.00% 25.64% 17.95% 5.13% 20.51% 15.38% 2.56% 2.56% 0.00%
2007 16 9 43 1.23% 7.41% 1.23% 4.94% 25.93% 16.05% 7.41% 17.28% 17.28% 1.23% 0.00% 0.00%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel B: Z values of difference of percentage for Educational Background       
Year Sector Medical Law Fin/RE Arts Com/busi Engi Sci/Tech Acc Mgmt/mkt Comp/IT Agri/Far Others
1995 - 2000 1 n/a 0.74 0.20 0.95 -1.11 n/a 0.51 -0.07 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.51
2000 - 2007 1 n/a 0.01 0.14 -0.51 -0.09 -0.51 -0.95 0.55 -0.13 0.05 0.10 1.07
1995 - 2007 1 n/a 0.89 0.39 0.75 -1.32 -0.58 -0.51 0.51 -0.12 0.05 0.08 1.54
1995 - 2000 3 & 14 -0.73 -0.71 0.70 -0.34 0.50 1.17 -0.05 -0.91 0.38 0.36 -0.73 -0.73 
2000 - 2007 3 & 14 -0.42 0.36 -1.00 0.25 0.11 0.33 -0.44 -0.06 0.23 0.14 -0.15 -0.15 
1995 - 2007 3 & 14 -1.02 -0.42 -0.46 -0.13 0.68 1.71 -0.50 -1.05 0.68 0.55 -0.83 -0.83 
1995 - 2000 4 & 11 n/a 1.40 -0.69 -0.44 0.33 -0.35 -0.76 0.65 -0.08 n/a n/a -0.98 
2000 - 2007 4 & 11 n/a 0.22 -0.01 0.27 -1.30 0.90 0.90 -1.26 0.34 -0.63 -0.63 1.35 
1995 - 2007 4 & 11 n/a 1.68 -0.69 -0.28 -0.61 0.29 -0.20 -0.29 0.17 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel B: Z values of difference of percentage for Educational Background (continued)       
Year Sector Medical Law Fin/RE Arts Com/busi Engi Sci/Tech Acc Mgmt/mkt Comp/IT Agri/Far Others
1995 - 2000 5 & 13 -0.38 -0.87 -0.72 0.59 -1.44 0.88 0.13 0.67 -0.07 1.12 0.51 0.05 
2000 - 2007 5 & 13 0.79 -0.07 -1.66 0.40 0.50 1.82 0.13 -1.64 1.45 -1.15 -0.64 0.97 
* *
1995 - 2007 5 & 13 0.32 -1.00 -1.90 1.06 -1.11 2.75 0.28 -0.87 1.32 0.04 -0.09 1.02 
* ***
1995 - 2000 6 & 10 -0.48 -0.46 -0.69 -0.91 0.40 0.48 1.01 -0.27 0.03 0.53 -0.48 -0.48 
2000 - 2007 6 & 10 0.61 -0.77 -0.02 0.33 0.89 1.65 -0.77 -1.64 0.36 0.61 0.61 0.61 
*
1995 - 2007 6 & 10 n/a -1.00 -0.70 -0.65 1.09 1.99 0.29 -1.47 0.32 0.98 n/a n/a
**
1995 - 2000 8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2000 - 2007 8 n/a -0.20 -0.88 0.45 0.67 -0.72 1.35 -1.16 0.56 -0.73 -0.51 0.52 
1995 - 2007 8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel B: Z values of difference of percentage for Educational Background (continued)      
Year Sector Medical Law Fin/RE Arts Com/busi Engi Sci/Tech Acc Mgmt/mkt Comp/IT Agri/Far Others
1995 - 2000 12 & 15 -0.75 0.68 n/a 0.11 -1.01 1.40 -0.31 -0.09 -0.65 -0.31 0.31 0.64 
2000 - 2007 12 & 15 0.73 0.40 -1.52 0.97 0.01 -0.84 -0.21 -0.10 0.18 1.29 -0.84 -0.40 
1995 - 2007 12 & 15 n/a 0.93 -1.17 1.01 -0.92 0.47 -0.46 -0.17 -0.43 1.09 -0.46 0.20 
1995 - 2000 16 -0.72 0.69 n/a 1.57 -1.31 -0.07 -1.03 0.11 0.14 0.38 -0.72 0.69 
2000 - 2007 16 0.38 0.04 -0.49 -0.99 -0.02 0.19 -0.33 0.30 -0.18 0.38 1.05 n/a
1995 - 2007 16 -0.50 0.90 -0.50 1.03 -1.47 0.10 -1.25 0.44 -0.02 0.88 n/a 1.03 
              
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Industrial Background        
Year Sector N
N
Directorships Legal Food
Finance/
RE
Industr/
Constr Busi
Medical/
Health Consult Mgmt/Mkt Engi/Sci
1995 1 5 42 1.96% 0.00% 11.76% 1.96% 15.69% 0.00% 9.80% 3.92% 0.00%
2000 1 6 45 1.69% 5.08% 15.25% 0.00% 8.47% 1.69% 8.47% 3.39% 0.00%
2007 1 9 67 4.21% 10.53% 11.58% 1.05% 8.42% 2.11% 9.47% 9.47% 3.16%
1995 3 & 14 8 59 1.98% 0.99% 13.86% 0.99% 9.90% 0.99% 9.90% 8.91% 1.98%
2000 3 & 14 6 43 3.17% 7.94% 7.94% 3.17% 15.87% 4.76% 4.76% 14.29% 1.59%
2007 3 & 14 12 77 5.34% 2.29% 15.27% 2.29% 9.16% 5.34% 7.63% 15.27% 1.53%
1995 4 & 11 6 32 8.89% 0.00% 6.67% 24.44% 11.11% 2.22% 8.89% 11.11% 4.44%
2000 4 & 11 7 46 4.72% 0.00% 7.55% 27.36% 9.43% 1.89% 7.55% 9.43% 8.49%
2007 4 & 11 11 70 6.56% 1.64% 12.30% 29.51% 9.84% 0.82% 11.48% 6.56% 3.28%
1995 5 & 13 8 57 3.85% 0.00% 23.08% 0.96% 13.46% 4.81% 9.62% 7.69% 2.88%
2000 5 & 13 17 93 4.73% 0.59% 20.71% 4.73% 14.20% 4.14% 13.02% 6.51% 1.78%
2007 5 & 13 19 103 7.18% 1.10% 23.20% 2.76% 11.60% 3.87% 10.50% 11.60% 2.21%
Table 35
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Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Industrial Background (continued)       
Year Sector N
N
Directorships
Logis/
Transp
Retail/
Manuf Acc
Agri/
Farm IT/Tech Invmt
Govt/
Politics Others
1995 1 5 42 3.92% 1.96% 19.61% 21.57% 0.00% 3.92% 3.92% 0.00%
2000 1 6 45 3.39% 1.69% 13.56% 25.42% 0.00% 6.78% 5.08% 0.00%
2007 1 9 67 0.00% 4.21% 4.21% 23.16% 1.05% 4.21% 2.11% 1.05%
1995 3 & 14 8 59 0.99% 6.93% 18.81% 1.98% 1.98% 0.99% 7.92% 10.89%
2000 3 & 14 6 43 0.00% 17.46% 6.35% 0.00% 0.00% 3.17% 3.17% 6.35%
2007 3 & 14 12 77 1.53% 9.16% 7.63% 0.76% 0.76% 3.05% 0.76% 12.21%
1995 4 & 11 6 32 2.22% 0.00% 13.33% 0.00% 2.22% 4.44% 0.00% 0.00%
2000 4 & 11 7 46 0.94% 3.77% 6.60% 0.00% 0.00% 3.77% 4.72% 3.77%
2007 4 & 11 11 70 2.46% 4.10% 4.92% 2.46% 1.64% 0.00% 0.82% 1.64%
1995 5 & 13 8 57 0.00% 2.88% 12.50% 7.69% 0.00% 3.85% 3.85% 2.88%
2000 5 & 13 17 93 0.00% 1.18% 5.33% 0.00% 4.73% 8.28% 1.78% 8.28%
2007 5 & 13 19 103 0.55% 4.42% 9.94% 2.21% 1.10% 2.21% 1.10% 4.42%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Industrial Background (continued)       
Year Sector N
N
Directorships Legal Food
Finance/
RE
Industr/
Constr Busi
Medical/
Health Consult Mgmt/Mkt Engi/Sci
1995 6 & 10 8 57 5.88% 6.86% 13.73% 7.84% 11.76% 1.96% 4.90% 5.88% 1.96%
2000 6 & 10 10 68 5.51% 7.87% 12.60% 11.02% 14.17% 1.57% 11.81% 5.51% 2.36%
2007 6 & 10 11 58 2.91% 7.77% 15.53% 1.94% 17.48% 0.00% 11.65% 12.62% 1.94%
1995 8 0 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2000 8 3 15 3.23% 3.23% 22.58% 0.00% 16.13% 0.00% 9.68% 0.00% 6.45%
2007 8 7 44 3.16% 2.11% 26.32% 3.16% 10.53% 2.11% 11.58% 10.53% 4.21%
1995 12 & 15 6 51 4.90% 1.96% 8.82% 7.84% 11.76% 0.98% 4.90% 2.94% 3.92%
2000 12 & 15 9 70 7.45% 3.19% 10.64% 4.26% 15.96% 4.26% 7.45% 4.26% 3.19%
2007 12 & 15 12 51 8.57% 2.86% 11.43% 2.86% 12.86% 0.00% 15.71% 5.71% 1.43%
1995 16 7 49 2.86% 0.00% 14.29% 8.57% 8.57% 0.00% 14.29% 5.71% 0.00%
2000 16 5 31 1.47% 1.47% 10.29% 0.00% 13.24% 1.47% 10.29% 11.76% 4.41%
2007 16 12 78 3.79% 1.52% 12.88% 3.03% 8.33% 5.30% 13.64% 17.42% 7.58%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Industrial Background (continued)       
Year Sector N
N
Directorship
s
Logis/
Transp
Retail/
Manuf Acc
Agri/
Farm IT/Tech Invmt
Govt/
Politics Others
1995 6 & 10 8 57 1.96% 0.98% 13.73% 1.96% 2.94% 6.86% 5.88% 4.90%
2000 6 & 10 10 68 0.00% 2.36% 3.15% 0.00% 1.57% 6.30% 4.72% 9.45%
2007 6 & 10 11 58 1.94% 3.88% 3.88% 0.00% 0.97% 2.91% 1.94% 12.62%
1995 8 0 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2000 8 3 15 0.00% 3.23% 6.45% 3.23% 9.68% 9.68% 0.00% 6.45%
2007 8 7 44 3.16% 3.16% 10.53% 1.05% 1.05% 3.16% 2.11% 2.11%
1995 12 & 15 6 51 13.73% 1.96% 11.76% 6.86% 0.98% 3.92% 11.76% 0.98%
2000 12 & 15 9 70 10.64% 3.19% 10.64% 4.26% 0.00% 4.26% 5.32% 1.06%
2007 12 & 15 12 51 14.29% 0.00% 5.71% 8.57% 0.00% 0.00% 7.14% 2.86%
1995 16 7 49 0.00% 5.71% 20.00% 2.86% 2.86% 2.86% 2.86% 8.57%
2000 16 5 31 0.00% 0.00% 10.29% 13.24% 7.35% 10.29% 0.00% 4.41%
2007 16 12 78 0.00% 6.82% 4.55% 0.76% 7.58% 3.03% 1.52% 2.27%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel D: Z values of difference of percentage for Industrial Background      
Year Sector Legal Food Finance/RE Industr/Constr Busi Medical/Health Consult Mgmt/Mkt Engi/Sci
1995 - 2000 1 0.09 -1.48 -0.47 0.94 1.04 -0.85 0.22 0.13 n/a
2000 - 2007 1 -0.74 -1.02 0.57 -0.69 0.01 -0.15 -0.18 -1.23 -1.20 
1995 - 2007 1 -0.64 -2.17 0.03 0.39 1.17 -0.95 0.06 -1.08 -1.16 
**
1995 - 2000 3 & 14 -0.38 -1.79 0.93 -0.80 -0.90 -1.19 0.96 -0.85 0.15 
*
2000 - 2007 3 & 14 -0.55 1.46 -1.16 0.29 1.10 -0.14 -0.61 -0.14 0.03 
1995 - 2007 3 & 14 -1.01 -0.58 -0.23 -0.58 0.15 -1.38 0.47 -1.11 0.20 
1995 - 2000 4 & 11 0.74 n/a -0.15 -0.29 0.24 0.10 0.21 0.24 -0.70 
2000 - 2007 4 & 11 -0.41 -0.87 -0.82 -0.25 -0.07 0.51 -0.69 0.57 1.22 
1995 - 2007 4 & 11 0.42 -0.73 -0.86 -0.53 0.20 0.59 -0.39 0.79 0.29 
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel D: Z values of difference of percentage for Industrial Background (continued)     
Year Sector Logis/Transp Retail/Manuf Acc Agri/Farm IT/Tech Invmt Govt/Politics Others
1995 - 2000 1 0.13 0.09 0.76 -0.42 n/a -0.59 -0.26 n/a
2000 - 2007 1 1.52 -0.74 1.79 0.27 -0.69 0.60 0.87 -0.69 
*
1995 - 2007 1 1.63 -0.64 2.59 -0.19 -0.67 -0.07 0.56 -0.67 
1995 - 2000 3 & 14 0.65 -1.65 1.82 0.93 0.93 -0.80 1.00 0.79 
* *
2000 - 2007 3 & 14 -0.81 1.34 -0.26 -0.57 -0.57 0.04 1.00 -1.02 
1995 - 2007 3 & 14 -0.27 -0.47 1.95 0.62 0.62 -0.82 2.15 -0.24 
* **
1995 - 2000 4 & 11 0.46 -1.11 1.00 n/a 1.02 0.15 -1.25 -1.11 
2000 - 2007 4 & 11 -0.59 -0.09 0.39 -1.07 -0.87 1.64 1.35 0.72 
1995 - 2007 4 & 11 -0.07 -1.16 1.49 -0.89 0.20 1.78 -0.51 -0.73 
*
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel D: Z values of difference of percentage for Industrial Background (continued)      
Year Sector Legal Food Finance/RE Industr/Constr Busi Medical/Health Consult Mgmt/Mkt Engi/Sci
1995 - 2000 5 & 13 -0.26 -0.58 0.34 -1.26 -0.13 0.19 -0.63 0.28 0.45 
2000 - 2007 5 & 13 -0.72 -0.39 -0.42 0.73 0.54 0.10 0.55 -1.23 -0.22 
1995 - 2007 5 & 13 -0.85 -0.80 -0.02 -0.76 0.34 0.28 -0.18 -0.78 0.26 
1995 - 2000 6 & 10 0.09 -0.21 0.19 -0.60 -0.40 0.16 -1.37 0.09 -0.15 
2000 - 2007 6 & 10 0.72 0.02 -0.47 2.01 -0.51 0.96 0.03 -1.41 0.16 
1995 - 2007 6 & 10 0.78 -0.19 -0.27 1.47 -0.87 1.07 -1.31 -1.25 0.01 
1995 - 2000 8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2000 - 2007 8 0.01 0.25 -0.29 -0.70 0.58 -0.57 -0.20 -1.31 0.35 
1995 - 2007 8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
           
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel D: Z values of difference of percentage for Industrial Background (continued)     
Year Sector Logis/Transp Retail/Manuf Acc Agri/Farm IT/Tech Invmt Govt/Politics Others
1995 - 2000 5 & 13 n/a 0.75 1.57 2.71 -1.67 -1.06 0.78 -1.33 
*** *
2000 - 2007 5 & 13 -0.72 -1.35 -1.21 -1.44 1.53 1.93 0.40 1.12 
1995 - 2007 5 & 13 -0.56 -0.48 0.50 1.66 -0.80 0.60 1.16 -0.48 
*
1995 - 2000 6 & 10 1.16 -0.59 2.17 1.16 0.52 0.13 0.29 -0.97 
**
2000 - 2007 6 & 10 -1.15 -0.49 -0.22 n/a 0.30 0.89 0.85 -0.57 
1995 - 2007 6 & 10 0.01 -1.01 1.87 1.07 0.76 0.98 1.09 -1.46 
*
1995 - 2000 8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2000 - 2007 8 -0.70 0.01 -0.46 0.58 1.63 1.02 -0.57 0.82 
1995 - 2007 8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel D: Z values of difference of percentage for Industrial Background (continued)      
Year Sector Legal Food Finance/RE Industr/Constr Busi Medical/Health Consult Mgmt/Mkt Engi/Sci
1995 - 2000 12 & 15 -0.57 -0.41 -0.33 0.84 -0.65 -1.06 -0.57 -0.38 0.22 
2000 - 2007 12 & 15 -0.23 0.11 -0.14 0.40 0.48 1.49 -1.44 -0.37 0.62 
1995 - 2007 12 & 15 -0.74 -0.30 -0.44 1.12 -0.17 0.71 -1.80 -0.69 0.78 
1995 - 2000 16 0.40 -0.85 0.52 1.67 -0.67 -0.85 0.52 -0.97 -1.48 
*
2000 - 2007 16 -0.63 -0.02 -0.37 -0.98 0.78 -0.90 -0.47 -0.73 -0.60 
1995 - 2007 16 -0.28 -0.87 0.23 1.37 0.05 -1.64 0.10 -1.92 -1.97 
         * ** 
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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Table 35
Director Educational and Industrial Background by Sectors (continued)
Panel B: Z values of difference of percentage      
Year Sector Logis/Transp Retail/Manuf Acc Agri/Farm IT/Tech Invmt Govt/Politics Others
1995 - 2000 12 & 15 0.52 -0.41 0.19 0.63 0.83 -0.09 1.29 -0.04 
 
2000 - 2007 12 & 15 -0.61 1.29 0.96 -0.98 n/a 1.49 -0.41 -0.73 
1995 - 2007 12 & 15 -0.08 1.00 1.08 -0.32 0.71 1.43 0.80 -0.69 
1995 - 2000 16 n/a 1.35 1.15 -1.79 -0.94 -1.39 0.95 0.71 
*
2000 - 2007 16 n/a -1.49 1.12 2.90 -0.04 1.56 -0.69 0.60 
1995 - 2007 16 n/a -0.25 2.76 0.93 -1.11 -0.06 0.52 1.63 
  ***      
significance * 10% ** 5% *** 1% **** 0.5%
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5 Conclusion
During  the  examination  period  of  1995  and  2007,  board  characteristics  have 
significantly changed in NZ listed firms. Many of these characteristics show primary 
changes between 2000 and 2007, a period that experienced major corporate scandals 
followed  by  global  governance  legislative  reforms,  including  NZ.  Hence,  it  is 
reasonable  to  propose  that  changes  happening  within  the  corporate  boards  of  NZ 
listed  firms  could  be  influenced  by  the  global  recognition  of  better  corporate 
governance systems. In addition, the contribution of this study is to fill out the gap to 
report board characteristics of NZ listed firms since 1996.
Within  the  fifteen  characteristics  examined,  all  except  board  ownership  have 
demonstrated  significant  transformation  during  the  thirteen  years.  Among  those 
changed, the most prominent are reductions in board size, multiple directorships by 
each director and growth in director fees, board diversity, and director tenure. Those 
which experienced less significant changes are board independence, staggered board 
frequency,  meeting  frequency,  and  CEO  involvement  on  committees.  Board 
independence  and  committee  meeting  frequency  have  increased  during  1995  and 
2007,  while  staggered  board  incidence,  board  meeting  incidence  and  CEO 
involvement on committees are decreasing in popularity in corporate boards in NZ 
listed  firms.  In  addition,  the  level  of  compensation  for  chairmen  has  increased 
modestly while the CEO duality phenomenon has shrunk.
After datasets are conditioned into different size groups for each variable, small firms 
have undergone more changes than the other two size groups. This is understood as 
meaning that the characteristic of small boards inside small firms might not permit the 
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board to be completely legislation-oriented. In other words, there are limitations on 
small firms being able to completely obey the best corporate governance rules. For 
example, if there are only three directors on board, it would be pointless to construct 
an audit committee. Rather, issues can be addressed by the whole board. Therefore, 
board  structures  inside  small  firms  might  be  looser  compared  to  larger  firms. 
However,  the  subsequent  more  restricted  governance  rules  could  have  impacted 
largely on board structures inside small  firms so that changes occurring mostly in 
small firms can be expected. 
This study does not address the quality of good corporate governance characteristics. 
It  simply  presents  those  factors  that  have  received  quantitative  investigation  and 
attention  from  academic  scholars  and  institutional  investors,  which  reflect  the 
importance of their roles in the corporate governance framework. However, it does 
not explain the actual impacts of these characteristics examined on firm values. It also 
does not justify the relationship between all these changes and the new legislative 
reform  which  happened  around  2004.  This  may  well  be  a  good  future  area  for 
research.
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